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Abstract
Machines That Learn: Aesthetics of Adaptive Behaviors in Agent-based Art
Jean-Sébastien Senécal, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2016
Since the post-war era, artists have been exploring the use of embodied, artiﬁcial agents. This
artistic activity runs parallel to research in computer science, in domains such as Cybernetics,
Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Artiﬁcial Life. This thesis oﬀers an account of a particular facet of this
broader work — namely, a study of the artistic practice of agent-based, adaptive computational
artistic installations that make use of Machine Learning methods. Machine Learning is a sub-ﬁeld
of the computer science area of Artiﬁcial Intelligence that employs mathematical models to classify
and make predictions based on data or experience rather than on logical rules.
These artworks that integrate Machine Learning into their structures raise a number of impor-
tant questions: (1) What new forms of aesthetic experience do Machine Learning methods enable
or make possible when utilized outside of their intended context, and are instead carried over into
artistic works? (2) What characterizes the practice of using adaptive computational methods in
agent-based artworks? And ﬁnally, (3) what kind of worldview are these works fostering?
To address these questions, I examine the history of Machine Learning in both art and science, il-
lustrating how artists and engineers alike have made use of these methods historically. I also analyze
the deﬁning scientiﬁc characteristics of Machine Learning through a practitioner’s lens, concretely
articulating how properties of Machine Learning interplay in media artworks that behave and evolve
in real time. I later develop a framework for understanding machine behaviors based on the mor-
phological aspects of the temporal unfolding of agent behaviors as a tool for comprehending both
adaptive and non-adaptive behaviors in works of art. Finally, I expose how adaptive technologies
suggest a new worldview for art that accounts for the performative engagement of agents adapting
to one another, which implies a certain way of losing control in the face of the indeterminacy and
the unintelligibility of alien agencies and their behaviors.
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My fascination for nonhuman agencies goes back to my childhood. In the ﬁrst seven years of my
life, I was an only child, and I believe that I was uniquely good at it. Being very much so a calm
and solitary kid, I did not need nor seek out friends of my age, as I seemed to get along better with
adults and things. One of my favorite activities, besides reading books and ﬁddling with LEGO
blocks, was to play board games. While the games I enjoyed most were meant to be played socially,
I immensely preferred to play alone, and for that to work I needed to invent an opposing player,
whom I would quite unimaginatively call “L’Autre” (“The Other”). “L’Autre” was a smart player
of course — almost as smart as I was — and he often oﬀered a challenging battle, although he
always ended up losing, either because of bad luck or — when the die were rolling too much in his
favor — due to some bad decisions he would make in the mid-game.
Fast-forward a few decades later. Upon entering the University of Montreal in my early twenties,
I was quickly hooked by computer programming, and in particular by Object-Oriented Programming
(OOP). During my ﬁrst Java class, I started building a software library for making artiﬁcial beings
as soon as I learned about class inheritance and packages, which was more of an abstract fantasy
than anything and never really achieved much. In my second year, I read an interview about
Machine Learning with Yoshua Bengio in the student departmental journal. I was immediately
excited by the idea of computational processes able to make inferences, to come up with their own
decisions, by interpreting real-life data. Machine Learning seemed to be a much more promising
approach to creating Artiﬁcial Intelligence than the kind of rule-based logic I was seeing in my
programming classes.
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I started doing research with Yoshua during the Summer, and when I ﬁnished my B. Sc. I
pursued a M. Sc. in his lab, studying neural networks applied to natural language modeling (Bengio
and Senécal 2003; Bengio et al. 2006). I was especially enthralled by the spectacle of watching the
error rate lowering during stochastic gradient descent. I imagined the neuronal connections self-
adjusting as megabytes of English sentences from the Brown Corpus was fed into the system. I
pictured the system as an artiﬁcial entity who tentatively tried to make sense of all of this text,
exploring the millions of dimensions of the error space, self-organizing both semantic and syntactic
information in a global, distributed network of subsymbolic representations.1 I always perceived
these systems as alive, in their own way, as possessing agency, years before I even know anything
about Cybernetics and Artiﬁcial Life.
When I ﬁnished my degree and was oﬀered a pretty sweet deal for pursuing doctoral studies
in the area, I found myself in a diﬃcult spot. I loved the work — at least, the creative part of
it — but not the environment. The science itself was fascinating, but what seemed to come with
it was less attractive: I perceived a very competitive and somewhat “macho” culture pervaded
by rampant libertarianism, techno-utopianism, and a relative lack of interest in the philosophical
and socioeconomic repercussions of the technologies we were developing. This, aligned with a
generalized absence of self-scrutiny and self-criticism with respect to the entanglement of science
with what were to me questionable endeavors such as ﬁnancial computing or marketing which had
alienated me since my ﬁrst day in the lab, pushed me to quit the ﬁeld.
I created my ﬁrst art installation in 2004 in collaboration with fellow developers and artist
Jonathan Villeneuve. The piece, which was created as part of a one-night multidisciplinary event
for emerging artists, was an interactive video work where the audience’s faces would get recognized
through the use of a homemade implementation of a cutting-edge Machine Learning algorithm,
and transformed using concave and convex distortions. It was really simple, quite silly in fact,
but surprisingly eﬃcient in drawing people into an interactive experience. What attracted me the
1The model I studied during my Master involved a Multi-Layer Perceptron feedforward neural network with
eighty (80) hidden units, with millions of self-adjusting weights, which is relatively small by current standards. My
Thesis focused on a technique for accelerating the training of such networks using importance sampling. Even with
that acceleration method, in those years, it needed to run on a cluster of 20 CPUs for weeks in order to return
results (Senécal 2003).
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most to the experience was how the audience engaged with the work, using it in unexpected ways,
exploiting its imperfections. That night, I decided I wanted to become an artist. In the coming
years, I would, indeed, dedicate myself fully to this enterprise.
Changing disciplines is somewhat similar to moving into a new country. You need to learn new
languages. You discover a lot about yourself through another culture’s eyes. And yet, you never
ever really feel at home anywhere anymore. An emerging artist in the mid–2000s, I was lucky to
ﬁnd in Montreal’s blooming new media art scene an extremely welcoming and generous community.
At ﬁrst I just wanted to put my knowledge in Machine Learning to use in my work, but this
in turn constrained the possibilities for me to explore artistically, at a time where I needed, on the
contrary, to “open up”. So I decided to avoid using Machine Learning in my pieces, because I found
that it limited my perspective as an artist. For more than ﬁve years, my brain had been trained
to do science: now I needed to rewire it to be more of an “artist’s brain”, or maybe to develop
another part of it. It was rather schizophrenic in a way, and it took me years to develop another
way of thinking and being. Eventually these two realms inside my psyche, which were separated at
ﬁrst, came to reconnect in ways that are hard to explain, the result of which is what makes me feel
constantly a bit like an outsider both in art and science — like an immigrant never feels at home
even when traveling in his country of origin.
My early works consisted in artistic software-based works based on dynamic models of social
and life processes. While interactive and computational in nature, these works stemmed from
my original interests in adaptive intelligent systems and natural language processing, and were
mostly an attempt to generate a poetic representation of some aspect of reality. My work with
the Drone collective — a Montreal-based group of practictioners consisting of three programmers
(Mathieu Guindon, Julien Keable, and myself), an electronics engineer (Samuel St-Aubin) and a
visual artist (Jonathan Villeneuve) — was centered on dynamic sketches of social interactions, such
as dialogue (Vélodrame, 2005) and tourism (Travel Agent, 2005). In the web-based software artwork
CHARACTERS (2005–2006), a game based on the deﬁnition and evolution of real and ﬁctitious
identities is put forward within the constraining framework of an online dictionary.
In 2005 I started a M. A. in Communication at Université du Québec à Montréal (UQÀM) in
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was also my ﬁrst work using reinforcement learning. It consisted of an old speaker attached to a
handheld microphone. The interactive agent’s only possible actions were to stay silent or emit a
digital sound which was parameterized by a simple genetic algorithm, thus allowing an evolution
of variety.
People could interact with the system by speaking into a microphone. The interactive agent
would cycle through two diﬀerent states, one where it would seek company and another where it
would try to be alone. How to achieve these two goals was left to the agent to ﬁgure out. Typically,
after a certain time, it would learn to attract spectators and respond to them using its “voice” when
it wanted company, while staying silent when seeking solitude.
My experience with Drift would bring important changes to my artistic practice of the time.
My contact with electronics and especially the Arduino platform opened up the possibility for a
new approach to art through direct interventions in real-life using small, autonomous electronics
objects rather than representing processes within the safe and artiﬁcial realm of the gallery walls.
Figure 2: Drift (2007), V2 Institute for the Unstable Media, Rotterdam, Netherlands. Photo by
Soﬁan Audry.
During the years to come, I would steadily move my practice towards what I call an agent-based
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practice, where in essence, my approach as an artist is to design an artiﬁcial agency. Here, “agent”
is to be taken in its very general sense, of an entity or process that is able to act in an environment
in response to its own perceptions. Moreover, these developments slowly brought back the idea of
learning, which through the project Absences (described in chapter 4) would prove to be crucial
component of my research in understanding the aesthetics of such agents.
Related to the concept of agent is that of behavior, which is understood here as the observable
patterns that agents produce beyond their physical appearance. One can see how this idea directly
resonates with computationalism, a philosophical view that understands cognitive processes as di-
rectly derived from algorithms (software) operated by the brain (hardware), and holds that human
performance is completely independent of the material substrate that implements it (i.e., the body).
But this concept of behavior need not be understood within this reductionist framework, and should
rather be embraced by considering behaviors as the perceived performance of an embodied entity
acting within its environment.
Computation is a central idea in new media, and could be perhaps the concept that distinguishes
it from other artforms. In particular, computing allow to produce another artistic medium through
the design of agents governed by algorithmic processes: an “aesthetics of behavior” (Penny 2000,
398). To make a parallel, if we compare video and photography and try to ﬁnd the most fundamental
properties that diﬀerentiates them, we can say that video, as a sequence of ﬁxed images, adds
to photography a third dimension: that of time. It does not mean that video is better than
photography, but this diﬀerence is crucial to understand how both these media work, the eﬀects
they can create, and how to use them.
When it comes to computational behaviors, which are activated by computer algorithms, we
are faced with something slightly diﬀerent than video. A video is delimited by a ﬁnite time period:
if you play it back, it will replay exactly the same sequence of images. A behavior is diﬀerent:
it can play for an inﬁnite amount of time and will never exactly repeat itself. Yet, despite the
inexhaustible nature of its manifestations, it is still recognizable by a human observer as a deﬁnite
thing. If we experience a behavior long enough, we can adapt to it, we can get to know it, and then
xii
the patterns will become familiar.3 Contrary to a mere record of agents’ behavioral patterns (such
as a video of birds ﬂocking), a behavior can be aﬀected by stimuli in real-time.
Agent-based artworks thus conjure “The Other”, an alien entity that evokes liveliness, suggesting
the emergence of novel aesthetic experiences. In seeking the creation of such experiences, I am
especially interested in the blurry and muddy aspects of these behavioral forms, the uncanny nature
that results from their imperfections, mirroring our own fragility as living beings. This might
explain why I am an artist and not a scientist: I am not after some kind of optimal path to some
objective truth, but rather, I believe in art’s potential to provide humanity with the truth of reﬂexive
becoming, the reﬂection of ourselves as imperfect and contradictory beings. Defect, faillibility, and
indeterminacy are the substance of life, and the essence of freedom.
But beyond the aesthetics of behavior lay an important question: What role do algorithms
themselves play when they are articulated through an embodied system? There is an important
assumption as the base of this research: that there is a relationship between the choice of the
algorithm governing an agent and the way this agent’s behavior is experienced by the audience. This
belief is supported by the fact that people are able to recognize behaviors beyond the appearance
of the agents they animate. For example, people recognize swarming patterns in dots moving on a
screen governed by a certain algorithm that behaves like a swarm (ﬁg. 3).
Figure 3: Swarming dots moving on the screen according to a swarming algorithm, as described in
(Reynolds 1987). Based on code by Daniel Shiﬀman (Shiﬀman 2012).
3As a comparison, consider the behavior of speaking a natural language. While the possible combinations of
words in a given grammatical structure in a given language are potentially inﬁnite, in such a way that it is highly
possible that the exact words that constitute this dissertation have never been written (ﬁngers crossed!) and will
never be written again in the history of the Universe, it remains that this thesis is recognizable as English writing,
and can be understood as such by an English reader.
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Does this mean there is always and automatically a relationship between an algorithm and how
it is perceived? No. While two diﬀerent algorithms will objectively yield diﬀerent outcomes, it does
not mean that these outcomes will be perceived diﬀerently by a human subject. For example, two
algorithms might both generate diﬀerent forms of noise, but they might be indistinguishable from
one another by a general audience; the same way, two diﬀerent “ﬂocking” algorithms might give
the same impression of “lifelikeness” to an audience without necessarily being discernable from one
another.
Does it mean that we can control the outcomes by changing the algorithm? This is the assump-
tion that this thesis makes, that it is indeed possible to do so, and that Machine Learning is a path
for accomplishing this when working with self-organizing agents evolving in the real world.
At its heart, this dissertation focuses on the challenge of harnessing aesthetic experience from
the building blocks of life, a story that keeps repeating itself, spanning diﬀerent time scales in the
history of humanity. It is a story of agents called genes who have traveled through millions of years,
adjusting themselves, ﬁghting and cooperating with others to survive through the organisms that
host them; of an ant colony ﬁnding a route to a new source of food; or of an artiﬁcial neural network
learning to pilot an automobile. It is the story of computationally evolved circuit boards that learn
to recognize sound signals using microscopic magnetic perturbations of completely disconnected
components, in ways that lay beyond human comprehension. This story is the story of all and
everyone of us, that of a child learning how to smile, move, walk, talk, and later, ride a bike, read,
make friends, step by step, through trial and error, exploring and exploiting its environment, set
on a road of becoming. It is about how our world is ﬁlled with agents that adapt to one another,
competing and collaborating in incommensurable ways that defy logical understanding. Exploring
this universal narrative — and the evocative aesthetic potentials it holds — is what I seek above
all in conducting in this research.
xiv
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When viewed on a long enough time scale, life forms are always changing, adjusting,
producing novel responses to unpredictable contingencies, adapting and evolving
through blindly opportunistic natural selection.
– Mark A. Bedau, The Nature of Life
There is no intelligence where there is no change and no need of change.
– H. G. Wells, The Time Machine
Since the 1960s, artists have been creating bodies of work using and/or inspired by computer
technologies. In this research, I am interested in a speciﬁc branch of artistic works that make
use of artiﬁcial agents, that is, man-made autonomous systems who act within their environment
in response to what their perceptions. Examples include pioneering cybernetic artworks such as
Nicholas Schöﬀer’s CYSP1 (1956) or Edward Ihnatowicz’s The Senster (1970—1974); more recent
works include Bill Vorn and Louis-Philippe Demers’ large-scale robotic piece La Cour des Miracles
(1997), Ken Rinaldo’s artiﬁcial life installation Autopoiesis (2000) and Yves Amu Klein’s “living
sculptures”. Artist and media theorist Simon Penny calls these kinds of work “embodied cultural
agents” or “agents as artworks” and integrates them within the larger framework of an “aesthetic of
behavior”: a “new aesthetic ﬁeld opened up by the possibility of cultural interaction with machine
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systems” (Penny 2000, 398). These works are distinct from so-called “generative art” or “algorithmic
art” which use computer algorithms to produce stabilized morphologies such as images and sound.
The former’s aesthetics are about the performance of a program as it unfolds temporally in the
world through a situated artiﬁcial body.
This project oﬀers an account of a particular facet of this broader work — namely, a study of
the artistic practice of agent-based, adaptive computational artistic installations that make use of
Machine Learning methods. Examining the cultural-social-technical repercussions that arise in the
use of such techniques in artistic works, I argue for an aesthetics of adaptive agents rooted in the
distinctive way their behavior evolves and stabilizes as they couple with their environment.
Machine Learning is a sub-ﬁeld of the computer science area of Artiﬁcial Intelligence. It employs
mathematical models that can classify and make predictions based on data or experience rather
than on logical rules. Learning systems usually consist of computational structures that adjust
themselves when submitted to large quantities of data. Machine Learning is directly related to
the biologically-rooted concept of adaptation which refers to a “process whereby a structure is
progressively modiﬁed to give better performance in its environment” (Holland 1992, 7).
A late oﬀspring of the cybernetic revolution, the ﬁeld of Machine Learning has experienced an
impressive growth since the mid–1990s. Its applications are extremely widespread and its success
in the era of “big data” since the beginning of the millenium has pervaded Artiﬁcial intelligence
research in areas such as pattern recognition, natural language processing, data mining, search
algorithms and robotics.
As a proof of the importance of the ﬁeld in contemporary society, consider the increased ac-
quisition of Machine Learning startups by major IT players like Google, Facebook and others. For
example, Geoﬀrey Hinton, the great-great-grandson of logician George Boole and an emeritus pro-
fessor at University of Toronto in the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Neural Networks, joined Google in 2013 as
Distinguished researcher. Yann LeCun, another eminent pioneer in the ﬁeld, was appointed in 2012
to be the ﬁrst director of Facebook AI Research in New York City while Andrew Ng, an authority
in the ﬁeld of Reinforcement Learning, became Chief Scientist at Baidu Research in Silicon Valley
in 2014. The year before, during Fall 2013, Ng’s Machine Learning class at Stanford was the most
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popular class on campus, enrolling more than 760 students (Markoﬀ 2013). His online class at-
tracted more than 100,000 students in 2011, contributing to the development of Stanford’s Massive
Open Online Courses and the founding of Coursera (Friedman 2012).
Although the impact of these technologies on contemporary society is still relatively elusive,
the debate surrounding them has reached the public sphere. In a recent appearance that made
headlines, physicist Stephen Hawking warned about the threats that AI and in particular Machine
Learning pose to the future of mankind. He signed an open letter asking for more control over AI
and made numerous claims in the media that the rapid development of Machine Learning could
allow us to reach human-level AI soon, possibly leading to human extinction.
Many researchers in the ﬁeld have since refuted his arguments, showing that research was actu-
ally not progressing as dramatically fast as Hawking claimed and that humankind should not worry
about an “AI singularity” happening in any foreseable future (Madrigal 2015). While Hawking’s
concerns seem largely unfounded, recent advances in Machine Learning research seem to have ag-
itated, in Western media, the classic fear of machine cognition outstripping human intelligence, a
sign that the widespread presence of AI is starting to gain public attention, for better or for worse.
While recent years have seen the ﬁeld of Machine Learning grow at an unprecedented rate, the
underlying idea of a computational system able to adapt to or learn from a ﬂow of observations
coming from real life is certainly not new. On the contrary, it recurs throughout the history of
computing, from early concepts of negative feedback in Cybernetics to evolutionary computation.
There has been a growing trend, since at least the late 1990s, to apply Machine Learning to the
ﬁelds of robotics and agent-based systems (Dorigo and Colombetti 1997; Riedmiller and Merke
2002; Quinlan 2006; Chalup, Murch, and Quinlan 2007). Reinforcement Learning, a branch of
Machine Learning dealing with agents adapting to their environment, is ﬁnally gaining momentum
after more than a decade of research (Soni and Singh 2006; Gu and Hu 2002). The advent of Deep
Learning in recent years suggest that this movement is not about to slow down (Mnih et al. 2013).
Despite this increased use of Machine Learning in many facets of contemporary industrial and
commercial culture, one site where it has not seemed to make a meaningful impact is the ﬁeld of
art practice. This seems odd, considering that the use of computational systems in art goes back
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to at least until the early 1950s. Indeed, it feels like interest within the arts has been focused on
techniques and concepts such as self-regulation, evolution and emergence, while there has been little
rigorous work on Machine Learning and Adaptive Computation by artists (Kac 1997; Penny 1997;
Tenhaaf 2000).
Why is this? The relatively recent popularization of Machine Learning in scientiﬁc communities
might partly explain it. Another factor that may have slowed the adoption of such techniques by
artists is the lack of access to the skills and knowledge required to utilize them. Moreover, there is
a problem of translation: these techniques have never been designed for artistic production, which
makes it particularly unclear for artists as to how they would even begin to use them in their own
domain. Finally, the concepts surrounding adaptive systems and their deﬁnitions are ﬂuid and
shifting depending on the context in which they are used. For example, the deﬁnition of concepts
such as “learning”, “adaptation” and even “AI” as they are used by artists more than often diﬀer
largely from their scientiﬁc descriptions. The presence of such approaches in artistic works is often
hard to trace because they are frequently used more as metaphors than as actual techniques.
Hence, while a signiﬁcant and increasing number of new media artworks are indeed employing
artiﬁcial agents, the vast majority of these agents are nonadaptive. Nevertheless, the integration of
such methods in new media artworks raises important questions that have powerful sociotechnical
and philosophical ramiﬁcations for aesthetic practice: (1) What new forms of aesthetic experience
do Machine Learning methods enable or make possible when utilized outside of their intended
context and are instead carried over into artistic works? (2) What characterizes the practice of
using adaptive computational methods in agent-based artworks? (3) And ﬁnally, what kind of
worldview are these works fostering?
These questions are hard to grasp, as they are solidly entangled with multiple disciplinary ﬁelds.
The category of artworks under consideration here are built around situated agents engaged in an
adaptive performance with their environment. But what exactly distinguishes them from systems
that share all their characteristics but which are not adaptive?
One potential key to this question lies in the intimate relationship between adaptivity and
performativity of a system. Adaptivity is what allows a system such as the brain to do things in
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the world. But the way a brain — and hence a human subject — performs is diﬀferent from the
way a drop of water or a grain of sand does.
Cognitive scientist Stevan Harnad provides a comprehensive explanation of this concept when
he talks about the importance of learning in category formation:
The adaptiveness comes in with the real-time history. Autonomous, adaptive sensori-
motor systems categorize when they respond diﬀerentially to diﬀerent kinds of input,
but the way to show that they are indeed adaptive systems — rather than just akin to
very peculiar and complex conﬁgurations of sand that merely respond (and have always
responded) diﬀerentially to diﬀerent kinds of input in the way ordinary sand responds
(and has always responded) to wind from diﬀerent directions — is to show that at one
time it was not so: that it did not always respond diﬀerentially as it does now. (Harnad
2005, 3)
I suggest that the use of Machine Learning in works of art is distinguished from nonadaptive
works in their temporal unfolding. Works based on nonadaptive autonomous agents are, in theory,
able to respond to interactions in real-time, often in complex ways. However, their behavior —
understood as the way they act in the world — remains ﬁxed over time, because the structure that
implements their actions remains unchanged. The behavior of such nonadaptive agents can surely
be convoluted and unpredictable, but more analogous to the way a grain of sand is carried by the
wind (responding to inputs in a manner that remains ﬁxed over time) than in the way a living
and/or cognizing agent acts (which changes temporally as it is confronted to its environment).
In fact, adaptive agents can move beyond given limitations because their structure itself at
a given moment is changeable in response to interaction with the world. An adaptive systems’
behavior at any given time is determined by a structure, such as a set of weights in a artiﬁcial
neural network or a digital DNA code in the case of genetic algorithms. When the agent acts in
its environment, for example through its motor system, it does so both in reaction to both sensory
data as well as its structural characteristics. Furthermore, this structural change is accomplished
with the intent of enabling the agent to perform its tasks more eﬀectively in the future. In other
words, the history of the agent’s interactions modiﬁes the its behavior: the past feeds the future.
But the diﬀerences do not stop there. Indeed, one of the important characteristics of Machine
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Learning algorithms (and especially the most recent advances) is their ability to represent the raw
data in a more compact, abstract, eﬃcient way (Bengio, Courville, and Vincent 2013). In other
words, recalling Harnad, their ability to categorize. These systems accomplish this in their own
unique way, thus the categories they create don’t necessarily correspond to what we would expect
as human beings. The responses from hidden neurons in a trained artiﬁcial neural network, for
example, are often hard to grasp, if not utterly incomprehensible to a human observer.
Based on both observation and experience, I argue that the strong representational power of
these systems, deﬁned along dimensional axes that highlight the invariances in sensory data, can
somehow be “felt” in the highly nonlinear behavioral patterns generated by these algorithms. This
uncanny feeling feeds on the same intricate dynamics that evoke our very own way of performing
into the world, nevertheless at the same time alien to us, as the behavior of such systems follows
convoluted rules that lie beyond human comprehension.
This resonates with composer Iannis Xenakis’ call for the application of scientiﬁc techniques
by artists for the generation of new morphologies (Xenakis 1981a). For Xenakis, art is a “crys-
tallization”, a “materialization” of human intelligence, wherein art is fundamentally engaged in
the same universal, deductive, and socio-cultural dynamics on which the sciences are founded. As
a manifestation of this claim, he notes the close historical ties between music and mathematics,
demonstrating how one cannot be dissociated from the other. Xenakis concludes that a new type
of artist is required, one who can freely use science and mathematics to create spatio-temporal
“shapes” that can only be understood as the constant interaction between function and structure.
What does this mean for artmaking in a contemporary moment of Machine Learning and AI?
This question is challenging to address, because the practice of adaptive agent-based artworks is
marked, ﬁrst and foremost, by a high degree of diversity in materials, subjects and outcomes.
In order to analyze the practical aspects of artworks that integrate these technologies into their
structures, I ﬁrst need to take into account the technical challenges inherent to Machine Learning
systems in the context of agent-based artistic installations. Namely, the diﬃculty to build big and
reliable data in artistic venues, the loss of locus of control by the artist, diﬃculties that come with
real-time adaptation and the lack of a descriptive framework for adaptive behaviors.
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An important feature of this genre of work lies in the constant tension that exists between the
scientiﬁc and the artistic perspective in the creative process. I concur with digital artist Marc
Downie on the importance of authorship in this matter: it is a common mistake to think that
the use of computational technologies could replace altogether the artist’s artistic input, and it is
crucial for artists to hold on to their aesthetic intentions (Downie 2005). This might be especially
true for Machine Learning technologies which largely consist of optimization techniques that were
never designed for artistic use.
The speciﬁc shape of adaptive behaviors that I have called attention to is not a magical trick but
rather a tool to be explored to achieve a certain eﬀect. Artists need to reﬂect from the beginning
on how the overall experience of a work will be related to the adaptive process, and in general, to
adopt a critical stance, in relationship to the technology.
It is useful here to stress that the speciﬁc aesthetic qualities of adaptive agents outlined above
are almost haphazard, in the sense that scientists working in the ﬁeld of Machine Learning typically
have very little interest in the shape of behaviors and how they unfold in time. Most Machine Learn-
ing algorithms run entirely oﬄine, training intricate mathematical models on huge, pre-compiled
databases of real-world data, with the sole objective of achieving a better performance on solving
a speciﬁc problem, according to a precise error factor. Bearing this scientiﬁc perspective in mind,
the aesthetics of such processes appears to be little more than a side-eﬀect.
In order to tap into the artistic potential of learning and adaptive systems, artists need to
somehow invert this perspective. Whereas scientists ﬁne-tune their algorithms to achieve better
performance over an agreed-upon error measurement, artists need to ﬁnd their own way through
the diﬀerent components of learning systems in order to produce subjectively compelling behaviors.
This being said, the artistic and scientiﬁc practices of adaptive agents have a similar set of
relationships between author and machine in that they both involve a constant interaction between
the practitioners and the material agents they interact with. Sociologist of science Andrew Pickering
has come up with the concept of a “dance of agencies” to describe the constant movement of
resistance and accommodations going on in scientiﬁc practice (Pickering 1995). The stakes in art
are diﬀerent than those in science, of course, because artists are generally invested in the creation
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of an experience, while scientists try to discover or conﬁrm some truth about the world by building
theories based on observations. However, both the artistic and the scientiﬁc processes have striking
similarities, and what Pickering essentially says about scientiﬁc practice can be applied to art.
Bringing British Cybernetics to the foreground as an inspirational example of this worldview,
Pickering argues for a conception of human cognition that is performative rather than represen-
tational: “the cybernetic brain was not representational but performative, as I shall say, and its
role in performance was adaptation.” (Pickering 2010, 6). In making these statements, Pickering
stands alongside many other humanities scholars who reject representationalism in favor of per-
formativity (Hayles 1999; Penny 2000). Following my discussion on adaptive systems, I want to
connect Pickering’s performative ontology of science to both Xenakis’ and John Cage’s approaches
to indeterminacy in art.
As an artist and researcher trained in the ﬁeld of Machine Learning, I propose to tackle these
seemingly abstract and hard questions using three complementary approaches. First, I examine his-
torical accounts of machinic life and machine intelligence since the post-war era from both the per-
spectives of computer scientists working in the ﬁeld of Machine Learning as well as techno-cultural
studies scholars exploring the larger sociotechnical impact of machine-based systems. Through
this dual perspective, I touch upon issues of adaptivity, learning, autonomy, self-organization and
emergence.
Second, I analyze artistic works making use of Machine Learning algorithms through close read-
ings of core texts on adaptive systems in three areas: science and technology studies (STS) (Hayles
1999; Pickering 1995, 2010); media art history (Shanken 2002, 2015; Ascott 2003b; Whitelaw 2004)
and computer science (Sutton and Barto 1998; Bishop 1995; Langton 1990; Langton 1995). My aim
here is to tease out the two diﬀerent worldviews I described earlier (representational versus perfor-
mative) and to articulate how these diﬀerent viewpoints have come to be deﬁned, problematized,
expressed and legitimated in artistic works utilzing computationally adaptive techniques.
Finally, I provide descriptive and reﬂexive accounts of practice on three works I have been
involved in over the past few years. These artistic works speciﬁcally employ Machine Learning
methods such as Reinforcement Learning and Artiﬁcial Neural Networks in order to achieve the kind
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of adaptive behavior I have been describing above. I describe these works — Absences (2008—2011),
Vessels (2010—2015), and N-Polytope (2012) — in detail because they each embody diﬀerent ways
of working with such systems to achieve certain aesthetic eﬀects. Furthermore, they embody the
tensions between representation and performance that I’m attempting to describe here in practice.
As such, these artistic works are important to my argument in that they involve diﬀerent ways to
approach my research questions, grounding theory into real-life bodies of work.
1.1 About my Artistic Practice
This dissertation, due to its interdisciplinary nature, might seem at times very technical to the
reader. Since I am writing this thesis primarily as an artist and a humanities scholar (and not as
a scientist or engineer), I believe it is important to give an overview of my own perspective on art,
and my approach as a practicing artist before entering into the core of the subject.
When it comes to art theory, I consider myself an anti-essentialist (Weitz 1956). It is never
possible to “pin down” art, to ﬁnd a common set of properties that would encompass all of its
diﬀerent forms. I think art is best conceived of as a socially constructed, constantly ﬂuctuating
concept marked by an incommensurate richness and diversity. Art can be recognized, rejected,
criticized, debated, but never reduced to an absolute set of suﬃcient characteristics.
Whether political, expressive, and/or conceptual, however, most works of art propose a form of
human experience that happens in context. In this sense, art as John Dewey argues, is chieﬂy about
experience (Dewey 1959). It consists of physical energy and matter that circulate through human
bodies, stimulating neural synapses, provoking hormonal reactions, mobilizing organic systems. At
its best, art can truly change someone, physically, in ways that are often so personal that they can
hardly be foreseen. This transformative interweaving between the artistic process and the perceiver
is core to the aesthetic act.
The creative process itself is central to my practice. Part of being an artist is to be able to
bend oneself according to the transforming materiality of the work. The work itself is thus in a
process of becoming–through my interactions with matter (the materiality of the artwork), it grows
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an identity of its own. My engagement with practice does not only concern the interaction with
these material agencies. A signiﬁcant aspect of my art practice involves collaborative work, which
necessitates an open approach. One needs to agree on an abstract set of basic principles, and then,
each co-author usually advances the project with the skills s/he has, in constant feedback with the
rest of the group.
This collaborative aspect of my artistic practice is directly linked with the nature of my preferred
medium: computer programming. The immense power of computers does not lie so much in their
capacity to rapidly treat information than in their great ﬂexibility. While I believe the concept of a
“universal machine” is problematic in many ways — some of which will be covered in this thesis —
one cannot deny that computers, as a technology, possess a unique capacity to adapt to diﬀerent
contexts and situations, which explains to a large extent their widespread dissemination across all
spheres of society.
This “quasi-universality” of computers makes them especially appropriate for collective work,
because in themselves algorithms are somehow an empty shell. Only through their embedding in
a network of other media can they truly become eﬀective in the world. This brings me to mention
another equally important quality of computation beyond their ﬂexibility, which is their capacity
to express behavioral patterns — in other words, to enact agency.
While computation has allowed the expansion of existing media such as photography, video,
and music, more interesting to me is the new forms of media that it can generate. The temporal
unfolding of dynamic patterns enabled by computation reveals movements that never exactly repeat
themselves, yet can be experienced in real-time as “something” that can be “felt”. In this regard,
I have a particular interest in artiﬁcial intelligence, which is the ﬁeld of computer science that
has engaged primarily with questions of computational agency and behavior. As some of the core
results of this dissertation suggest, one of the aspects of this question is that some algorithms exist
that do not have a ﬁxed structure, but can evolve over time.
From an aesthetic point of view, what are the politics of such practice? My own refusal of the
technoscientiﬁc trajectory that was oﬀered to me as an engineer, in order to pursue the risky venture
of an artistic career is a deliberate political act. Nowadays, art provides one of the last remaining
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bastions for research against techno-utopianism and techno-determinism. I have no doubt that
whatever companies engaged in AI such as Google and Facebook are after will “work”, that we will
be besieged by autonomous cars, auto-diagnosis health systems, and robots that perfectly reproduce
human behavior. But the real challenge of history is not about technological advancement: it is
about a process of becoming, it is about the kind of human qualities we want to develop as a species.
Science and engineering have, over the past 30 years, been caught in the turmoil of a technocratic,
applied agenda, and have come to a dead-end. As an interdisciplinary artist trained in science and
engineering, I want to use my unique position, and through my work, actively participate in the
critique of these technologies, suggesting alternatives to this limited future.
1.2 Scope and Relevance
This research concerns agent-based installation artworks that use Machine Learning or adaptive
computational systems as a core element of behavior generation. Works that use Machine Learning
techniques without speciﬁcally staging agents, or nonadaptive agent-based installations, are also
considered when necessary, but only in order to better grasp the concepts under scrutiny.
The relevance of this research project, highlighted by the originality of its approach and the
importance of its subject of inquiry, can be summarized as follows:
1. Adaptation and learning are important concepts to understand the world we live in and the
future of contemporary societies.
2. In particular, they provide core insights into sociotechnical questions of practice in both art
and science.
3. Art oﬀers a way to critically engage with adaptive systems through their material articula-
tions, in a manner that neither science or the humanities can approach them, thus generating
alternative kinds of knowledge.
4. However, while there has been some work on related questions of emergence and interactivity,
there is currently a lack of aesthetic theories speciﬁc to adaptive systems and how they are,
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have been, and can be used, in artistic practice.
This research oﬀers an interdisciplinary account of adaptivity and learning in machinic agents.
I show how adaptivity pervades contemporary conceptions about life, autonomy, cognition, intel-
ligence, and the brain, emphasizing its strong inﬂuence on media art since the 1960s. Underlying
the concept of adaptivity is the idea that the human brain should not be understood as a universal
machine for solving problems using logical rules, but rather as an incredibly malleable organ with
the ability to change, to tune itself to its environment, and to even reinvent itself when needed.
Adaptive artworks resonate with this idea, holding the potential to change our perception of the
world, a world ﬁlled with performative agents in constant ﬂux, adapting to their environment and
to one another.
This study is not about generative art and design. I am not interested here in computational
algorithms that create ﬁxed and stable forms, but rather, I am interested in the aesthetics of the
processes themselves as seen in their real-time unfolding, and as part of an embodied, material
experience; agents that live and act in the physical world. As there has been much research carried
out in adaptive music composition and improvisation, I focus the scope of my research outside of
the music realm.1
Because I am interested in considering adaptive systems as an art practice, I choose not to engage
with works that merely make use of Machine Learning techniques as part of a specialized pattern
recognition component, such as face-tracking devices, unless when this component is modiﬁed or
used in a critical fashion that inﬂuences the aesthetic behavior of the piece.2 Finally, further
limiting the scope of analysis, I will not be considering works that involve human performers, such
as theater or dance works. Instead, I will focus on experiences that involve a direct, physical
relationship between nonhuman adaptive systems and a human audience.
Finally, I feel it is important to note that despite the fact that I directly engage with these tech-
niques as an integral part of an artistic practice involving the conception, design and implementation
1With the exception of certain robotic artworks that involve music performance such as Baginsky’s artiﬁcial
adaptive robotic rock band The Three Sirens (1992—2005).
2In other words, I exclude from this study artworks that use ML techniques in ways they are usually intended to
be used.
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of computational systems, I am not seeking advancements in the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence, but
rather, to connect art practices that make use of AI with broader questions of life and agency. The
project thus remains within the ﬁeld of the humanities, however, my hope is that it will provide
contexts and approaches that could beneﬁt AI researchers as well.3
1.2.1 Adaptation Matters
As necessary conditions of life, standing right between self-organization, autonomy, and the genera-
tion of novelty, adaptation and learning are powerful concepts for understanding living systems and
they way they operate. Ultimately, it is the capacity to adapt that distinguishes life from other nat-
ural phenomenon. Life is about maintaining and extending itself in a changing environment, about
learning from experience; it is a process of becoming that emerges through a constant negotiation
with inner and outer conditions.
Adaptation and learning occupy a sweet spot in the hierarchy of systems properties, being more
closely related to the living than the concepts of emergence and self-organization imply. Adaptation
is a suﬃcient yet unnecessary condition of emergence, and while there exist self-organizing systems
that are nonadaptive, such as hurricanes and galaxies, all adaptive systems must have a capacity to
self-organize. I claim that adaptation is, in fact, the process by which living systems self-organize:
as all living systems are complex, emergent systems, they are also adaptive, in their capacity to
adjust their own structure and behavior to their environment.
Yet, few researches have addressed the questions of adaptation and learning in the ﬁelds of media
art theory, art history and science and technology studies, let alone their relationship with concepts
such as emergence, self-organization, self-regulation, autonomy, and life. Recent studies about
“artiﬁcial-life art” or “behavior aesthetics” have mostly focused on concepts of embodiment (Penny
1997; Dourish 2001; Bogart and Pasquier 2013), emergence (Baljko and Tenhaaf 2008; Soler-Adillon
2015), and the generation of novelty in lifelike agents (Whitelaw 2004; Cariani 2008; Boden 2009).
While these works are key to understanding the way natural and social systems operate, and
3For example, there is a growing community of AI scientists interested in notions of computational creativity and
on artistic applications of AI, who may ﬁnd in this study valuable criticisms and alternatives to the research trends
commonly found in their ﬁeld.
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start seeing them for the biologically-inspired, statistically-driven, agent-based entities they have
become.
This become particularly important because we now have technologies that are adaptive, whereas
these kinds of systems were only found in natural phenomena before. In particular, such systems
are newly important for artists and art theory because: (1) they suggest new approaches to work
with emergent systems; (2) they hold the promise of generating more “lifelike” behavioral patterns,
opening up novel ways to understand what it means to be alive and human; (3) they challenge
the notion that artistic creation is a purely human-centric practice, as the agency becomes diﬀused
between humans and machines that couple with one another.
1.2.2 A Core Dimension of Art and Science Practice
Adaptation and learning are key concepts by which to address the question of practice. Sociologist
of science Andrew Pickering suggests the “mangle of practice”, an ongoing dialectic of resistance
(by nonhuman entities) and accommodation (by scientists), as a framework to examine scientiﬁc
practice (Pickering 1995). Pickering describes the way human and nonhuman agents interplay in
“the mangle” as a “dance of agencies”. Science is thus best described as a performative material
practice that stages both human and nonhuman agents, the former adapting to the latter.
More recently, Pickering ﬁnds in Cybernetics — an interdisciplinary ﬁeld started in the 1940s
which exists today under “many other names” — the perfect embodiment of his theory (Pickering
2010, 15). As early as the 1950s, cyberneticians built lifelike devices as a means to attain a higher
understanding of the workings of the brain. For example, Grey Walter designed a pair of artiﬁcial
“tortoises” with some basic learning capabilities, while Ross Ashby created the homeostat, a self-
regulating system that aimed to mimic feedback processes in the human brain. While clearly
scientiﬁc in nature, the creative process that made these apparatus possible is very close to art
practice, at least in the domain of computation art.4
Another interesting insight comes from Greek polymath Iannis Xenakis. For Xenakis, art and
4In the 1960s and 1970s, some of these devices were shown as part of art exhibitions, such as Gordon Pask’s
Colloquy of Mobiles (1968), a Cybernetics installation that was presented in the “Cybernetics Serendipity” 1968
exhibition curated by Jasia Reichardt in London.
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science can both access forms of objective knowledge through the processes of inference (the pro-
cess of drawing ideas out of observation and reasoning) and experimentation (veriﬁcation of these
ideas through experiments). But art can go beyond these, attaining forms of subjective knowledge
through what Xenakis calls revelation, giving us access to the emotional, personal, universal di-
mension of reality. In Xenakis’ mind, the artist must thus be “simultaneously rational (inferential),
technical (experimental) and talented (revelatory)” (Xenakis and Messiaen 1994, 5–6).
In inference, one looks at data and makes an hypothesis about the process that generated it; in
experimentation, one veriﬁes if the hypothesis is right, generating new data in the process. This is
an adaptive process, where we iteratively reﬁne our view based on our actions in the world and their
consequential eﬀect on our sensory surfaces. How does revelation interoperate with this process?
Is revelation reserved, as Xenakis claims, only to the arts, or does it also appear in science, but
hermetically, available only to scientists themselves?
Xenakis suggests that in the future, science and art must learn to work together, forming
“alloys” with new, emerging properties. But Xenakis deﬁnitely takes sides. In his mind, art
subdues science: it should be the driving force, bringing problems for science to resolve. I reject
this asymmetric worldview and I suggest, instead, one that supposes a co-adaptive relationship
between the artistic and the scientiﬁc spheres. Can adaptation help us understand and possibly
establish such a relationship between art and science, one that goes beyond Xenakis’ philosophy of
art and science alloys?
1.2.3 Art Offers Alternative Ways to Engage with Adaptive Technologies
The coming-of-age of Machine Learning seems to be activating a mix of fear and excitement, turning
contemporary discourse about AI technologies into a highly polarized debate. The ﬁrst camp warns
against the emergence of a much dreaded technological “singularity” from which point AI will
replace humans as the superior intelligent species, with possibly dire consequences that could lead
to the extinction of the human race (Kurzweil 2006). On the other side, Silicon Valley’s techno-
optimist choirs are chanting the libertarian utopia of a post-work, post-democratic world where all
of humanity’s problems are to be smoothly solved by benevolent artiﬁcial learning agents.
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With their capacity to work both critically and creatively with material and experiential ques-
tions, artists have a unique standpoint for reﬂecting on the complex issues surrounding AI. Art can
suggest alternative ways of engaging with AI systems and imagining our relationship with them
now and in the future.
I claim that learning and adaptive systems suggest a complete change in paradigm about our
way of considering technology and how it operates in the world. Technologies of the past and
present are immensely nonadaptive: they are driven by a human-centric ethics that seeks to con-
trol nature (Pickering 2010). Quite paradoxically, current-day Machine Learning has not really
escaped that paradigm, being used for the most part for pattern recognition purposes in attempts
to eﬃciently solve concrete, measurable “problems”; to gain more control over outcomes.
What if technologies were designed to adapt themselves to natural processes and entities, rather
than the other way around? Can we envision technologies that are not meant to control nature, but
rather to take part in an ecosystem, trying to survive while allowing other processes to ﬂow? Can
we give artiﬁcial agencies the right to make mistakes? Can we allow them to be gracefully weak,
imprecise and hesitant, just as we are? In the ﬁeld of AI, what would happen if we moved beyond
the ideal of optimization and control, towards the most open-ended paradigm of adaptation as a
living process?
I believe adaptive systems allow us to imagine a whole new future for the world we live in. In
that future, artiﬁcial agents would become an active part of the aesthetic fabric that makes up our
existence. I picture adaptive agents acting as surrogates, carrying emotions in their neuroplastic
shells, facilitating their contagion like viruses. Some would have their own survival attached to
something or someone we hold dear, helping us protecting them. Some would write with us, dance
with us, do things with us rather than for us — or, as STS scholar Sherry Turkle says, do things
to us by “by changing the way we perceive ourselves and our sociotechnical environment” (Turkle
2006, 1).
New artforms will likely emerge beyond the traditional formats. Public works could run for long
time spans, evolving across many generations, constantly adapting to new circumstances. Artiﬁcial
beings could live inside homes, keeping a trace of past interactions in the way they behave and act
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in the world, transcending time. Robotic bands and human-machine collectives would emerge, live
and die, producing albums and shows, breaking up and reassembling. Nomadic agents could be
allowed to circulate among us, moving at the speed of light, inﬂuencing one another and engaging
with us, stimulating debates around art, politics, and science, rather than merely providing us with
what we are assumed to need. AI travelers could be sent in space, surviving for millions of years,
able to adapt, grow, and die beautifully.
The development of Machine Learning has long moved away from Cybernetics, which was largely
concerned with adaptive processes as a way to understand the living. This eventually resulted in
the exploitation of massive amounts of data for optimization, classiﬁcation, and recognition tasks.
The vast majority of learning algorithms are designed to learn oﬄine (i.e., not in real-time) in order
to perform a given task. The few artists who use Machine Learning usually stay within the scope
of their intended use5.
The success of Machine Learning goes hand-in-hand with “big data”, large collections of infor-
mation which are, for the most part, in the hands of big businesses such as Google and Facebook.
These companies generate wealth and power by appropriating these massive datasets which, while
provided by the general population, stay out of the control of the public. These learning algorithms
are increasingly present in our lives, often without us knowing. We do not see them, we do not
understand them, and this leaves us ineﬀective at criticizing them or critically engage with them.
We are left without a voice, to be the passive containers that corporate interests feed upon, for the
beneﬁt of private interests.
As Machine Learning algorithms continue to transform our world, it is crucial to develop alter-
native ways to approach these technologies beyond science and business. What I propose here is
one attempt to do just that, by bringing together sociotechnical, artistic and aesthetic questions
into a global framework, and by suggesting ways artists can manipulate these algorithms. My hope
is that by providing these tools, I will inspire new ways of understanding the technology and its
impact on our world, giving artists some agency in creating works of art that are free of corporate
5For example, see David Rokeby’s works using ML for computer vision and image pattern recognition. In such
cases, ML could be replaced by any other technique which would be more or less as eﬃcient, without aﬀecting the
fundamental artistic intent behind the work.
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power and constraints.
1.2.4 Adaptation in New Media Art Theory: Filling the Gap
New media art as a ﬁeld of research has not often been a sustained topic of study for art historians,
leaving a void that is only starting to be addressed. For a large part, it is new media artists
themselves who have started building some of the theoretical tools for understanding their discipline
through analyzing their own practices.
Still, theory about new media remains scarce, in particular when it comes to the niche of agent-
based art, let alone that of adaptive behaviors. A search in the database of Leonardo (the most
important peer-reviewed journal in the ﬁeld of technological art) from 1997 to 2015 reveals a huge
gap between the number of papers containing references to Artiﬁcial Life (168), Artiﬁcial Intelligence
(160), and Cybernetics (165), when compared to Machine Learning (23), Connectionism (12), and
Adaptive Systems (4).6
Table 1: Number of articles containing a reference to certain terms in Leonardo (1997–2015).









By comparison, Machine Learning and Adaptive Computation have been an essential part of
the AI ecology. While their role has often been peripheral, their presence has been exponentially
growing since the Deep Learning revolution of the mid–2000s, largely due to their unprecedented
success in tackling major AI-related problems. Adaptation and learning are thus critical concepts
whose increasing presence in our world has vast sociotechnical repercussions.
6These results were compiled by performing a clear text search using the JSTOR Arts & Science search engine
on August 3, 2016.
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As these technologies become more popular and more readily available, their use in works of art
will likely grow as well. Yet there exists at the moment almost no guidelines, tools, or theoretical
frameworks on how to make these works and think about them. It is therefore crucial for the
discipline of new media arts that we start building an aesthetic theory of adaptation, in order to
allow for a better understanding of artworks that utilize them, as well as to understand the processes
entailed in working with them artistically.
1.3 Contribution
This research project aims to address three interrelated questions about adaptive systems in com-
puter arts: one is about aesthetic experience, one is about practice, and one is about the forms of
knowledge with emerge from such contexts.
The ﬁrst question concerns the kinds of experiences that are speciﬁcally enabled by using Ma-
chine Learning and Adaptive Computation as part of agent-based artworks. By extending and
reﬁning Simon Penny’s behavior aesthetics (Penny 2000; Kim and Galvin 2012), I show that emer-
gent and adaptive processes exist in a diﬀerent kind of time than formal/nonemergent/nonadaptive
behaviors, because emergent/adaptive behaviors change their morphology through time and thus
bring with them the potential for spectators to experience the unfolding of time in novel ways.
Therefore, these systems as used in art bring with them the potential to experience time in novel
ways.
As introduced above, adaptive behaviors bring with them a sense of aliveness, because adapta-
tion is “one step closer to life” than emergence. For instance, there exists emerging phenomenon
that are nonadaptive, yet adaptivity is impossible without emergence. Adaptation is a necessary
condition of life, ﬁrst at the level of species development and survival (genetic adaptation) and
second, at the level of the individual (neuroplastic adaptation). This “lifelikeness” comes with its
own experiential essence, a quality which has been sought by artists since the dawn of time, from
the animal representations in the caves of Lascaux to current-day agent-based installations.
The second question I investigate is how adaptive computational methods aﬀect practice in
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agent-based artworks. I delve into the core dimensions that deﬁne Machine Learning algorithms: (1)
the task they are aimed to accomplish; (2) the model that is trained by applying (3) an optimization
procedure that uses (4) an evaluation function to measure the system’s performance over (5) a set
of data. In the process, I suggest ways these components can be exploited for artistic expression.
Connecting Cariani’s taxonomy of agents (Cariani 1989; Cariani 2012) with Penny and Soler-
Adillon’s work on self-organizing systems (Penny 2009; Soler-Adillon 2015), I present a framework
for understanding behaviors based on the temporal unfolding of their morphology. At the ﬁrst
level, one ﬁnds patterns generated by stateless, function-like devices called “mappings”. The second
category comprises behaviorful devices with states, driven by Finite State Machines or other formal
structures that do not evolve through time, but generate recognizable temporal patterns. Finally,
the third and last level is occupied by “metabehaviors”, that is, behaviors whose transformation in
time is driven itself by a behavior, such as those generated by adaptive or evolutive devices.
As adaptation is intimately connected to emergence, being the way by which self-organizing
systems mutate their behavior in response to changes in their environment, I argue that Machine
Learning and Adaptive Computation can provide a suitable tool, a pathway to design emergent
behaviors that move beyond the direct — and often strenuous — programming of unitary agents.
My third and last contribution lies in the delineation of another worldview brought forward by
adaptation in general, and by adaptive works of art in particular. Adaptation allows to imagine
embodied artistic works that couple with the world, actively changing it. The integration of these
systems in artworks challenges the way art is presented and received by audiences, as their lifelike
properties also make them as intricate and mysterious as life is. Perhaps more than other media
art forms, artworks that integrate adaptive systems demand more eﬀort, more attention, as the
public itself needs to be engaged in an adaptive endeavor. These works thus often demands that
the audience spends enough time with these agents to get to know them in an embodied manner.
Through their capacity to transform their behavior through time, to reinvent their way of acting
in a constantly changing environment, adaptive agents-as-artworks can allow the emergence of a
worldview wherein agents are not just generating novelty out of the blue, but rather in relationship
with one another, by tentatively pointing their behavior towards a constantly evolving environment.
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1.4 Literature Review
This thesis aims to synthesize diﬀerent perspectives in an eﬀort to get a broad understanding of the
notion of adaptivity and its evolution in contemporary discourse in art and humanities. This is no
easy task, since diﬀerent disciplinary ﬁelds usually evolve their own vocabularies and concepts. A
term used in two diﬀerent disciplines might mean completely diﬀerent things, whereas two diﬀerent
terms might actually refer to a common notion. In practice, things are usually much more blurry
and one needs to be extremely careful where to draw the line when trying to establish appropriate
connections and groupings.
As previously argued, humanities scholars and artists who have tackled these concepts have
often provided incomplete, confused, inaccurate and/or out-of-date accounts of these practices. An
important contribution will thus be to use my scientiﬁc training in Machine Learning, mathematics
and computer science to articulate, disentangle and update these accounts.
In bringing together scientiﬁc, artistic, philosophical and sociotechnical contexts, I hope to (1)
present a more scientiﬁcally rigorous account than has previously been accomplished in media art
history and STS; (2) show how the aesthetic questions that drive the thesis are intimately entangled
with the scientiﬁc histories of AI, connectionism and adaptive systems, and; (3) to provide artists
working (or wanting to work) with adaptive technologies with a set of anchorpoints, highlighting
the aesthetic properties and potentialities speciﬁc to adaptive systems, and the challenges of using
them in artistic contexts.
In order to address the complex issues teased out above, I thus draw on three distinct but
overlapping bodies of literature and practice, namely: (1) scientiﬁc literature in computer science
and robotics; (2) sociotechnical and philosophical perspectives of artiﬁcial intelligence and artiﬁcial
life systems; (3) media art history and theory, including writings from art critics and media theorists
as well as works of media art dealing with adaptive systems.
First of all, I examine literature in computer science, tracing through the history of Machine
Learning since the post-war era. Within this history, I trace the occurrence and inﬂuence of adaptive
systems and Machine Learning on the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence, with a focus on connectionist
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systems. I focus not only on the sociohistorical context but also directly on the techniques them-
selves. The reason for looking directly at the technological practices is to address accounts of AI
by cultural critics and theorists who rarely have a direct experience with the technology and/or
provide inaccurate descriptions of these technologies (the same way many scientists writing about
art usually only superﬁcially address artistic questions). As an artist trained in computer science
and AI, I believe it is important to go back to these techniques directly to come up with my own
historical account of these practices.
In order to trace this archaeology of Machine Learning, I inspect seminal works in Cybernet-
ics (Wiener 1961; Ashby 1957; Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow 1943), information theory (Shan-
non 1948) and early connectionist models (McCulloch and Pitts 1943; Rosenblatt 1957; Selfridge
1959). I consider the emergence of what is referred to as “classic AI” or “Good Old-Fashioned
AI” (GOFAI) in the 1950s and 1960s, marked by a strong optimism in the ability of purely sym-
bolic, disembodied computational systems — often referred to as “computationalism” — to achieve
human-level cognition, and how this politically and instititutionally lead to the abandonment of
the connectionist project (Newell, Shaw, and Simon 1959; Minsky and Papert 1969). I describe
the emergence of the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Life (ALife) which brought together ideas on self-replication,
self-organization and emergence, supported by a “bottom-up” approach and a computationalist
deﬁnition of living systems (von Neumann 1951, 1966; Langton 1986, 1989b; Ray 1991; Reynolds
1987).
In parallel, I explore the emergence of Machine Learning in the mid–1980s, following the demise
of symbolic AI and marking the end of the “AI Winter”, by focusing on approaches in neural
computation and pattern recognition (Rumelhart, Hinton, and Williams 1986; Bishop 1995; Duda,
Hart, and Stork 2001), genetic algorithms (Holland 1992; Mitchell 1998) and Reinforcement Learn-
ing (Sutton and Barto 1998; Wiering and Otterlo 2012). I contrast Machine Learning to “Nouvelle
AI”, an approach to AI which suggests that AI systems should be built incrementally, starting with
“simple levels of intelligence” that do not use any representation, and rather, “use the world as its
own model” (Brooks 1987). A major criticism of Nouvelle AI in the ﬁeld of robotics is that by
refusing to include any form of representation in its architecture, it throws away Machine Learning,
23
thus making it diﬃcult to engineer adaptive systems which are deemed necessary to achieve more
robust forms of intelligent responses to real-world problems, such as driving a vehicle (Ziemke 1999).
For example, an important research strand since the 1990s in the ﬁeld of robotics has been
working with Machine Learning methods, often used in conjunction with architectures and algo-
rithms inherited from Nouvelle AI or symbolic AI (Dorigo and Colombetti 1997). Current research
seems to advocate for hybrid approaches that integrate rule-based symbolic systems and Machine
Learning approaches within a framework that takes machinic embodiment seriously (Quinlan 2006;
Chalup, Murch, and Quinlan 2007). Finally, I analyze the latest evolution of connectionism in
the “deep learning” revolution (Hinton, Osindero, and Teh 2006; Bengio 2009; Bengio, Courville,
and Vincent 2013; Arel, Rose, and Karnowski 2010) and examine its utilization in agent-based
systems (Mnih et al. 2013, 2015; Nath and Levinson 2014).
At the same time, I implicate the scientiﬁc histories of Machine Learning in the processes of
how such concepts arose in cognitive science, and, in particular, in the tension that these histo-
ries highlight between a representationalist/computationalist and a situated/performative view of
the brain (Turing 1950; Searle 1980; Harnad 2007, 2005; Boden 2006, 1996). I do this while con-
trasting these histories with phenomenological and neurophenomenological critiques (Dreyfus 1979;
Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991). Cognitive science is a rigorous
interdisciplinary ﬁeld which brings together computer science, philosophy, linguistics, psychology
and biology, and thus seems like a logical starting point for examining artiﬁcial intelligence while
expanding into other ﬁelds. In order to understand the relationship between human and machine
forms of cognition, I also explore sociotechnical work of researchers in areas such as technocul-
tural studies (Hayles 1999; Johnston 2008; Helmreich 2000), and science and technology studies
(STS) (Latour 2005; Pickering 1995, 2010), in order to understand how such ﬂat hierarchizing be-
tween human and nonhuman subjects and objects serve to decentre strictly “human exceptionalist”
approaches to the links between humans and sociotechnical frameworks for knowledge production.
The third category of writing that I explore in this research comes from media art history and
theory as well as agent-based media artworks, examining the manner in which such scientiﬁc systems
are appropriated by artists. Here, I demonstrate the gaps in art historical accounts surrounding
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issues of self-organization, adaptation and learning, while attempting to disentangle these terms
from their often confused or inaccurate appropriation by art historians and media critics. In doing
so, I also pose the central questions of why such techniques are used in art practice in the ﬁrst
place, and what they hope to accomplish.
I begin this endeavor by considering the inﬂuence of Cybernetics on art in the 1960s (Ascott
2003a; Burnham 1968; Software 1970; Hultén 1968), artiﬁcial life art (Penny 2009; Whitelaw 2004;
Tenhaaf 2008) and agent-based art (Downie 2005; Mateas 2001; Penny 2000). I pay special attention
to perspectives on the ﬁgure of the artist-engineer at the crossroads between art and science,
speciﬁcally as a way to analyze my own practice as an artist trained as an engineeer (Penny 2008;
Xenakis 1981a; Xenakis and Messiaen 1994). I compare nonadaptive agent-based installations
to ones that use adaptive computational systems, such as Ruairi Glyn’s multi-robot installation
Performative Ecologies (2010), Yves Amu Klein’s robotic sculpture Octofungi (1996), as well as
Stephen Kelly’s Open Ended Ensembles series (2014—2015). Through this analysis, I try to raise
the speciﬁc behavioral characteristics of artistic works that use Machine Learning while engaging
in larger discussions about the kind of worldview they suggest.
1.5 Methodology
This research follows the framework of “research-creation”, a growing set of largely qualitative
methodological approaches within the humanities which comes under many variants. Speciﬁcally,
my methodology aligns with “art-as-research” whereby art practice is embedded in theoretical
considerations in a bidirectional network of interactions.
Art and theory, in eﬀect, are nothing more than two diﬀerent forms of practice interre-
lated through a system of interaction and transferences. In this constellation, philosophy
neither brings the arts to the point nor does art sensualize philosophical truths; philoso-
phy serves a knowledge-based artistic practice as a point of reference, similar, conversely,
to how art might aﬀect theoretical practice. (Busch 2011, 1)
In this context, the process that guided this research is anchored into both material and discur-
sive practices, traveling alternately between thinking and making. Speciﬁcally I adopt an iterative
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design approach inspired from Agile, a methodological framework for software development that
largely bottom-up, iterative, and adaptive (Rasmusson 2010). Agile relies on the self-organization
of collaborators on a project and values ﬂexibility and adaptability in the planning and decision
making process. As an artist who develops open-source software, who is also often working collab-
oratively on art projects, I have successfully used Agile in the past and have found it a suitable
approach for making art that involves software.
Agile rests on the following process:
1. Break down a project into small units called user stories that describe situations we would
like the software to perform. These stories can range from the very abstract (e.g., “I want
the software to be able to generate reports”) to being very speciﬁc (e.g., “I need to be able to
export my monthly ﬁnancial report with the push of a button”). In artmaking, this amounts
to establishing artistic intentions and components of the ﬁnal work.
2. Estimate the resources needed to accomplish these tasks (usually measured in days of work).
3. Prioritize the list of stories. This is usually where you also establish a production calendar.
In an artistic context, where resources are often scarce, I typically choose to begin with
components that take less time to accomplish and that give me the most information in
regards to questions of technical feasibility and aesthetic eﬀectiveness.
4. Execute the plan, updating it as you go. If the project is not moving fast enough, you can
either choose to do “less” (which, in media art, could actually be beneﬁcial, as projects using
technology often tend to be so complex, that they risk reducing the overall aesthetic eﬀect
that was initially aimed for), or you can decide to allocate more resources (hire people or add
days to the calendar, if possible).
Agile possesses many interesting features that are relevant to a research-creation strategy. First,
it does not presuppose a temporal succession of activities such as: analyze, design, code, test,
repeat. To the contrary, it rejects such a method in favor of a continuous model where all of these
activities happen at the same time. This is very eﬀective in art-based research, where theoretical
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and practice questions are never fully separable, and are rather intertwined throughout the whole
process. Knowledge is thus constructed as part of an ongoing feedback loop between theory and
material practice.
Second, Agile favors an iterative design methodology with short development cycles. In Agile,
you usually start by implementing a simple working prototype of the ﬁnal application, and you add
incrementally to it over time. This aspect is particularly well adapted to artistic research, where
it is often hard to pin down which aesthetic strategies will work best until one sees a material
embodiment of their ideas and intuitions.
Third, Agile values working software as the primary measure of success. Principles such as
YAGNI8 and DRY9 reduce development costs and prevent overdesign by focusing on making things
work. This is a very useful principle in the context of media art, as it is, alas, not uncommon to
see artworks in galleries that are plainly defective.10
Finally, Agile’s planning methodology is adaptive, meaning that it allows for changing plans
along the way when faced with reality. Both artists and programmers alike know that it is hard to
know how you are going to achieve something, or whether it will really yield the expected results
and eﬀects, until you have gotten your hands dirty. This ﬁnal component is, as expected, intimately
linked with many of the theoretical and practical questions approached in this research.
Throughout this research, I rely on records of practice as a way to empirically examine these
processes. Through the gathering of documents (notes, diaries, video documentation), as well
as introspection and interviews with collaborators, I investigate three (3) artistic projects and the
resulting works within which I participated either as solo author or as co-author, thus informing the
critical thinking about adaptive systems within an artistic context. The objective is to understand
the characteristics and limitations of adaptive agent-based systems by focusing on the reasons
which pushed me to use Machine Learning, the ways I have applied these techniques in the creative
8YAGNI stands for “You Ain’t Gonna Need It” and demands coders not to add functionalities that are not
expressely needed.
9For “Don’t Repeat Yourself”, a principle that asks programmers not to repeat information in diﬀerent parts of
their code.
10I teach my students that if a new media work functions reliably, even the least of aesthetically compelling media
artworks are better than “busted masterpieces”.
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process, and how the audience reacted to them11. I then examine in detail the algorithms that we
used, how they were utilized in the research-creation process, and how they aﬀected the outcomes,
more speciﬁcally in terms of experience.
It is important to highlight the fact that the chosen methodology itself embraces adaptivity
as a mode of knowledge generation. The short cycles and the adaptive planning method, allow
the various agents engaged in the research-creation process to more tightly adjust to one another,
providing a structured yet open-ended frame that gives ground to the emergence of new theories
about the world.
1.6 Chapter Breakdown
The following chapters alternate between accounts of practice (chapters 2, 4, 6) and theory (chapters
3 and 5), each chapter responding to the previous one and feeding into the next.
In chapter 2, I discuss my previous work with agent-based systems. Focusing mainly on Absences
(2008–2011) — a series of environmental interventions using electronic agents set in natural settings
— I highlight the research and creation processes that brought me to consider the use of adaptive
procedures in agent-based systems, which in turn opened up questions about aesthetics and practice
with such systems that lie at the core of this research.
Chapter 3 presents traces the history of adaptive computation and Machine Learning from
the 1950s onward. In this ﬁrst historical overview, I discuss important notions related to agent-
based artworks, such as emergence, self-organization, adaptation, evolution, connectionism and
Artiﬁcial Life. I try to highlight how Machine Learning and adaptive computation operate in these
sociotechnical and art historical frameworks, in order to extract the diﬀerent ways artists have been
using them, as well as embracing the challenges that come with such practices. By dissecting the
scientiﬁc description of learning algorithms and connecting their properties with artistic questions,
I establish a comprehensive framework artists and media theorists can use to approach Machine
11It is important to mention that at the moment of writing this proposal, the majority of the practice-based aspects
of the research have already been carried out. The research will thus mainly consist of reinterpreting the results and
bringing them together to create a logical whole.
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Learning in works of art.
In chapter 4, I examine Vessels (2010—2015), a robotic installation consisting of a swarm of
autonomous water vehicles whose collective behavior resembles social interactions in a community
of living creatures. The piece involves adaptive mobile robotic agents with complete sensorimotor
systems. The signiﬁcant technological component of the work as well as my direct involvement with
the material in this project gives an opportunity to better exemplify the practical considerations of
an agent-based artwork involving adaptive methods. The chapter oﬀers a look at how adaptivity
plays artistically in agent-based art using the framework developed in chapter 2, exploring the
application of Machine Learning as a pathway to generate self-orgainzing, lifelike systems, while
contrasting artistic objectives with audience response.
Chapter 5 digs deeper into the notion of behavior from an aesthetic perspective, trying to
understand the role and position of adaptation, learning, and emergence in the temporal unfolding
of agents’ observation-action couplings. I describe how adaptive and evolutionary agent-based
systems allow for new morphologies of behavior characterized by the establishment of a second-
order relationship to time, one wherein the past aﬀects the future through the transformation of a
structure.
Finally, in chapter 6, I discuss the work N-Polytope: Behaviors in Light and Sound After Iannis
Xenakis (2012), a “spectacular light and sound performance-installation combining cutting edge
lighting, lasers, sound, sensing and Machine Learning software inspired by composer Iannis Xe-
nakis’s radical 1960s–1970s works named Polytopes”, directed by artist and researcher Chris Salter
and involving an interdisciplinary team, including myself who created the media behavior model-
ing and programming. This project allowed me to test a number of Machine Learning and other
adaptive algorithms such as Reinforcement Learning and Artiﬁcial Neural Networks in a large-
scale installation setting involving multiple agents. In revisiting the work of multidisciplinary artist
Iannis Xenakis, it provides a good starting point for thinking about the question of the relation-
ship between the spatio-temporal unfolding of adaptive systems and “alloys” of art and science
practices (Xenakis and Messiaen 1994).
The last chapter concludes the research by bringing back the questions and providing summaries
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of the arguments. It then examines the broad implications of the study with respect to the overall
areas of study. I end by discussing the limitations of the research and exploring future works that
could address some of these limits.
The reader will ﬁnd additional material concerning some of my own works discussed in this
dissertation in the appendices. Appendix A includes references to external web resources such as
blogs and video documentation, while appendix B contains full-page images of these works.12




The best bridge is one that just stands there, whatever the weather. Cybernetic
devices, in contrast, explicitly aimed to be sensitive and responsive to changes in
the world around them, and this endowed them with a disconcerting, quasi-magical,
disturbingly lifelike quality.
– Andrew Pickering, The Cybernetic Brain
I need to wait for it everyday. First thing in the morning, I put the circuit out under
the sun, letting it wake up, giving the batteries a chance to recharge. The days have a
strange shape. I seem to be waiting for the sunset to come for the whole day, measuring
the voltage increase as the day goes, doing some internet [sic], writing some code, running
simulations.
Then, when it comes, I’m always late. Around 4 o’clock, I got to [sic] restart the circuit
with the new, enhanced program. Even though I’m waiting for it all day long, I’m
always running after it, coming back home with the scooter, getting the program to
compile, checking if everything is ﬁne. Then I wait, carefully looking at the evolution
of the little indicator LED.
It goes very fast. In about an hour, the sun dives down to the horizon, setting the sky
on ﬁre. You can feel it in your skin.
Then the chill comes.
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Samuel St-Aubin is a self-taught artist who excels in hardware design, physical computing and
rapid prototyping. His extensive knowledge of electronics, combined with my programming skills,
would give us an opportunity for sharing approaches and learning. Inspired by psychogeographic
techniques of “détournement” (“drifting”) and street art, our work consisted of imagining and
designing low-cost electronics devices that could be distributed in the urban space, using “simple
means to give new qualities to the city environment by creating diﬀerent interactive situations”.2
Figure 6: Accrochages (2008). Art souterrain, Montréal, Canada. Photo by Alexis Bellavance.
The second project, called Absences (2008—2011), involved a series of ﬁve (5) electronic inter-
ventions where artiﬁcial-life agents were installed in outdoor environments. Taking shape at the
frontier of new media and environmental art, it proposed a meditation on solitude and associa-
tion, interaction and adaptation, natural and artiﬁcial, biological and inanimate. Each intervention
consisted of the creation and installation of autonomous electronic devices in various ecosystems.
These artiﬁcial agents acted and reacted within their speciﬁc environment.
In Absences, I set out to meddle directly with natural processes. The very concept of inter-
activity, largely explored in my past work, was put under scrutiny: these systems were no longer
meant to interact with human spectators, but with a whole ecosystem of nonhuman agencies. One
of my core interests with the series was to subvert the accepted notion of technology as something
2Source: http://accrochages.drone.ws/
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“useful” that embodies man’s unbounded control over nature. Instead, here, I sought to place frail
technological systems in the outdoors, with the modest goal of giving them the ability to survive
within their habitat — an objective which would prove to be much harder than I originally thought.
Though most of my previous works were interactive, one of the important choices that I made
was to purposefully keep humans out of the equation. The ﬁrst reason was conceptual: interacting
speciﬁcally with humans would have countered the spirit of the project itself, which called speciﬁ-
cally for a decentering of the human subject in our view of how technology and nature interoperate.
Having worked on many interactive projects in the past, I wanted with Absences to subvert the
human-centric concept of interaction by “interacting with nature”.
The second reason was more practical. Humans are extremely complex agents and the way
they choose to interact with a piece is equally unpredictable. As I was already taking a risk by
intervening in the outdoors — a rather hostile place for electronic entities — it felt like adding the
extra challenge of accounting for human behavior in the design was a bit excessive and would limit
my freedom. From my perspective, natural phenomenon possessed a more “predictable” dynamics,
which would facilitate the integration of the devices in outside milieus. This an assumption would
turn out to be quite overblown.
I created Absences as a research-creation program which would allow me to move beyond a prac-
tice based on representations, and instead towards one anchored in interventions and performances.
The projects of the series inspire important questions about technology, nature, and nonhuman
agency. Can artiﬁcial agents “survive” in nature (and how)? What is the aesthetic eﬀect of these
agents? How are they connected to art, science, beauty and truth? How do they reﬁne and redeﬁne
notions of agency and behavior in both science and art?
Absences marks a turning point in my research-creation practice as it resurrected my interest
in adaptive systems, fostering the fundamental questions at the core of this dissertation. One of
the important aspects of Absences — and the reason why I chose to speciﬁcally dedicate a chapter
to the project — is that there is a clear progression in the kinds of behaviors that were produced
in the project, from rule-based nonadaptive systems to self-regulated, self-organizing, and adaptive
processes. In particular, the last two interventions were adaptive, the fourth device being driven by
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(a) First Absence (2008). (b) Second Absence (2009). (c) Third Absence (2010).
(d) Fourth Absence (2009). (e) Fifth Absence (2011).
Figure 7: The ﬁve interventions of the Absences series (2008–2011).
a very simple feedback system, while the ﬁfth and last agent was governed by a Machine Learning
algorithm using neural computation.
In this chapter, I describe my creative process in the design of the Absences series, which re-
activated my interest in Adaptive Computation and Machine Learning. I ﬁrst recount my failed
attempt at building an agent activated by sunset during my ﬁrst intervention in Northern Thailand,
showing how it gave rise to the need for integrating adaptive behaviors in my work. I then report
my use of diﬀerent kinds of adaptive and learning algorithms, with increased complexity, in three
of the other interventions of the series. Finally, I discuss how Absences opened up the broader set
of questions that are addressed in this research.
2.1 The Need for Adaptation
One of the decisive moments in Absences happened while designing the ﬁrst intervention, a device
that would only activate at sunset by inﬂating artiﬁcial “fruits” using small air pumps. Whereas
the device had solar panels and light sensors which allowed it to perceive incoming light, I wanted
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to prevent it from being “fooled” by passing clouds or dust that could potentially accumulate
on its sensors. Thus, I gave the agent some extra sensors in the form of thermoresistors. The
algorithm, which I programmed “by hand” over the course of several weeks, looked not only at
absolute values, but rather at the variation in both light and temperature through the day, on
the assumption that the general slope of change in both temperature and light are more robust
measurements (in particular with respect to seasonal variations).
Figure 8: First Absence (2008), ComPeung, Doi Saket, Thailand. Photo by Soﬁan Audry.
The excerpt from the project’s blog that began this chapter describes the creative process
undergone during that period. It shows how I myself became engaged in an adaptive procedure,
making adjustments from sunset to sunset, my agency intertwined with nature’s immutable cycle.
I installed the module around December 2008, on a small tree located on the ComPeung resi-
dency center’s land.3 For a few days, I made sure the piece worked as I had so carefully designed it
3For reference, read: http://absences.soﬁanaudry.com/fr/node/38.
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to, marking every sunset with its daily behavior. In January and February, I became more occupied
with my second intervention and did not look too closely at it.
At the end of my residency in late February 2009, the center held a public event to showcase
the work. As everyone anxiously waited for the device to start, the sun slowly descended to the
horizon. After about thirty minutes, the sun was almost gone with no reaction from the “artiﬁcial
tree”, forcing me to manually start it by ﬂashing the microchip with an emergency program.
In the space of a few months, the initial conditions had changed and the adjustments I had so
carefully made in December to the light and temperature threshold, were no longer appropriate.
The algorithm, constrained by these hardcoded parameters, was utterly unable to adapt to seasonal
variations in daylight. That agent was therefore incapable of “surviving” in its environment, in the
sense that its behavior was unable to maintain itself through environmental changes. It was unable
to be “alive” — or at least stay alive — in these conditions without adaptation.
More importantly, the device’s aesthetic identity as a whole required adaptation in order to exist
temporally. While such an installation could have easily worked for an extended period of time
in a controlled setting such as a gallery space, the ﬁxity of its design was hereby brutally exposed
through the rich variability of nature’s complexity.
I claim that learning and adaptive systems suggest a complete change in paradigm in regards to
technology and how it operates in the world. Technologies of the past and present are immensely
nonadaptive: they are driven by a human-centric ethics that seeks to control nature (Pickering
2010). Quite paradoxically, current-day Machine Learning has not really escaped that paradigm,
being used for the most part for pattern recognition purposes in attempts to eﬃciently solve con-
crete, measurable “problems”; to gain more control over outcomes.
2.2 A Narcissistic Self-Regulating System
In the meantime, I had already ﬁnished creating the Second Absence (2009), a small device consisting
of a simple input-output system involving an LED and a photoresistor enclosed in a glass bottle.
The device, which was installed deep in the Thai rainforest and only activated during nighttime, was
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driven by a minimalistic self-regulating mechanism where it tried to adjust its light level (actionable
through the LED) to counter-balance its perception of light (through the photocell), as if rapidly
reacting to its own reﬂection.
The algorithm went as follows:
1. Let x be the value of light as read by the photoresistor, normalized and remapped to [0, 1].
2. Set the LED value to (1− x) (i.e., the opposite of perceived light).
3. Wait for some time.
4. Go to step (1).
Figure 9: Second Absence (2009), Mae Kuang reservoir, Thailand. Photo by Soﬁan Audry.
The process results in a rapidly, yet unstable ﬂickering light, as the agent iteratively adjusts
its actions to its perceptions. It stabilizes after a few seconds, asymptotically reaching a state of
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equilibrium. When the agent notices that its perceptions match its actions, it quickly gets “bored”
and moves into a “sleeping” state, represented by a simple sinusoidal oscillation.
This second intervention displayed a rather formal process that at the same time contained a
simple kind of adaptation called “self-regulation” through a closed feedback loop. We will see in
chapter 3 how self-regulation and negative feedback systems are the ﬁrst principles behind adaptive
systems as they were deﬁned by ﬁrst-order Cybernetics.
2.3 Surviving in the Wild
The Fourth Absence (2009) used a similarly simple self-regulating process, however this time running
in an open feedback loop, fully engaged with the natural elements.4 The project directly engaged
with the situation of allowing an artiﬁcial agent to “survive” in a hostile setting, exploiting the
aesthetic potential of its own energy management. The agent consisted of a three-meter high tube,
most of which was buried underground to protect the circuit and batteries from the extremely low
temperatures of Winter. At the top, two solar panels allowed the device to recharge its batteries,
with an eﬃciency that was expected to vary highly through the seasons.
Energy management is a concrete example of acting within nature and a recurring issue
in the project. I will here focus on a kind of device that have insuﬃcient access to
resources and thus needs to alternate between periods of activity and dormancy, such
as is the case for most real-life organisms. How can such a device reach its speciﬁc goals
in balance with the available energy resources?
A solution to that problem was developed during my stay near the Arctic (Yukon,
2009). I built a device that produced a sound at a speciﬁc pace. Between each sound
emission, it would switch to a sleep mode, consuming almost zero power. The massive
changes in day length in the region throughout the year requires it to adapt its frequency
accordingly. The right frequency cannot be computed analytically since it depends on
many unkown [sic] factors (such as the temperature and the precision of the sensors).
I addressed this issue by relying on a very simple adaptive algorithm that updates the
frequency of appearance of the action (in this case, emitting the sound) based on the
4For the sake of focusing on the most relevant works of the series, I will not discuss the_ Third Absence_ in
detail here. Suﬃce it to say that it played with the question of feedback and self-organization with multiple agents
using a very simple formal algorithm, using nature’s own indeterminacy as its main strategy. For more information,
please consult the following video documentation: https://vimeo.com/46469372.
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measured batteries [sic] power (voltage). If too much power is available, the frequency
is slightly increased, rising the energy consumption. If there is not enough, it is reduced
in a similar fashion. (Audry 2010, 2–3)
Figure 10: Fourth Absence (2009), Dawson City, Yukon, Canada. Photo by Soﬁan Audry.
The intervention thus applied a principle very important to early Cybernetics: homeostasis, the
mechanism by which organisms are able to keep some of their inner variables stable through time
by acting in purposeful ways with respect to their inputs. In this case, the charge of the battery is
the variable that is kept stable by adjusting the period at which the sound is played.
As in the Second Absence, the behavior is based on a simple feedback procedure — which as we
will see in section 3.1.1 is called negative feedback (Wiener 1961) — that updates a single parameter







When night comes, the agent compares the voltage that remains in its batteries (Vbatt) with a




This error becomes a way to assess the success of its strategy in choosing parameter w. The
agent then makes a step-wise adjustment to w, adjusting it to try and lower the error on the next
day, using a simple learning rule:
w ← w − η[(1− T )T ]E
This expression corresponds to a very common form of adaptive procedure called a stochastic
gradient descent (Bishop 1995). Parameter η is a small positive value called a learning rate which
controls the speed of adaptation. It needs to be set by hand to a value large enough to ensure
change, but small enough to smooth out natural variations in the data.7
Without entering into details, consider the case where too little energy has been consumed over
the day, with Vbatt > Vtarget, hence yielding a negative error (E > 0). Assuming the periodicity
of the actions is at least partly responsible for the situation, one can see how w will be decreased
because η[(1 − T )T ]E > 0. If that is the case, then the period T will also be decreased, which is
5This formula corresponds to the *sigmoid function*, an activation ﬁlter commonly used in Artiﬁcial Neural
Networks. One of its properties is that it maps values between 0 and 1 in a non-linear fashion (hence the expression
ensures that T stays between 0 and 1 hour). See Bishop (1995) for more information.
6The diﬀerence is divided by the maximum possible voltage of the batteries (Vmax) to ensure it stays between 0
and 1.
7Though this parameter is set by hand, it is relatively robust, meaning that a wide range of values for it will still
allow learning to occur. There is of course a tradeoﬀ between speed of convergence and precision.
For example, if we consider the case of the Fourth Absence, choosing a high learning rate will result in the agent
reacting very abruptly to day-to-day variations (which might be due to natural noise), whereas choosing a low rate
could prevent the agent from adapting fast enough to seasonal changes.
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exactly what we want in this case: we would have had enough energy to produce the sound more
often, hence we want to increase the pace by lowering the time between each action.
2.4 Adapting to Conflicting Desires
The issue of adaptation proved to become an increasingly important aspect of Absences, both
practically, conceptually and aesthetically. For the ﬁnal intervention, I decided to extend the idea
of an adaptive mechanism by trying to integrate a kind of Machine Learning procedure called
Reinforcement Learning (Sutton and Barto 1998) (see section 3.2.1 for more detail) by designing a
sensorimotor system animated by its own set of conﬂicting desires, which would be able to adapt
and learn from its actions.
Figure 11: Fifth Absence (2011), Catalonian Pyrenees, Farrera, Spain. Photo by Soﬁan Audry.
For this project, I imagined a robot that could control the orientation of one or more solar
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panels which would make up its body using servomotors. These solar panels would be used both
as sources of energy and as photosensors. The robotic agent would start with a “blank mind”,
not even knowing the relationship between its movements and the orientation of its solar panels.
It would simply explore its environment and, little by little, through trial and error, establish a
correlation between its actions and perception.
In December 2009, I had successfully used a Reinforcement Learning algorithm in the realization
of a very simple adaptive agent. Reinforcement Learning is an approach in AI that allows an
artiﬁcial agent to learn an optimal behavior from a series of actions based on observations, through
an iterative process of trial and error. In each action, the agent receives a reward or punishment in
the form of a number — positive or negative — which allows it to guide its future choices.
I found this approach exciting because it seemed to be an eﬃcient way to design self-organizing,
emergent, potentially surprising behavioral patterns while giving some “guidelines” for the agent
to follow. The resulting behavior is not determined in advance: it is chosen by the agent itself,
according to its particular context and the rewards it receives, through its interactions with the
environment. The practitioner can thus work with the context (i.e., the inputs and outputs aﬀorded
by the system) while encoding the desires of the agent through rewards and punishments. Yet, as
the agent itself determines its best strategy to maximize its rewards, the learning process holds the
potential to generate unexpected, possibly surprising behaviors.
The agent was anchored to a cliﬀ in the Catalonian Pyrenees, ﬂoating above the void. I encoded
a very simple reward function which rewarded the agent for looking away from the sun while heavily
penalizing it for running out of batteries. In so doing, I I put the robot in a tension between two
conﬂicting choices, forcing it to navigate along the thin ridge between need and desire, slowly
adjusting to ﬁnd its own balance in the world.
2.5 Towards Adaptive Systems
Absences was a ﬁrst attempt to directly intervene in uncontrolled, so-called “natural” ecosystems
through performative, embodied artiﬁcial entities. The project, which was articulated as a three
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years research-creation program, follows the artistic tradition of environmental art, which is itself
a particular form of conceptual art.
As I struggled to integrate such embodied artiﬁcial agents in changing, often unstable envi-
ronments, I was pressured and inspired into using adaptive systems, as is summarized in table 2.
I began exploring these concepts more profoundly over the next several years with projects such
as N-Polytope (2012), Plasmosis (2013), Archipelago (2014), and Vessels (2015). Through these
works, I reconnected with the aesthetic dimension of Machine Learning that lead me into the ﬁeld
in the ﬁrst place; only in this artistic context, instead of seeing an error rate get lower, there were
real-time, media eﬀects that unfolded in time and space.
Table 2: Evolution of systems in Absences.
Title Year Description of system
First Absence 2008 Nonadaptive (but should have been).
Second Absence 2009 Nonadaptive but included a process of self-regulation through a feed-
back loop.
Third Absence 20108 Nonadaptive but involved a multi-agent communication loop that
could be seen as a self-regulated system.
Fourth Absence 2009 Adaptive through a simple feedback system allowing the piece to “hi-
bernate” (i.e., adjust its consumption to available resources).
Fifth Absence 2011 Adaptive through a Reinforcement Learning system that made use of
an Artiﬁcial Neural Network.
This being said, Absences opens up a can of worms, provoking larger questions around the
use of such techniques within artistic practice. How can the diﬀerent components and properties
of Machine Learning algorithms be exploited by artists? How do they aﬀect the aesthetics of a
piece? How is adaptation related to autonomy, emergence, self-organization and self-regulation?
How are these concepts connected both aesthetically and historically? How do agent-based systems
work aesthetically? What eﬀects do they have on audiences? How can/does adaptation inﬂuence
these eﬀects? What distinguishes behaviors produced by adaptive systems from those produced by
self-organizing and rule-based systems?
To address these important considerations, we must ﬁrst understand the sociohistorical frame-
work surrounding adaptive and Machine Learning methods. The techniques I have employed in
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Absences were taken largely out of context, as I simply applied my own knowledge derived from
computer science. In the next chapter, I strive to understand where these approaches come from,
to extract them from their pure technical meaning and bring them into a broader interdisciplinary
domain, I do so by tracing agent-based and adaptive systems back through the history of computer
science from the 1950s onward while simultaneously establishing parallels with media art history.
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Chapter 3
Towards a Practice of Machine
Learning in Agent-based Art
I suspect that the "aesthetics of intelligent systems" could be considered a dialogue
where two systems gather and exchange information so as to change constantly the
states of each other.
– Jack Burnham, The Aesthetics of Intelligent Systems
The great difference between magic and the scientific imitation of life is that where
the former is content to copy external appearance, the latter is concerned more with
performance and behavior.
– Grey W. Walter, An Imitation of Life
This chapter aims to provide a strong contextual ground for this thesis. It introduces the
fundamental concepts that are studied in the research, such as systems, agents, behaviors, self-
organization, emergence, adaptation and Machine Learning. Tracing through the history of adaptive
and learning systems since WWII in both science and art, I highlight how these concepts travel
between scientiﬁc and art historical frameworks, trying in particular to articulate how artists utilize
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these concepts and the challenges that come with such practices. Finally, I discuss the main
components that constitute Machine Learning algorithms, exploring ways they have been, or could
be used for artistic expression.
The ﬁrst part of the chapter explores the history of adaptive and learning systems following a
more or less chronological path. One should however be aware of the intricate ramiﬁcations that run
synchronously to this story. I start by exploring so-called “ﬁrst-order” Cybernetics (1946–1950s)
which is associated with the appearance of early connectionist models (1950s). I then describe the
appearance of the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence in the 1950s which came in opposition to Cybernetics
and connectionism (1956–1974). The emergence of Cybernetics and AI in the 1950s is associated,
in the 1960s, with the rise of new art forms which art historian Jack Burnham has described as
“systems aesthetics” (Burnham 1968), and whose larger genealogy lies in artistic movements such
as conceptual art, cybernetic art, information art, algorithmic art, etc. I then examine the revival
of connectionism in the 1980s which I associate with the emergence of Machine Learning and its
development and popularization in the 1980s–1990s.
The second part of the chapter examines the intrinsic properties of Machine Learning systems
in an eﬀort to delineate unique artistic strategies that can be used to exploit them. I summarize
the diﬀerent dimensions that deﬁne Machine Learning algorithms in the scientiﬁc literature, such
as the tasks they can solve (supervised, unsupervised and reinforcement), the model being used
(neural networks, genetic algorithms), the evaluation criterion (measuring the performance of the
system) and the learning process itself. I discuss each of these properties from both and aesthetic
and practical standpoints, exploring how such techniques are utilized in artistic works, and based
on this knowledge suggest new possibilities.
3.1 Historical Context
History is imbued with a fascination for the possibility of humans to artiﬁcially fabricate life. Many
stories from Antiquity display artiﬁcial, humanoid creatures: Ovid’s Pygmalion, who fell in love
with a statue of his own making, brought to life by Venus, is perhaps the most well-known of
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them (Ovid 2008). The ﬁgure of the Golem, a humanoid creature made of clay, brought to life by
the name of God, appears in early talmudic mythology (Idel 1990).
There exist several records of mechanical automata in the ancient world. One of the ﬁrst
documented example is a steam-activated “pigeon” constructed by mathematician Archytas of
Tarentum (circa 400–350 BC). In China, a mechanical orchestra was allegedly built for the emperor
during the Han dynasty around the 3rd century BC. In the 13th century, Muslim inventor al-Jazari
created a series of moving peacocks for the royalty of the Urtugid dynasty in Mesopotamia. French
inventor Jacques Vaucanson, who created the ﬁrst completely automated loom, designed many
life-imitating automata. His most famous work, The Digesting Duck (1739), was an artiﬁcial bird
made of more than 400 parts who could move, drink, eat, and defecate.
These examples are only a fraction of the numerous life-imitating machines designed in both
the Eastern and the Western world from the Antiquity to the mid-XXth century. A common
characteristic of these mechanical devices is that they were always dedicated to a single set of tasks
and could not be easily modiﬁed and/or re-purposed to accomplish another one.
But a change in paradigm takes place in the period following WWII. Increased interest in
military applications of computation such as ballistics and cryptography led to the appearance of
the ﬁrst general-purpose computers in the late 1940s. Contrary to mechanical automata, which were
usually able to address very speciﬁc problems such as manufacturing textiles or performing simple
arithmetics operations, computers are programmable, which means that they are theoretically able
to perform almost any kind of algorithmic symbol manipulation.1 It makes them uniquely powerful,
which led many at the time to think that computing is universal and could theoretically model any
kind of process found in nature, including animal behavior and human cognition.
Several accounts of the history of Artiﬁcial Intelligence and Machine Learning exist from both
humanities and social sciences (Hayles 1999; Whitelaw 2004; Johnston 2008; Penny 2008; Clarke
and Hansen 2009; Pickering 2010; Halpern 2014; Shanken 2015) as well as computer science (Brooks
1There are theoretical limitations to the power of computers, as was ﬁrst revealed by Kurt Gödel in his famous
incompleteness theorems, published in 1931 (Van Heijenoort 1977). Five years later, inspired by Gödel’s work, math-
ematicians Alonzo Church and Alan M. Turing almost simultaneously demonstrated the impossibility of writing a
generic algorithm for solving the “halting problem” – or Entscheidungsproblem – which is the problem of automati-
cally reading another computer program and deciding whether it will stop (halt) or run undeﬁnitely (Church 1936;
Turing 1936).
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1999; Sutton and Barto 1998; Duda, Hart, and Stork 2001; LeCun, Bengio, and Hinton 2015; Medler
1998; Nilsson 2010). Whereas the latter accounts from computer science have the advantage of
oﬀering an insider’s perspective over the history of the ﬁeld, it traditionally focuses on the evolution
of techniques, often neglecting to contextualize the sociocultural dimensions. As for the former in
the humanities and social sciences, they seem to suﬀer from the inverse illness, as they bring larger
considerations into the picture but often fail to understand the science itself and are thus prone to
misrepresenting it.
As an interdisciplinary scholar trained in Humanities, Media Art and Machine Learning, I aim
to bring some clarity into the debate by developing my own story of adaptive systems since the
post-war era. In particular, I want to focus on Machine Learning systems, analyzing them from the
perspective of the history of science as well as art history, articulating origins and developments of
cultural imaginings surrounding artiﬁcial adaptation and the role it plays in contemporary art.
One of the most important challenges lies in the diﬃculty to trace techniques used by artists, as
works using adaptive systems are scarce and often poorly documented. For example, many artists
use extremely general terms when describing the techniques employed in their works, such as “neural
networks”, “ecosystems”, or “evolutionary systems”.2 An important aspect of my contribution here
is thus to disentangle which methods were actually used in order to connect these works with their
scientiﬁc practices.
3.1.1 Cybernetics
It is largely accepted that contemporary concepts about artiﬁcial agency and adaptive systems
such as AI, Machine Learning, and Neural Computation, originated in the early 1940s with the
Macy Conferences on Cybernetics (1946–1953). A set of ten interdisciplinary gathering chaired by
neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch, these conferences brought together mathematicians, psychi-
atrists, psychologists, biologists, social scientists and computer engineers, with the ambitious goal
2For example, compare the use of the term “neural network” in the work of Yves Amu Klein (Klein 2014) —
which refers, in fact, to a speciﬁc kind of unsupervised neural net called self-organizing maps — with the dome
performance Bio-inspire by Turkish audiovisual artists Bahadır Dağdelen and Yusuf Emre Kucur who provide a
very elusive description of the kind of networks they are using, with no scientiﬁc reference that would allow one to
understand the kind of technique they are putting into action (Dağdelen and Kucur 2016).
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of constructing a general theory of the human mind (Dupuy 2000).
The conferences revolved around the organism and its relation with its environment. At the ﬁrst
gathering in 1946, Warren McCulloch, following on his recent research with logician Walter Pitts,
had shown how propositional logic could be modeled by simple artiﬁcial neural networks. In their
1943 paper on neural networks, the authors had proposed a simpliﬁed model of neuron activity
where each brain cell is in either one of two states at any given time (on/oﬀ, true/false, 0/1) (Mc-
Culloch and Pitts 1943). The neurons are connected using synapses which are either excitatory or
inhibitory.3 The alleged “all-or-none” neural activity, thus reduced to on/oﬀ mathematical com-
ponents, allows “neural events and the relations among them” to be treated using logical calculus
(1).
In January 1943, Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener and Julian Bigelow published “Behavior,
Purpose and Teleology” where they presented a teleological model of human and animal behavior
which would also be shown at the ﬁrst Macy Conference in March of the same year (Rosenblueth,
Wiener, and Bigelow 1943). They deﬁned behavior as a transformation in the organism related
to its environment (1). Recognizing the extreme broadness of the deﬁnition, they developed a
hierarchical taxonomy of behavior, classifying animal behavior as active (as opposed to passive),
purposeful (as opposed to random) and teleological.
Teleology is key to understanding the origins of contemporary notions of adaptation. It is
tightly connected to the notion of feedback, a concept that would become a central component of
Cybernetics (Wiener 1961). The term feedback comes from engineering where it has two meanings.
The ﬁrst sense of the word, called positive feedback, refers to a property of a system where “some of
the output energy of an apparatus or machine is returned as input”, such as in an ampliﬁer circuit.4
Thus, when talking about (teleological) feedback, the authors rather refer to the second sense of
3In neurological terms, an excitatory synapse increases the likelihood that the post-synaptic neuron will ﬁre when
the pre-synaptic neuron does, while an inhibitory synapse decreases that likelihood. Inhibitory synaptic connections
play an important regulatory function in the brain.
As an example, epilepsy seizures are the result of a dysfunction in the inhibitory mechanisms in the brain which
causes neurons to ﬁre erratically due to unregulated excitation.
In McCulloch & Pitt’s design, inhibitory inputs are absolute, meaning that if a neuron receives many inputs,
inhibition will take precedence over excitation, thus preventing the post-synaptic neuron to ﬁre.
4Economic collapses are usually caused by such positive feedback loops: as people lose their trust in the market
they begin selling their assets, which causes more people to lose their trust in the market, and so on.
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clear separation between the message and the signal that encodes it. He states that the meaning
that the message conveys is unimportant to the engineering problem of communication, which is
rather concerned about its probability of appearance. Shannon thus deﬁnes information as an im-
material measurement of uncertainty that has nothing to do with signiﬁcance; a “pattern, not a
presence” (Hayles 1999, 33).
Rosenblueth and Wiener’s deﬁnition of behavior and Shannon’s theory of information would
both have a major impact on Cybernetics. They are related to another foundational concept in the
ﬁeld: homeostasis, a property of a system that constantly adjusts the output of an organism such
that it maintains a state of stability using an adaptive criterion embedded in a negative feedback
loop.6 A thermostat is the perfect example of a simple homeostatic system. It tries to regulate the
ambient temperature using negative feedback, switching the furnace on when the temperature is
too low, and oﬀ when it gets too high.
The perfect embodiment of homeostasis can be found in Ross Ashby’s homeostat (Ashby 1957),
a physical device that can adapt to its environment using a feedback loop. The homeostat was
presented by Ashby at the ninth Macy Conference. It is an electrical device made of two parts.
The ﬁrst part consists of four units. Each unit has an electrical magnet that can deviate from its
central position. The deviation of each magnet is converted into an electric current which is sent as
an input to the other three units. Within the system, all units are interconnected. Moreover, each
unit sends its electric output as a feedback input to itself. The inputs control the activity of coil
relays that move the magnet in such a way that the deviation of the magnet is roughly proportional
to the sum of the currents (Ashby 1954, 95).
With appropriate tuning, the device displays extreme stability. “If the ﬁeld is stable”, Ashby
explains, “the four magnets move to the central position, where they actively resist any attempt
to displace them. If displaced, a co-ordinated activity brings them back to the centre.” (96) For
Ashby, this “ultrastability” found in homeostatic systems is a necessary condition of life (110).
The Fourth Absence, described in the previous chapter, is an example of a simple homeostatic
device. In eﬀect, it tries to maintain a stable variable (its battery level) over which it has only
6The concept was ﬁrst described by physiologist Claude Bernard in 1865 (Bernard 1957) and the term homeostasis
was coined in 1928 by Walter Cannon (Cannon 1928).
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indirect control by tentatively adjusting its actions (the frequency at which it plays a sound) so as
to adapt to seasonal variations (cf., section 2.3).
3.1.2 Early Connectionist Models
Early after the war, the science of Cybernetics in the Macy era thus started designing rudimentary
adaptive, self-regulated systems able to “stay on course”, moving towards a deﬁnite target by
making micro-adjustments to their internal structure. Of particular interest is the self-organizing
nature of Cybernetics devices such as the homeostat, which also suggests a perspective on human
cognition. From this viewpoint, memory functions not as a deﬁnite trace image (like a “snapshot”)
that can be retrieved through some kind of addressing mechanism, but rather as the real-time,
dynamic relationship ongoing between a distributed set of control units.
In 1949, Canadian psychologist Donald O. Hebb proposed a revolutionary model for human
neural networks that went along similar lines. He claimed that as brain cells subject to certain
types of stimuli ﬁre together, they also increase their likelihood of ﬁring together in the future when
subjected to similar stimuli, thus forming self-organized assemblies of neurons (Hebb 1949). This
principle, a “form of connectionism” (xix) which would come to be known as Hebbian learning, views
human memory as a subsymbolic, distributed, self-reinforcing process, rather than as a collection
of coded representations that would somehow be stored in the brain.7
Building upon both Hebb’s ﬁndings and cybernetician models of the brain such as Ashby’s
homeostat and McCulloch and Pitts’ logical neural nets, Frank Rosenblatt proposed in 1957 one
of the ﬁrst adaptive connectionist devices: the Perceptron (Rosenblatt 1957). The perceptron is a
simpliﬁed model of a human neural network in the shape of a thresholded linear function8 that is
able to classify a pattern in one of two categories.
7Physiological theories of learning similar to Hebbian learning had been around since the 19th century. For an
in-depth historical review, see Cooper (2005).
8A linear function is a polynomial function of degree zero or one. In the one-dimension case, such a function has
the form:
y = mx + b
which once drawn on a cartesian plane shows as a line with slope m, hence the attribute “linear”.
The Perceptron uses such a linear function, but in the more general n-dimensional domain, where n is the number
of inputs:
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It maps a set of typically binary data (input neurons) to a binary output (output neuron) using
a layer of parametric values called weights (representing the synapses). The weights are usually
initialized randomly. A simple training procedure allows the perceptron to adjust its weights based
on a series of example inputs for which the expected output is known.9
For example, suppose that we want to diﬀerentiate handwritten letters that are either “A” or “B”
using a Perceptron. We create a database of multiple 8x8 black and white images of handwritten
A’s and B’s. Each such image can thus be represented as a vector x of 256 dimensions x1, · · · , x256,
each being assigned a value of −1 to represent black pixels and a value of 1 for white pixels. The
model possesses a weight wi that is associated with each of the 256 inputs of an image, which is
usually initialized randomly.10
To compute the class of a given input as predicted by the Perceptron, we feed it one of the
examples by copying the values of one of the images to the network’s inputs xi, multiplying each





Thresholding the value at zero (0), we classify this image in the “A” category if the resulting






where wi are the weights (synapses) associated with inputs xi (eg., each pixel in a black and white image), while b
is a “bias” weight. In that case, the function can be represented geometrically as a hyperplane in n dimensions that
splits the space in two distinct regions representing the two classes that we try to distinguish.
The result (a scalar) is then “thresholded” to yield a binary output (representing the true/false category the
perceptron is trying to infer from the input data): the category will be 1 if the output o(x) is positive, and 0 if it is
negative.
9It is worth mentioning that the perceptron was invented around the same time as another connectionist network
inspired by the McCulloch-Pitts model, the Adaptive Linear Element or ADALINE (Widrow and Hoﬀ 1960), which
uses a similar learning rule.
10There is also an additional bias weight b that needs to be initialized, however for the sake of simplicity we will





1, if o(x) ≥ 0
0, otherwise
Let d represent the desired category of the example under consideration (which we know of
because as human beings we can identify the true category of the character as either an “A” or a
“B”). We can then adjust the weights wi according to the following learning rule:
wi ← wi − η(y − d)xi
The motivation behind that rule amounts to:
1. If network output y = 0 while target output d = 1, then y is too small, so we need to increase
the weights associated with positive inputs by a small value η called a learning rate while
decreasing weights that correspond to negative inputs.
2. Likewise if y = 0 and d = 1 we need to do the exact opposite so as to lower the value of y.
3. Finally, if the network classiﬁed the example correctly (i.e., y = d) we do not change anything.
The procedure repeats for several steps, running through the database of images until the average
error converges to a minimum.
A similar kind of learning rule was used in the second and fourth interventions of Absence. In the
Second Absence (the light-adjusting system in a bottle), the output itself (i.e., the LED intensity)
is directly adjusted using a learning rate of 1 in response to the input (i.e., the photocell measuring
the light intensity) (see the algorithm p. 4). In the case of the Fourth Absence, an intermediate
parameter w is used to control the output (i.e., the rhythm at which a sound is produced); this
parameter gets updated in response to the battery voltage using a learning rate η (c.f. page 2.3).
In other words, a parameter gets adjusted to generate actions by trying to lower an error rate
(measured as the diﬀerential between a target and an actual battery charge during nighttime).
Perceptrons mark an important step in the history of Machine Learning for two reasons. These
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more complex and abstract features, such as handwritten letters.
The Pandemonium was built on Selfridge’s previous research on visual pattern recognition. In
1954, the scientist had given a talk at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, describing a system
programmed by G. P. Dinneen that was able to learn by experience (Dinneen 1955; Selfridge 1955).
Present at the conference was computer scientist Allen Newell who was then conducting research
into army-related logistic problems. Newell was deeply inspired by Selfridge’s talk. While the
learning capabilities of the system were rather poor in practice, it nonetheless revealed a true
potential for machines to display intelligent behavior.
In the year that followed, Newell started working on an adaptive system to eﬀectively play chess,
which was presented at the Western Joint Computer Conference in 1955. His work grasped the
attention of economist Herbert A. Simon at Carnegie Mellon and, together with RAND programmer
J. C. Shaw, they started working on the ambitious project of designing a program that would be
able to prove mathematical problems.
The program, called the Logic Theorist, was shown the next year during the famous 1956 Dart-
mouth Conference at Dartmouth College in Hanover, New Hampshire. An initiative of Computer
Scientist John McCarthy, the conference brought together a small group of scientists around the
study of a new ﬁeld: artiﬁcial intelligence. The study proceeded on the basis of the conjecture
that every aspect of learning, or any other feature of intelligence, can in principle be so precisely
described that a machine can be made to simulate it.
Whereas several approaches to the problem of computer intelligence were considered, includ-
ing connectionist methods (McCarthy et al. 2006), the conference was dominated by the work of
Newell, Shaw and Simon, who were the only researchers who came with an actual, working artiﬁcial
intelligence system.
Generally considered to be the ﬁrst artiﬁcial intelligence program, the Logic Theorist was even-
tually able to prove 38 theorems from Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica, even coming
up with a more elegant proof for one of them (Newell, Shaw, and Simon 1958; Newell, Shaw, and
Simon 1959). It was extremely impressive in its ability to perform in a category of tasks that seemed
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extremely diﬃcult to humans, requiring a high degree of abstraction and logic.11 To the contrary
of connectionist and Cybernetics approaches, it also did not attempt to model existing biological
systems, and instead focused on structured, symbolic manipulations to achieve its remarkable goals.
Newell, Shaw and Simon’s work would set the stage for the ﬁrst phase of the development of
the ﬁeld of AI from the mid–1950s till the mid–1970s. This era was marked, on the one side, by a
dubious optimism, as some researchers managed to rapidly achieve satisfying results on high-level
problems such as playing checkers or chess (Newell 1955), and responding eﬀectively to simple text-
based chat interactions, or solving problems in simulated “micro-worlds” (Winograd 1970); and on
the other, by a heavy reliance on symbolic, rule-based systems, with little or no interest in biological
systems such as neural networks.
Indeed, the excitement for connectionist structures inspired from human biology that was grow-
ing in the 1950s would come to a halt with the publication of Minksy and Papert’s forceful critique
of perceptrons (Minsky and Papert 1969). By showing that even simple problems are unsolvable
by such a linear neural network, the book put a halt to the non-symbolic and distributed approach
which had had great attention in the ﬁeld since the 1940s. Public funding switched sides and for
two decades, AI research turned towards the symbolic and heuristic approach pioneered by Minksy,
Papert and Simon, which would later be known as “classic AI” or Good Old Fashioned AI (GOFAI).
Classic AI is usually associated with “strong AI” or computationalism, a theory of mind based
on the premise that cognition is computation (Dietrich 1990).12 In 1950, Alan Turing proposed a
test for machine intelligence using a simple “imitation game”. The goal of the machine would be
to engage in a continuous chat with a human interrogator and try to “pass” as a human being. If
the interrogator could not distinguish the machine from a human interlocutor, then that machine
should, according to Turing, be considered as a thinking being (Turing 1950). In other words, what
11It would later be found that the most diﬃcult problems for computers to address are not intricate mathematical
proofs or eﬃcient strategies for playing board games, but rather the kind of problems that seem so easy to us that
we do them almost unconsciously, such as walking, talking, or driving a car.
12To understand the importance of this perspective in the history of AI, consider how the preamble of the project
proposal for the Darthmouth conference, written in 1955, places it as a foundational component of the ﬁeld:
The study is to proceed on the basis of the conjecture that every aspect of learning or any other
feature of intelligence can in principle be so precisely described that a machine can be made to simulate
it. (McCarthy et al. 2006, p. 12)
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their approach, he proposes to address these caveats by putting the body back into the equation.13
After the impressive results of early AI, research quickly plateaued, plagued by profound theo-
retical and practical problems (Pfeifer 1996). By the mid–1970s, government support had stopped
ﬂowing, leading to a dry period often referred to as the “AI Winter” which ran for about a decade.
In the 1980s, new approaches started resurfacing, such as Expert Systems, Artiﬁcial Life and Ma-
chine Learning. But before we move on, we will have a look at the inﬂuence of early conceptions of
machine intelligence and adaptation on the artistic culture of the 1960s and 1970s.
Many of my own agent-based installation works before 2008 used some form of rule-based systems
that, in the spirit of GOFAI, approached the question of artiﬁcial agency through heuristics. For
example, my M. A. project Flag (2007), an immersive interactive installation, generates sequences
of words semantically connected to one another through the construction of a hand-made graph
representation of a word cloud. The First Absence was also designed using such an approach,
using my own a priori knowledge of the world to encode a behavioral response (in this case to the
sunset). Most agent-based installations that use some form of AI technology actually follow this
same approach, often with very good results. Consider for example the excellent work of robotic
artists such as Louis-Philippe Demers, Jessica Field, Ken Rinaldo, and Bill Vorn.14
3.1.4 Cybernetics and Aesthetics
In the ﬁrst three decades following the end of the war, Cybernetics, Connectionism and AI oﬀered
diﬀerent perspectives over the functioning of cognition. The apparition of computer-based technolo-
gies in society had a tremendous impact in these years. However, how it aﬀected the artistic world
is often overlooked. Art historian Edward A. Shanken describes the inﬂuence of Cybernetics on art
in the 1960s through the work of Roy Ascott (Shanken 2002). Ascott’s reading of cyberneticians
13There is an extensive body of literature that critiques computationalism. For example, see (Searle 1980), (Wino-
grad and Flores 1987), (Suchman 1987), and (Harnad 1990).
14There are many reasons for this, but I will only name a few here. First, the controlled environment of the gallery
space oﬀers very few degrees of freedom and it is possible to restrict it even more, thus allowing the eﬀective use of
simple computational tricks. In other words: galleries are “small worlds” that can be toyed with in often impressive
ways. Second, contrary to AI researchers, artists only need to generate an illusion of agency which does not even
need to feel or look smart. Figurative elements are really important in the production of a sense of agency. Picture
how drawing two eyes and a mouth on an inanimate object such as a potato can suddenly transform it into an agent,
at least perceptually. Finally, the public itself is adaptive and, in an artistic setting, often ready to “suspend their
disbelief” as long as they are going to have a good show.
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Norbert Wiener, Ross Ashby and Frank H. George in 1961 made him envision a new conception
of art as something embodied in interactive systems rather than in physical objects. The scope of
Cybernetics as an encompassing theory of systems’ behavior and communication, would allow As-
cott to merge Cybernetics and art, in an eﬀort to “theorize the relationship between art and society
in terms of the interactive ﬂow of information and behavior through a network of interconnected
processes and systems” (4).
Cybernetics’ conceptions of adaptivity, homeostasis and feedback loops are thus an integral
component of Ascott’s perspective, which he explains in his 1966 paper Behaviourist Art and Cy-
bernetic Vision (Ascott 2003a). In it, he claims that visual arts have entered a new era where
other modalities (such as sound and touch) are explored by artists and where the interactive and
participative experience of the spectator in relationship with the artwork becomes central. Ascott
thus suggests the name “behavioural art”15 as a replacement for “visual art”, which has become too
narrow to describe the new paradigm (110). Ascott later argues more speciﬁcally what he means
by it and its relationship with adaptivity and feedback:
Behaviourist art constitutes [. . . ] a retroactive process of human involvement, in which
the artifact functions as both matrix and catalyst. As matrix, it is the substance
between two sets of behaviours; it exists neither for itself nor by itself. As a catalyst,
it triggers changes in the spectator’s total behaviour. Its structure must be adaptive,
implicitly or physically, to accommodate the spectator’s responses, in order that the
creative evolution of form and idea may take place. The basic principle is feedback. The
artifact/observer system furnishes its own controlling energy: a function of an output
variable (observer’s response) is to act as an input variable, which introduces more
variety into the system and leads to more variety in the output (observer’s experience).
(128)16
Hungarian artist Nicolas Schöﬀer’s piece CYSP I, created in 1956, is considered to be the ﬁrst
autonomous cybernetic sculpture to follow Ascot’s deﬁnition.17 The work consists of an eight-foot
15Ascott seems to use the terms “behavioral” and “behaviourist” interchangeably in his writings.
16Roy Ascott would enact this vision not only through his art practice but also through his views on the pedagogy
of art. In his 1967 manifesto Behaviourables and Futuribles, Ascott frantically argues for restructuring art schools
“as homeostatic organisms, living, adaptive instruments for generating creative thought and action.” (Ascott 2003b,
p. 159)
17In fact, the name of the work comes from a combination of the two ﬁrst letters of cybernetics and of Schöﬀer’s
theory of spatiodynamic sculpture.
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tall metallic structure that can move freely across space thanks to four rollers set at its base. At
the top of the sculpture are mounted sixteen (16) motorized plates of colored acrylic glass. A
central processing unit designed by the Philips corporation uses the signals coming from a set of
photo-electric cells and a microphone to control the motors, allowing the device to respond to its
environment and to itself, thus engaging in a self-organized behavior. This design allows it to adapt
to diﬀerent contexts of presentation: shown for the ﬁrst time in Paris as part of “Nuit de la poésie”,
it would later join human dancers in a pas de deux by choreographer Maurice Béjart and, in 1957,
would participate in a “spectacle cybernétique” in Évreux under the musical direction of Pierre
Henry (Schöﬀer 2004). Directly inspired by Norbert Wiener’s theory of control and communication,
Schöﬀer’s work is a pioneering example of the kind of feedback systems early cyberneticians had in
mind (Fernández 2006, 472).
British polymath Andrew Speedie Gordon Pask is another key ﬁgure of the cybernetic art
movement which was lead by Roy Ascott in the UK.18 Pask had allegedly discovered Cybernetics
as an undergraduate at Cambridge in the early 1950s, through an impromptu meeting with Norbert
Wiener himself (Pickering 2010, 313). While he his mostly known for his scientiﬁc work, Pask’s
involvement with Cybernetics ﬁrst started in the art world. During his years at Cambridge, Pask
had participated in the lighting design of theatrical shows in Cambridge and London and created,
together with fellow student Robin McKinnon Wood, a business specialized in the orchestration
of musical comedies. In 1953, they invented a theatrical lighting system called the Musicolour, an
apparatus that “used the sound of a musical performance to control a light show, with the aim
of achieving a synesthetic combination of sounds and light”(316). Reacting adaptively to a sound
signal, it generated patterns of light, interacting with human performers in real-time. The device
contained a “rudimentary learning facility” that was able to change the relationship between sound
and light during the course of a performance.
Notions of adaptation and learning are what fascinated Pask the most in cybernetics systems.
Discussing the evolution of the work as it toured across the country, he notes:
18Evidently, it is Pask who originally explained cybernetics to Ascott at his request (Miller 2014). Pask and
Ascott would actually get to work together in the early 1960s as consultants on Price and Littlewood’s Fun Palace,
an ambitious Cybernetics architectural project that would never be built (Mathews 2005).
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By that time it was clear that the interesting thing about Musicolour was not synaes-
thesia but the learning capability of the machine. Given a suitable design and a happy
choice of visual vocabulary, the performer (being inﬂuenced by the visual display) could
become involved in a close participant interaction with the system. He trained the ma-
chine and it played a game with him. In this sense, the system acted as an extension of
the performer with which he could co-operate to achieve eﬀects that he could not achieve
on his own. Consequently, the learning mechanism was extended and the machine itself
became reformulated as a game player capable of habituating at several levels, to the
performer’s gambits. (Pask 1971, 78)
Along with artists Nam June Paik, Jean Tinguely, John Cage and Edward Ihnatowicz, Pask
would participate in 1968 in the exhibition “Cybernetic Serendipity” at the Institute of Contem-
porary Arts in London, with his work Colloquy of Mobiles, which involved a social and sexual
metaphor of agents trying to collectively achieve a goal by adapting to one another (Reichardt
1968). The exhibition, curated by Jasia Reichardt, set a landmark in the historical upbringing of
media art. It brought together the work of more than a hundred contributors, the majority of which
were not artists, such as computer scientists, engineers, and philosophers, as well as a chaotic mix of
apparatuses and installations that were purposely intended to confuse the visitor as to whether they
were created by an artist or a scientist. Many of the works displayed were, like Pask’s installation,
directly inspired by Cybernetics, using principles of feedback as their core mechanism (Cybernetics
Serendipity - Late Night Lineup 1968).
The same year, artist and critic Jack Burnham published “Systems Aesthetics” in Artforum,
where he explained how the society of the time, shaken by the rapid progress of science and tech-
nology, was transiting from an “object-oriented to a systems-oriented culture” where “change em-
anates, not from things, but from the way things are done.” (Burnham 1968, 31). This transition,
he claims, is reﬂected in contemporary practices emerging in the 1960s such as Robert Smithson’s
“earthworks”, the light “sculptures” of Dan Flavin, the “kinetic art” of Jean Tinguely and Alexander
Calder as well as Allan Kaprow’s Happenings.
Burnham’s perspective over art and science is intimately linked with conceptual art, which in
the 1960s promulgated the supremacy of ideas over forms. Indeed, Burnham’s epitomic 1970 exhi-
bition Software brought together conceptual artists such as Vito Acconci, John Baldessari, Robert
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Barry, Donald Burgy, Hans Haacke, Douglas Huebler and Joseph Kosuth, to explore computer tech-
nologies as ways to generate interactions between the audience and machines. “Systems aesthetics”
established a link between Grey Walter’s creative experiments with mobile robots and the work of
pioneering cybernetic artists such as Nam June Paik and Nicholas Schöﬀer through their interest
in imitating life.
Whereas Burnham’s visionary perspective was directly inﬂuenced by Cybernetics, the concept
of systems on which it was built originates from General Systems Theory, an interdisciplinary
approach originally formulated by biologist Ludwig von Bertalanﬀy in the 1930s as well as in
diﬀerent publications after the war. Observing that diﬀerent disciplines were in fact dealing with
similar problems, he argued for an integrated approach that could be applied across them:
Thus, there exist models, principles, and laws that apply to generalized systems or their
subclasses, irrespective of their particular kind, the nature of their component elements,
and the relations or “forces” between them. It seems legitimate to ask for a theory, not
of systems of a more or less special kind, but of universal principles applying to systems
in general. (Bertalanﬀy 1969, 32)
General Systems Theory and Cybernetics are very close in spirit and in practice. In fact, as
pointed out by interdisciplinary researcher Francis Heylighen at the Free University of Brussels,
both approaches focus on the same problem of “organization independent of the substrate in which
it is embodied” using only a slightly diﬀerent approach. “[S]ystems theory has focused more on
the structure of systems and their models, whereas cybernetics has focused more on how systems
function”. They should be considered as two faces of the same coin (Heylighen 2000, 460—461).
Burnham argued how art as an institution could be understood as a hierarchical system, with
artists as its basis being “similar to programs and subroutines”, with, at the very top, a “metapro-
gram” that constantly rearranges the long-term objectives of art. Key to Burnham’s vision is the
conclusion that this self-organizing, adaptive system does not produce new objects, but rather new
information embodied in works of art (Burnham 1969). In 1970, he curated the show Software at the
Jewish Museum in New York, where he articulated this vision by bringing together works created
by artists and scientists alike that made extensive use of computer technology, with the objective
of generating aesthetic eﬀects without the intervention of objects. “The machines in Software”, he
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claimed, “should not be regarded as art objects; instead they are merely transducers, that is, means
of relaying information which may or may not have relevance to art.” (Software 1970, 12)
Burnham’s systems art and Ascott’s behaviourist art both translated ideas about the adap-
tive and emergent nature of human and nonhuman systems inherited from scientiﬁc research in
Cybernetics and General Systems Theory. While both Burnham and Ascott have been relatively
overlooked by art historians and theorists, their aesthetics have ramiﬁcations in many art forms
from the 1960s onward, such as conceptual art, information art, algorithmic art, generative art and
robotic art.
Yet, when applied to works such as Absences, both Burnham and Ascott’s theories have short-
comings. One of the strengths of Burnham’s framework is to relocate the locus of aesthetics from
the physical properties of an art object into the artwork’s mode of operation as a system embedded
in a network of relationships. Burnham’s emphasis on a disembodied ﬂux of information that chan-
nels through the art object — which only act as an empty shell independent from the process that
it allows to run — is, however, reminiscent of computationalism as a model for the workings of the
brain. Burnham’s vision is thus somehow tainted by the Shannionian myth of aerial, disembodied
processes that run independently from their corporeal substrate. This argument is problematic
when applied to an aesthetics of agent-based systems as it fails to take into account the question
of the embodiment of these agents.
Ascott, on the other hand, seems to be interested in taking into account not only the production
of novelty as pure information but also in its morphological evolution. His perspective, however,
presupposes an interaction between a work of art and a human, which seems less appropriate in
the case of the nonhuman-to-nonhuman dynamics that happen in Absences.
Still, both Ascott and Burnham highlight an important point in their focus on behaviors —
and the experience of such behaviors — in machine-human conﬁgurations in the artistic domain.
Furthermore, their interest in Cybernetics aligns with a vision of society, culture, and art, as
profoundly adaptive systems, evolving through a network of self-organizing agents which adjust to
one another through a myriad of feedback loops.
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3.1.5 Machine Learning
At the beginning of the 1980s, classic approaches in AI were still dominant, showing no interest
in any form of biologically-based computation such as genetic algorithms and neural computation.
Nevertheless, a small portion of AI researchers had become interested in questions of learning
systems. Pat Langley describes the creation of the new discipline of Machine Learning in the early
1980s:
The ﬁrst workshop in 1980 at Carnegie-Mellon University had identiﬁed a community
of researchers with common interests in computational approaches to learning and ar-
rived at a name for its activities. Moreover, the parent ﬁelds of artiﬁcial intelligence
and cognitive science were showing little interest at the time in learning-related issues,
preferring to focus on the role of knowledge in intelligence, regardless of its origin. As
a result, we encountered some diﬃculty publishing and, more generally, felt we were
not getting the attention we deserved. Finally, there was the common urge of young,
energetic researchers to create something of their own to which they could attach their
names. (Langley 2011, 275)
Machine Learning is a sub-ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence that employs mathematical models that
can classify and make predictions based on statistical inference over observed data rather than
on logical rules. It can be split in three main areas of inquiry: supervised learning, unsupervised
learning and reinforcement learning. Supervised and unsupervised learning methods are used for
statistical classiﬁcation or regression of data points.19 Supervised learning is used when we know in
advance the target category of the data points we want to classify, such as when trying to recognize
hand-written digits, whereas unsupervised learning is when we do not have tagged data points
but rather want to learn some inherent properties of the data distribution under consideration.
Finally, reinforcement learning (RL) rather tries to address the problem of an agent adapting to its
environment by trying to optimize a criterion called a reward function, which basically rewards or
punishes the agent depending on its current state and actions (Sutton and Barto 1998).
19Classiﬁcation consists in assigning a label or class to a data point, for example the symbol (A, B, C, etc.)
represented by a handwritten letter, or the name of an individual recognized in a photograph. Regression, on the
other hand, concerns the estimation of a numerical value, for example, the expected amount of claimed dollars that
will be made by an insurance customer, or the expected temperature for tomorrow.
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3.1.6 Connectionism in the 1980s
At its beginning, the new ﬁeld of Machine Learning was still mostly based on symbolic methods
such as decision trees and logic. But in the middle of the decade, the discovery of an eﬃcient
way to train Multi-Layer Perceptrons (MLP) would suddenly bring connectionism back on the
scene (Rumelhart, Hinton, and Williams 1986). MLPs — which are also often called Feedforward
Artiﬁcial Neural Networks (FANN) — can be used for classiﬁcation as well as for regression (i.e.,
function approximation). As their name indicates, they consists in stacking many perceptrons on
top of each other in interconnected layers of neurons. Hence, they diﬀer from perceptrons in that
they not only have an input and an output layer of neurons but also one or more hidden layers
between these inputs and outputs. Like in the perceptron, a ﬁrst set of weights maps the input
neurons to an intermediate “hidden” layer, where abstract, higher-level representations of the inputs
are automatically generated through the cooperation of neurons.
One way to understand these structures is to consider each hidden neuron as the output neuron
of a perceptron. The diﬀerence is that in the case of the perceptron, the output is transformed
into a binary value using a hard threshold. In a MLP, the hidden neurons are transformed using
a smooth, non-linear thresholding function that pushes them towards a binary value. Finally, the
hidden neurons are linearly combined using a second set of weights to produce the next layer of
neurons.20 This process moves forward, from layer to layer, until the ﬁnal output layer is reached,
yielding the result.
Because each layer projects the previous layer’s outputs using a non-linear thresholding func-
tion,21 MLPs model smooth classiﬁcation functions that can grasp intricate, high-order variations
20One can look at an ANN as a network of agents, where each hidden neuron is seen as a minimal agent that
becomes an expert classiﬁer over a speciﬁc domain. These agents are encouraged to divide the input space between
them. They are then combined to produce the ﬁnal output, as if they were “voting”.
21As can be recalled from section 3.1.2, perceptrons are simple linear models that separate space using a hyperplane.
They are thus incapable of dealing with problems that are not linearly separable, as was rightfully pointed out by
Minsky and Papert (Minsky and Papert 1969). Indeed, most interesting problems turn out to be non-linearly
separable.
MLPs’ “tour de force” consists in preserving the self-organizing, distributed representation properties of percep-
trons, while alleviating their ﬂaws by applying a non-linear ﬁlter to their outputs. A very commonly used ﬁlter is
the sigmoid function, which was described in section 2.3 .
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in the data, thus circumventing the main caveat of perceptrons as pointed to by Minsky and Pa-
pert (Minsky and Papert 1969). But while MLPs were actually known way before the mid–1980s22,
there existed no tractable way to train them. The 1986 breakthrough, introduced by David E.
Rumelhart, Geoﬀrey E. Hinton, and Ronald J. Williams, consisted in a method known as back-
propagation that allowed the eﬃcient computation of the neural network’s weights’ gradient.23 The
gradient essentially represents the partial derivatives (in other words, the degree of change, or the
slope) of the error function with respect to the weights. Knowing it thus gives a sense of how the
error changes in function of the weights, allowing the adjustment of weights in a stepwise manner
in the direction that is most likely to lower the error, a procedure known as Stochastic Gradient
Descent (SGD).24
Without entering into details, consider the similarity of the update rule in SGD to that of the
perceptron. Let E be the error function, w be a weight in the MLP, and ∂E
∂w
be the partial derivative
of the error with respect to that weight. After each step of SGD, the weight will be changed using
the following formula:
w ← w − η ∂E
∂w
Once again, we retrieve a negative feedback procedure that ﬁne-tunes a weight by pushing it in
the direction that will enable it to most likely contribute to better classiﬁcations (i.e., lower errors)
in the future, tempered with an adjustable learning rate η that controls the speed of learning.
Like real neural networks in the brain, ANNs represent information in a distributed way, as
opposed to a symbolic, local representation. At the beginning of the procedure, the weights are
initialized randomly, such that the network decisions are completely chaotic (i.e., the entropy is
maximal). By getting exposed to the environment (in other words, by being subjected to examples
sampled from the real world distribution) and taking actions in a range of diﬀerent contexts, the
network is slowly adjusted to make better predictions. Thus, the network itself becomes increasingly
ordered as its parameters (weights) are shaped to decrease the global entropy of the model.
22Selfridge’s Pandemonium, introduced earlier, grasped the concept of interconnected layers of abstractions already
in the 1950s (Selfridge 1959).
23In fact, backpropagation had been discovered years before but had not been applied speciﬁcally to neural net-
works. For a detailed historical account of backpropagation, read (Schmidhuber 2015).





Genetic Algorithms (GA) is another approach to Machine Learning that was largely popularized
in the 1980s. GAs stemmed from a completely diﬀerent branch than neurology: that of genetics
and evolution. Although developing through its very own path, it is important to describe it here,
mainly because it is one of the learning approaches that has been the most largely adopted by
artists.25
While the were many research groups in the 1960s working on computational models of evolution
applied to AI,26 the invention of Genetic Algorithms (which is one of many approaches to evolution-
ary computation) is usually attributed to scientist John Holland (Mitchell 1998), who developed
them in an eﬀort to build a formal mathematical representation of genetic adaptation that could
be run on computerized systems. Holland’s framework understands natural evolution as an itera-
tive optimization process that functions by evolving populations of individuals using basic genetic
operators such as cross-overs and mutations, testing them against a ﬁtness function27 and selecting
only the best individuals to generate the next population (Holland 1992). The basic form of GAs
as proposed by Holland employs artiﬁcial chromosomes that are essentially sequences of bits (i.e.,
the genotype). Segments of the string correspond to genes that determine actual characteristics of
the individual (i.e., its phenotype). The performance of the individual can than be assessed using
a ﬁtness function which determines what needs to be optimized.
A genetic algorithm in its simplest form goes more or less as follow (Mitchell 1995, 5):
1. Begin with an initial population of N individuals (i.e., chromosomes).
2. Select the M ﬁttest individuals according to ﬁtness function F (x).
3. Perform crossovers and mutations over pairs of selected individuals, thus generating a new
25The reasons for this are unclear. However, one can point to the fact that GAs are more easy to understand,
implement and apply in works of art, as one possible explanation.
26For example, see Rechenberg’s evolutionsstrategie (Rechenberg, 1965/August//; Rechenberg 1973) as well the
“evolutionary programming” by described in Fogel, Owens, and Walsh (1967).
27A ﬁtness function is an evaluation function that gives a value (typically as a real number) to an individual in a
population, usually representing its performance over a problem that the GA tries to solve.
For example, a GA used to learn how to play chess might generate populations of agents and have them play
games against one another. The ﬁtness function could then be the percentage of games won (with ties counting as
a half-win).
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generation of N oﬀsprings.
4. Replace the population with the newly generated one.
5. Go to step 2.
This is an optimization algorithm: it performs a search through the space of possible solutions
to a problem, represented as computational chromosomes, using an evolutionary heuristic. The
process works by making local changes in potential solutions to a problem, moving closer to the
end goal in a stepwise manner. It is thus very close, in essence, to other adaptive algorithms such
as Stochastic Gradient Descent.
3.1.8 Adaptation and Learning
This historical overview exposes the important role played by adaptation and learning in the sci-
entiﬁc landscape in regards to computational cognition and machinic life, from the post-war era
onward. Yet, these ideas and associated techniques seem to have only been rarely exploited di-
rectly by artists and even less examined by humanities scholars. Before we move into the second
part of this chapter, I would like to discuss further these notions by considering diﬀerent scientiﬁc
deﬁnitions.
As suggested earlier, we can trace the origins of modern understandings of adaptivity down to
ﬁrst-order Cybernetics in the work of Arturo Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener and Julian Bigelow (Rosen-
blueth, Wiener, and Bigelow 1943). Core to their conception of system processes is the teleological
nature of animal behavior, that is, their ability to adjust to their environment to reach their goals
using negative feedback. This fundamental idea constitutes the cornerstone of Machine Learning
approaches, which requires the interaction between a structural component, an error function and
an optimization procedure, as I will further explain in section 3.2.
The authors suggest a hierarchical taxonomy of behavior. In that ontology, living systems are
ﬁrst said to be active, in that they are the source of energy that allows their actions, as opposed
to passive objects like a stone being thrown by another agent. They are also considered purposeful,
which relates to their behavior appearing as being directed voluntarily towards a goal. Some
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purposeful active behaviors are also teleological, meaning that they use negative feedback to adjust
their aim while trying to reach their goal.28
British cyberneticians like Ross Ashby, Grey Walter, Gordon Pask and Staﬀord Beer proposed
visions of Cybernetics systems that can be seen as alternatives to these behavioral categories.
These researchers seemed less interested in a designing a theory of ﬁnal causes than in imagining
and articulating ways in which living systems perform, in particular through the creation of devices
endowed with lifelike qualities. Discussing their work, Andrew Pickering writes:
There is something strange and striking about adaptive mechanisms. Most of the exam-
ples of engineering that come to mind are not adaptive. Bridges and buildings, lathes
and power presses, cars, televisions, computers, are all designed to be indiﬀerent to their
environment, to withstand ﬂuctuations, not to adapt to them. The best bridge is one
that just stands there, whatever the weather. Cybernetic devices, in contrast, explicitly
aimed to be sensitive and responsive to changes in the world around them, and this
endowed them with a disconcerting, quasi-magical, disturbingly lifelike quality. (7)
Grey Walter created his electro-mechanical “tortoises” during his spare time. His later versions
testify to an interest in a machinic form of learning inspired from behaviorism, even though he does
not explicitly use the expression “Machine Learning” to describe their behavior (Walter 1951). The
ﬁrst alleged use of the term comes from engineer Arthur Lee Samuel who worked — also in his
time oﬀ — on the game of checkers. Samuel was interested in achieving better results at playing
the game not through logical rules or brute-force search, but rather by providing an algorithm with
several instances of played games, allowing the system to learn by itself what are the best moves.
His technique, which he describes in his 1959 foundational paper (Samuel 1959), can be considered
as an embryonic instance of reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto 1998, 267).
In the preface to his foundational book Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems, John H.
Holland proposes a formal deﬁnition of adaptation as a “process whereby a structure is progressively
modiﬁed to give better performance in its environment” (Holland 1992, xiii). In this perspective,
28To understand the diﬀerence between teleological and non-teleological systems, consider the example of a snake
striking at a frog with “no visual or other report from the prey after the movement has started”. As the authors
express, in that case the movement is “so fast that it is not likely that nerve impulses would have time to arise at
the retina, travel to the central nervous system and set up further impulses which would reach the muscles in time
to modify the movement eﬀectively.
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the story of evolution can be seen as an optimization process that performs a heuristic search in
the realm of possibilities by selecting the best individuals at each generation, preserving part of
their genetic structure while combining and mutating them. Signiﬁcantly, the same kind of genetic
procedure which nature applies to evolve ﬁttest forms or organs in living systems can be digitally
simulated to develop better strategies of action in computational agents:
Roughly, experience guides changes in the organism’s structure so that as time passes
the organism makes better use of its environment for its own end. (Holland 1996, 9)
As a ﬁnal remark, to better contextualize the place of adaptation and learning in post-WWII
discourses on artiﬁcial intelligence, it is worth stating that agent-based approaches to learning and
Genetic Algorithms were substantially sidestepped during the connectionist renaissance of the mid–
1980s — which established the foundations of Machine Learning as a ﬁeld of research in its own
rights — in favor of pattern recognition applications.29 The neural approach to learning decreased in
popularity throughout the 1990s in favor of a more general conception of computational adaptation
known as probabilistic or statistical learning. Gaussian Mixture Models (GMMs) and Support
Vector Machines (SVM) are examples of such approaches that rely primarily on statistics rather
than on some model of biological processes (Vapnik 2000).
3.1.9 Deep Learning
What mainly explains the decrease in popularity of connectionism as an approach to AI in the
1990s was the problem of training artiﬁcial neural networks with many layers of neurons. This
prevented such systems to grasp highly varying functions, which are needed to express complex
behaviors such as the ones we ﬁnd in “intelligent” agents such as humans.
Until the mid–2000s, it was only possible to train shallow neural architectures eﬃciently — that
is, connectionist networks with only 1, 2, or 3 layers. But many neuroscientists seem to believe that
brains are organized in deep architectures, processing sensory information through many diﬀerent
levels of abstraction (Serre et al. 2007; Bengio 2009). For example, the visual cortex contains
29However, GAs were very important in artiﬁcial life and evolutionary art communities.
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multiple layers of neurons that correspond to diﬀerent degrees of representation, from detecting
edges and orientations to more complex shape recognition (Kruger et al. 2013).
In the early 2000s, raw computational power became more readily available to scientists, foster-
ing what Machine Learning expert Jürgen Schmidhuber called a “second Neural Network ReNNais-
sance” (Schmidhuber et al. 2011) — a reference to their “First Renaissance” in the 1980s triggered
by the publication of the backpropagation algorithm by David E. Rumelhart, Geoﬀrey E. Hinton
and Ronald J. Williams. This allowed researchers to run experiments over much larger models,
encouraging the development of algorithmic techniques to address the shortcomings of shallow
architectures.
In 2006, Geoﬀrey E. Hinton (who was part responsible for the aforementioned ﬁrst “Renais-
sance” of neural nets), Simon Osindero, and Yee Whye Teh came up with a solution for training
Deep Belief Networks, which are a special kind of multi-layered neural network. This development
plugged the breach left open twenty years ago after Hinton last published his work on backpropa-
gation (Hinton, Osindero, and Teh 2006).30 The method they proposed used unsupervised learning
to pre-train the lower layers of the model before subjecting the whole system to a traditional su-
pervised learning procedure. Their approach created a signiﬁcant improvement in the error rate of
MNIST (a benchmark database well-known in the ﬁeld of Machine Learning) over other approaches
using shallow architectures or Support Vector Machines.
This breakthrough, along with much other research, allowed for the emergence of a whole new
ﬁeld within Machine Learning called Deep Learning, whose main interest lies in ﬁnding solutions
to diﬃcult problems (such as driving a car) by allowing computers to “learn from experience and
understand the world in terms of a hierarchy of concepts, with each concept deﬁned in terms of its
relation to simpler concepts”. This system therefore avoids the need for humans to “formally specify
all of the knowledge that the computer needs”. In particular, this “hierarchy of concepts allows
the computer to learn complicated concepts by building them out of simpler ones” (Goodfellow,
Bengio, and Courville 2016).31
30This is an oversimpliﬁcation of the history, of course, as scientiﬁc discoveries do not happen in a vaccuum. For
a more thorough analysis of the history of deep learning, please consult (Schmidhuber 2015).
31Deep Learning models have become extremely complex and powerful, with some neural nets being more than
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While none of the artworks described in this dissertation make use of deep architectures, I
wish to discuss Deep Learning here because of its important socio-technical repercussions. As
mentioned in the introductory chapter, its successes have now made Deep Learning the spearhead
of big IT companies such as Google and Facebook, who have become the main hiring bodies for
Deep Learning engineers. After the media success of its Deep Dream project, Google has recently
launched Magenta, a research project that seeks to advance and explore the applications of AI
relative to “music and art generation” (Eck 2016).32
While Google’s interest in art and creativity sounds like good news to media art professionals,
a word of caution is necessary. One should not forget that the multi-billion dollars companies’
main source of proﬁt is advertising: in other words, their main use of Machine Learning and Data
Mining algorithms is to better target consumers who freely give their data through the use of
their platforms. I do not place faith in techniques developed by such companies, as I doubt their
capability to be particularly revolutionary or challenging aesthetically if they are intended to appeal
to a mass consumer market. I also notice that there are severe power unbalances between artists
and these companies, often resulting in a situation where artists are eﬀectively functioning as an
underpaid cultural currency at best, and underpaid technological labor at worst. As such, I and
other cultural critics see art and science initiatives such as the Google Cultural Institute and the
Facebook Artist in Residence program as branding strategies that also oﬀer convenient ways to
capitalize on artists, by getting access to their ideas and expertise at a low cost.33
3.2 Machine Learning in Art Practice
Cybernetics-style adaptive systems have evolved from the 1980s onward into the science of Machine
Learning, bringing together a vast multitude of approaches ranging from statistics, stochastics and
Bayesian logic to neural and genetic computing under a common research program within AI.
Machine Learning explores algorithms that are able to make inferences and predictions about the
1000-layers deep. . .
32It is unclear what they mean by “art” (as opposed to “music”) in this description.
33Read (Wilk 2016) for an in-depth analysis of the problematics raised by such initiatives.
76
world by looking at large quantities of data.
Clearly, these techniques were never intended to be used for artmaking. Artiﬁcial Intelligence
in general, and Machine Learning in particular, have only recently been applied to artistic creation,
being traditionally focused on rational problem solving and optimization (Eigenfeldt, Burnett, and
Pasquier 2012; Mateas 2001). Art usually attempts to ask more questions than it tries to solve,
and does not provide the kind of objective criteria one needs to perform optimization.34 Still,
the excitement and fascination one feels while observing an agent tentatively trying to achieve the
arduous task of balancing a pole (Sutton and Barto 1998), performing acrobatic stunts with a toy
helicopter (Ng et al. 2004; Abbeel et al. 2007) or ﬁnding new ways to play Pong (Mnih et al. 2013),
show these experiences possess expressive and aesthetic potentials. But what are the dimensions
of Machine Learning algorithms that can be exploited for artistic expression, and how? As a way
to approach this question, let us examine the fundamental characteristics of learning methods and
explore ways they can be harnessed for art creation.
A Machine Learning algorithm comprises four components: (1) the category of task one is trying
to solve; (2) the model used to address it; (3) the loss function against which the model is trained;
and (4) the search or optimization procedure. These items represent interdependent dimensions of
a learning system which come to inﬂuence its outcomes — in particular, its aesthetic potentialities.
3.2.1 Tasks
As explained earlier, the ﬁeld of Machine Learning is divided in three sub-ﬁelds, corresponding
to three diﬀerent classes of problem: (1) supervised learning; (2) unsupervised learning; and (3)
reinforcement learning. These categories do not exist in utter isolation. Quite permeable, they often
share models and algorithms, as the research carried out in one domain can often be applied to
another. One famous example of this is the so-called “deep learning” breakthrough which involved
unsupervised learning as a key component in training neural network architectures with several
layers of neurons on both supervised and reinforcement learning tasks (Hinton, Osindero, and Teh





Supervised learning — the most common category — concerns the problem of predicting an output
associated with a certain input data, based on a dataset containing examples of data points with
expected target response (typically hand-labelled by humans). Two sub-cases exist: (1) classifica-
tion, which consists in determining the correct category of a data point; and (2) regression, where
a continuous value needs to be predicted. A typical classiﬁcation task is pattern recognition, for
example recognizing hand-written digits. In this case, input data (pixel values) is labeled by hu-
mans with a corresponding category (the digit that was written). Using only these examples, the
algorithm needs to learn how to recognize unseen examples correctly.
Most of contemporary applications of Machine Learning are supervised learning tasks, such as
speech recognition, spam detection, face recognition, and medical diagnosis. There has also been
much research carried on their artistic use in the past two decades, with often impressive successes,
such as in the ﬁeld of music generation (Eck and Schmidhuber 2002; Boulanger-lewandowski, Bengio,
and Vincent 2012). Since supervised learning can be used to estimate probability distributions, it is
possible to train models such as ANNs on a database made up of all of Chopin’s work: the resulting
network could then be used to randomly generate a score that would sound like a Chopin piece.
Similar experiments have been done in the visual arts for generating images. Australian engineer
and digital artist Jonathan McCabe has created a piece called Nervous States (2006) consisting in
a series of prints generated by neural nets. The images come to reveal the underlying organization
of the system:
The X and Y coordinates correspond to two variables in the connections of the network;
the colour of the pixel at that point is a representation of the network’s behaviour for
those parameters. So the image is a map of system states; coherent colours show areas
of relative stability or gradual change; edges show sharp jumps in the output; marbled
swirls show complex oscillations. (Whitelaw, Wednesday, August 16, 2006)35
35Another research project analogous to this one that has gained a much wider audience is Google’d DeepDream
program, which produces psychedelic images based on the response of one of their deep neural network architectures
which is fed back into itself (Mordvintsev, Olah, and Tyka 2015).
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Rebecca Fiebrink, a computer scientist from Goldsmiths University, has created the Wekinator,
an open-source software that employs supervised learning as a tool for music performers and artists.
The software allows practitioners to easily train ML models to recognize gestures and map them
into any kind of contents. One advantage of the approach is that it opens up the possibility for
non-coders to create intricate relationships between movements and content in real-time.
An important work from the mid–1990s, Karl Sims’ Galápagos (1997), uses a GA trained in
real-time using supervised learning. The piece is representative of his interest in the evolution of
morphologies and behaviors. A series of twelve computers each show a single virtual 3D organism
whose shape and movements are the phenotypic outcome of a digital genotype. Visitors interact
with the piece by choosing which organisms they prefer. The selected individuals are then used
to generate a new population of organisms using a Genetic Algorithm that mates, recombines and
mutates their digital DNA, producing oﬀsprings that resemble their parents (Sims 1991, 1994).
Galápagos rests on Sims’ astute application of a GA process where visitors take part in a retro-
action loop by evaluating the ﬁtness of virtual creatures according to their (subjective) aesthetic
qualities. The artiﬁcial life forms are thus evolved so as to adapt to the audience’s tastes over the
exhibition period.
Supervised learning has thus been used for creative expression in generative art and performance-
driven works. In agent-based art that relies on the design of real-time behaviors, such as robotic
installations, it has mostly been utilized in less experimental manners, such as for computer vision,
often applying oﬀ-the-shelf solutions. These works are less interesting for the current study, as
the fact that they are based on learning does not have a strong impact on the resulting behaviors
produced. In other words, these works might simply perform better than previous non-learning
systems, but it does not change their ﬁnal aesthetics in a signiﬁcant manner.
Unsupervised Learning
Unsupervised learning refers to classes of problems wherein there are no precise outputs that need
to be predicted, typically referred to as “unlabeled data”. Rather, the algorithm needs to learn
“something about the data distribution”. Tasks include (1) clustering, where the system is asked
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to split the data space in diﬀerent regions, or classes; (2) dimensionality reduction, where it tries to
extract the most important regularities in a distribution to represent it using less dimensions; and
(3) representation learning, where the model attempts to learn “good” representations of the data,
usually to be fed as inputs to other Machine Learning systems.
Unsupervised learning techniques are particularly interesting for artistic research and produc-
tion, as they give more space for the learning models to come up with potentially surprising solu-
tions, whereas supervised learning methods aim to achieve clear, deﬁnite goals in the most accurate
way possible; a property that is certainly useful for engineering applications, but quite restrictive
in its ability to generate novel content.
Indeed, one of the learning methods that has been the most widely used by new media artists
is an unsupervised neural network called a Self-Organizing Map (SOM). SOMs were invented in
1981 by Teuvo Kohonen — they are often called Kohonen Maps — and would become one the most
famous unsupervised learning techniques (Kohonen 1981, 2001).36 They can be thought of as a kind
of Perceptron that can be trained to learn a mapping from a high-dimensional continuous input
space to a low-dimensional, discrete output space, a clear example of a dimensionality reduction
method. In other words, it automatically creates a set of organized categories based on the data it
observes.
Many artists who claim to make use of neural networks are in fact using SOMs. Such is the case
of sculptor Yves Amu Klein, who demonstrates an explicit commitment to creating autonomous
robotic life forms. His Living sculpture project, a series of works that attempt to “bring emo-
tional intelligence and awareness to sculptured life forms” (Klein 1998, 393), directly resonate with
Burnham’s vision.
Many of Klein’s works show adaptive features. Such is the case of Octofungi, a 1996 robotic
sculpture that relies on shape-memory alloy wire to control eight robotic legs arranged in a circle.
The movements of the robot are deﬁned by the interaction between the position of the legs and
the value of eight photocells that measure incoming light from all directions. The data from both
legs and photocells is fed into a SOM which autonomously extracts regularities from the input data
36Kohonen, which I brieﬂy introduced in section 3.1.6, is a good example of a scientist whose research in connec-
tionist adaptive systems, shelved during the AI Winter, would ﬁnally be recognized during the 1980s.
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space and chooses to activate one of the eight legs as a response. The SOM thus learns from its
environment, adapting to it in real-time.
Other works from Klein’s Living Sculpture series which make use of SOMs, include Scorpibot
(which was the artist’s ﬁrst attempt at using them), The Pods, Bella, and Flexicoatl. Klein loosely
refers to them as “neural nets” which is somehow misleading since, as I pointed out, the expression
does not refer to a speciﬁc technique but is rather an umbrella term for a large group of artiﬁ-
cial models that try to achieve adaptive properties by reproducing biological neural networks on
computer systems.
Nicolas Baginsky also uses the term “neural nets” interchangeably for SOMs when describing his
piece The Three Sirens (1992—2005), a robotic music band who play improvisational rock music.
The band consists of three robots: a slide guitar player, a bassist and a drummer. The guitarist and
the bassist use SOMs to direct their actions, playing live music in response to the sound environment
they generate in real-time. Since the sound environment is largely inﬂuenced by their own playing,
they are also entangled in a feedback loop that runs through their bodies and their environment.
A particularly fascinating aspect of the piece is how the robots have allegedly evolved through a
number of years as the connections of their SOMs were preserved between performances:
When the robot ﬁrst started playing in december 1992, the six neural network [sic]
that control the machine’s behaviour were randomly initialised. Today there are several
diﬀerent sets of networks available for diﬀerent modes of operation (diﬀerent speeds
and tunings). All these sets are descendants of the primal neural nets from 1992. This
means that the robot system now has the experience of about ten years of playing. Not
constantly but regularly. (Baginsky 2005)
Quite interestingly, these systems use the self-organizing properties of SOMs as part of a decision-
making process, which is in counterpoint to what these models were originally designed for. Their
ability to organically remap their inputs into outputs in a meaningful way seems to be eﬀectively
used by these artists to generate novel behaviors that is both organized, yet deﬁnitely nonhuman.
Whereas this particular approach of using unsupervised learning to control an agent-based system
is an original, creative hijacking of the technology, the ﬁeld of ML has developed a distinctive
approach for training agents.
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Reinforcement Learning
Reinforcement learning (RL) (c.f., section 3.2.1) tries to address problems involving an agent that
attempts to take actions in an environment in order to maximize its reward over time (Sutton and
Barto 1998). The agent learns by taking actions and receiving positive or negative feedback from the
world through rewards. A reward is a single-value information unit given to the agent in response
to his state or actions. Following Holland’s deﬁnition of adaptation, the goal of a reinforcement
learning agent is to modify its inner structure in order to maximize its performance — represented
as the rewards it collects over time — as it evolves in the environment (Holland 1992).
The ﬁeld of Reinforcement Learning (RL) emerged in the late 1980s as the result of a coalescence
between behavioral psychology, optimal control theory and dynamic programming. In reinforcement
learning, agents evolve inside an environment deﬁned as a discrete time-based stochastic control
procedure known as a Markov decision process (MDP). In this procedure, an agent takes actions
in the environment based on what it observes. Each action modiﬁes the environment, yielding a
new set of observations for the agent as well as a single-valued reward feedback. The goal of the
agent is to maximize its rewards over time. In order to do so, it usually proceeds by trial-and-error,
trying to infer what is the best course of action to take in a given context based on rewards and
punishments received in the past.
An example of a Reinforcement Learning technique is Q-Learning (Sutton and Barto 1998, 148),
a procedure in which the agent bases its decisions on an estimator function called a Q-function.
This function takes as parameters both the observation s and an action a and produces an estimate
of the expected reward the agent will get for taking action a in context s:
Q(s, a) = expected reward for taking action a given observations s
After each action taken, the Q(s, a) function is slightly adapted by the agent to give a better
approximation of the expected reward in the future. There are a certain number of ways the agent
can use that information to choose the actual action it is going to take. The way the agent uses
the Q-function to choose its actions is called a policy. The most obvious policy is just to take the
action with the maximum Q-value:
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a = argmaxa′Q(s, a′)
This is what we call a greedy policy. However, remember that the Q(s, a) function is learned
and thus, it is not the actual expected reward, but rather, an approximation of it based on what
the agent has been observing in the past (i.e., in the state-action pairs it went through). A purely
greedy policy favors exploitation of what the agent already knows, which is done at the expense
of exploration. Concretely, greedy agents will tend to get stuck in the same, safe zone where they
started, because they have not been given a chance to try out diﬀerent things (i.e., to wander inside
the whole state-action domain).
To alleviate this problem, which will more often that not result in sub-optimal behaviors, one
has to introduce some exploration in the policy. A simple way to do this is to let the agent be
greedy most of the time but, once in a while — say, with a probability of ǫ — let it take a random
action. This variation on the greedy policy is called the ǫ-greedy policy and is the one used most
frequently in reinforcement learning. This is due both to the simplicity of its implementation as
well as to its surprising eﬃciency in allowing the agent to converge to a good solution in most
situations.
In their 2014 installation Zwischenräume, artist Petra Gemeinboeck and computer scientist Rob
Saunders looked at the live adaptative performances of robotic agents. The robots are “sandwiched”
between the gallery wall and a temporary wall. Each one of them is equipped with a motorized
system that allows it to move vertically and horizontally, covering a speciﬁc region of the wall.
The robots are also equipped with a puncturing device that allows them to make holes through
the surface, as well as a camera and a microphone that allows them to sense their environment.
The system also give robots the ability to extract features from the camera and from the audio
signal. It combines all this information using both a Self-Organizing Map to detect similarities
between images, and a Reinforcement Learning program that tries to “maximise an internally
generated reward for capturing ‘interesting’ images and to develop a policy for generating rewards
through action”. The level of interest in the described system is based on a measure of “novelty
and surprise” where “‘novelty’ is deﬁned as a diﬀerence between an image and all previous images
taken by the robot” and “‘surprise’ is deﬁned as the unexpectedness of an image within a known
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situation” (Gemeinboeck and Saunders 2013, 217).
An interesting aspect of the work is the relationship that is established between robots and
audience. As they dig holes through the walls, the curiosity-motivated agents become an “audience
to the audiences [sic] performance”. It is thus “not only the robots that perform, but also the
audience that provokes, entertains and rewards the machines’ curiosity” as the “robots don’t only
respond or adapt to the audience’s presence and behaviours, but also have the capacity to perceive
the audience with a curious disposition.” (218)
Canadian artist, musician and AI researcher Stephen Kelly, one of the collaborators on Vessels,
has produced a number of experimental works using Genetic Algorithms and Genetic Programming
(GP). Genetic Programming is a particular approach to GAs where the individuals that get evolved
are instances of computer programs. In a typical GP application, populations of such programs
are generated, tested on a problem, and then selected based on their performance. The ﬁttest
candidates are used to generate new oﬀsprings using diﬀerent genetic manipulations. Hence, Genetic
Programming is considered a form of policy search, where the agents’ behaviors are evolved directly
based on their performance over a given task — as opposed to value search methods such as Q-
learning where agents are rather made more eﬃcient based on the adaptation of a value function
that tries to estimate what is the best action to take in a given context (Grefenstette, Moriarty,
and Schultz 2011).
Kelly’s Open Ended Ensemble is an ongoing project involving physical, sound-generating agents.
In the current version (labeled Competitive Coevolution), two robotic probes move along a ﬂuores-
cent light ﬁxture, trying to ﬁnd the region with the lowest electro-magnetic radiations.
The agent’s behaviour is adaptive, subject to an evolutionary process in which a random
population of computer programs slowly evolve, eventually achieving enough control of
the robotic probe to coax its movement away from the source of radiation and into
silence. Meanwhile, the light ﬁxture would prefer to maintain the drone, and slowly
evolves a strategy of its own, learning to move the lights and trap the probe in regions of
strong radiation. An arms race ensues as the two competing forces interact and coevolve,
akin to predator/prey or host/parasite relationships in biological systems. (Kelly 2016)
Kelly’s strategy, in this particular version, echoes my own approach for staging agents with
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Figure 18: Open Ended Ensembles (Competitive Coevolution) (2016) by Stephen Kelly. Hamilton
Artist Inc, Hamilton, Canada. Image courtesy of the artist. Photo by Caitlin Sutherland.
conﬂicting goals, such as in Drift (2007) (solitude vs company) and Fifth Absence (2011) (energy
need vs desire of shade). The agents in Open Ended Ensemble have an imperfect control over their
movements, and their observations are limited, which places them into a partially unpredictable
environment.
The artist reported that one of the biggest challenges in creating this work was the fact that
the plastic, visual and audio components of the piece were, in his opinion, taking much more
place in the aesthetic space of the piece than its behavior, obscuring the trial-and-error process.
This remark resonates with my own observations working with adaptive agent-based systems in
art. It is not clear at all how a learning behavior can be observed or felt by the audience while
integrating it as part of an experience that manifests through diﬀerent media in the creation of
a global experience. I have experienced similar diﬃculties working on projects using RL such as
my underwater installation Plasmosis (2013) and N-Polytope: Behaviors in Light and Sound After
Iannis Xenakis, which is described in more detail in chapter 6.
3.2.2 Components of a Machine Learning Algorithm
Parallel to the category of task they are designed for, Machine Learning algorithms can be qualiﬁed
by the interoperability of four constituents: (1) the model; (2) the optimization procedure; (3) the




Models in Machine Learning refer to the computational structure that gets modiﬁed through learn-
ing. The best way to think of a model is as a function that tries to approximate as close as possible
a distribution of data, based on a sample of that distribution (the dataset). The model contains
free parameters that are to be adjusted by the training algorithm. For example, in the Multi-Layer
Perceptron, the parameters are the “weights” or “synapses” that connect the neurons with one
another. Other models include decision trees, Bayesian networks, Support Vector Machines and
nearest neighbors models. In a GA, the model is the function that associates DNA strings with a
phenotype, while the chromosomes are the free parameters to adjust.
Models are the object of important debates in the ﬁeld of Machine Learning, being the deﬁning
ﬂagships of diﬀerent research strands. However, when it comes to artistic works, they are possibly
the least explored dimension. As was expressed earlier, most adaptive artworks involve a very re-
stricted set of models, which happen to be among the most easily understandable and applicable
ones (GAs and SOMs). This most likely has to do with the fact that scientists and artists have
diﬀerent goals and expectations. To put it simply, an apparently small improvement in the perfor-
mance of a model can be seen as revolutionary from a scientist’s perspective but will not change
much in terms of how it aﬀects the experience of an artwork.
Nonetheless, there are at least three ways in which models can aﬀect artistic outcomes. First,
the nature of the model is often an important part of the concept of a piece: the imaginary space
opened-up through the use of neural nets diﬀers conceptually from that of evolutionary computation
or decision trees. For example, Sims’ Galápagos plays with the richly evocative nature of evolution,
allowing the user to take part in a story of genetic adaptation as the godlike subject that runs
the natural selection process. Ben Bogart’s installation Dreaming Machine #2 (2009) and Ralf
Baecker’s Mirage (2014) both involve neural networks in pieces about memory and dreaming —
two themes that lie at the center of research on neurology that directly inspired computer-based
connectionism.
Secondly, models have speciﬁc structures that allow diﬀerent forms of “hijacking”. Chapter 4
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presents an artistic strategy whereby a Genetic Algorithm model is used in a way utterly diﬀerent
than what it was designed for. Google’s DeepDream is a good example of a creative approach that
employs speciﬁc properties of a neural net to transform it into a generative device it was never
meant to be. These artistic strategies usually take advantage of an accidental feature of a model,
diverting it out of its habitual or intended use. It requires a good comprehension of the model
and/or an experimental approach.
The third process by which models can impact artistic works is more subtle and has not been
the object of serious analysis. It has to do with the fact that diﬀerent models will yield, or aﬀord,
diﬀerent kinds of behaviors. The variety and types of behavioral strategies that the model allows,
and the “smoothness” — or “abruptness” — in the evolution of these strategies during learning,
are examples of how models can aﬀect agent aesthetics.37
Optimization Procedure
The optimization procedure — also called search or training algorithm depending on the context
— changes the parameters of the model in an attempt to improve its responses over time. Diﬀerent
kinds of such procedures exist, each with their own advantages and domain of application. For
example, there is a vast amount of research on training algorithms for neural networks, using
diﬀerent optimization approaches such as Stochastic Gradient Descent, Genetic Algorithm, and
simulated annealing.
Most optimization algorithms exploit the Cybernetics notion of negative feedback: in response
to the perceived error yielded by its actions, the organism adjusts its inner structure in a timewise
manner, step by step, moving towards an optimum. Whereas many cyberneticians were interested
in the process itself, for scientists working in the ﬁeld of Machine Learning, optimization is a means
to an end. The principal goal is to train a system that will perform well on a particular task
once it has been optimized. What happens before that, the behavior of the system as it gets there,
is considered irrelevant. Conversely, it is what is probably the most relevant to an aesthetics of
adaptive behavior.
37The advantages and disadvantages of neural nets, as opposed to GAs and other techniques such as fuzzy logic
and Support Vector Machines, is a broadly debated topic in the ﬁeld of Machine Learning.
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The learning process can typically be ﬁne-tuned using a set of meta-parameters. For example,
most optimization methods involve the use of a learning rate parameter which represents the speed
at which the system moves towards a local minimum. There is, however, a trade-oﬀ: high learning
rates will get models to converge faster, however, they will often yield poorer results; lower values
will take more time but result in a ﬁner model. A common way to solve this trade-oﬀ is to start
with a larger learning rate and slowly decrease it over time.
Another example is the exploration vs exploitation dilemma in Reinforcement Learning (Sutton
and Barto 1998, 4). When an agent moves in a space searching for the best strategy to maximize
its reward over time, it needs to be able to both exploit its current knowledge (by making decisions
it thinks are going to yield good rewards) and explore new avenues (so as to avoid getting stuck in
a region of the space that yields poor rewards). Exploration is usually more chaotic and random,
while exploitation is targeted and greedy. In a typical RL setup, agents will start by exploring and,
over time, be tuned to favor exploitation as they become more eﬃcient in accumulating rewards.
The agent’s tendency to favor exploration over exploitation is usually represented by a single
parameter. For example, in one of the most commonly used learning policies, called ǫ-greedy, a
parameter ǫ between 0 and 1 represents the probability that, at any given step, the agent will choose
a completely random action (if not, then it will choose the action it believes will yield the highest
return, hence the name “greedy”) (28). Altering ǫ can be used as an aesthetic trick in agent-based
systems, allowing the shaping of behaviors in real-time, moving them between chaos and order.
This strategy was applied in the immersive installation/performance piece N-Polytope (2012), for
the construction of live generative behavioral patterns, as described in section 6.3.4.
Evaluation Function
The evaluation function measures the performance of the model in completing its task. In Super-
vised and Unsupervised learning, it is usually referred to as the loss function or cost function. In a
classiﬁcation task, for example, the category predicted by the model given an example to classify
is compared to the expected target category: the more the model misses the target, the larger the
loss. In Reinforcement Learning, the evaluation function is called the reward function, while in
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Genetic Algorithms, it corresponds to the fitness function.
Among the three dimensions of a Machine Learning algorithm, the evaluation function is prob-
ably the one that is the most readily useable by authors. This is because it has been designed
speciﬁcally for the purpose of bringing human input into the equation. Models and optimization
procedures are meant to be rather agnostic: the evaluation function determines the kind of “prob-
lem” one tries to solve. However, the approach in art completely diﬀers from that of science. While
scientists use evaluation functions as objective criteria for the learning algorithm to solve, artists
typically use the evaluation function as a tool for generating self-organizing behaviors, subject to
their own authorial control. In other words, for scientists, the evaluation function represents the
goal they aim to achieve, without any care for the way it is reached (i.e., the goal is more important
than the process to reach it), whereas for artists the relationship between the evaluation function
and the goal (which is to generate interesting behaviors) is indirect (i.e., the process is the goal).
Artists can thus play with evaluation functions and observe how the agent responds. An eval-
uation function can also be learned or attributed by another agent. Finally, evaluation functions
can be interactive, with either the artist or the audience replacing the function by directly giving
an evaluation of the system’s performance. In the case of evolutionary computation, this tech-
nique is known as an Interactive Genetic Algorithm (IGA), an approach ﬁrst proposed by Richard
Dawkins (Dawkins 1986).
Karl Sims’ Galápagos (1997), which was presented earlier in section 3.2.1, is one of the most
renowned examples of the use of IGA in an interactive installation. Here, visitors are asked to
select their favorite artiﬁcial 3D creatures, whose genetic code is used to create the next generation
through mutations and crossovers. Core to the work’s aesthetics is its participatory nature, engaging
audiences in the production of novel forms through a playful and intriguing experience.
The Fifth Absence (2011) is another example of how an evaluation function can be used poetically
in the generation of an artiﬁcial behavior. As described earlier, the work involves a robotic agent
immersed in a behavioral conundrum through the implementation of a reward function precisely
designed to generate it. The agent in this artwork is forced to discover, through trial and error,
a strategy that will allow it to match its desire to avoid looking at light sources with its need to
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get solar energy. The slow-paced behavior of the agent, who moves about once every 2–3 minutes,
places it in a diﬀerent category than Galápagos in terms of aesthetics. Like most other interventions
in Absences, this is a very conceptual piece, as the shape of its behavior can not be perceived in
real-time by human subjects and thus needs to be imagined by the audience.
Data
Data is an often overlooked, yet crucial dimension to consider when thinking about adaptive behav-
iors, especially in an artistic context. There are practical concerns when dealing with data encoding,
as well as challenging issues that arise when dealing with high dimensional spaces, such as is the
case with image or speech recognition, which are largely beyond the scope of this dissertation.
The ﬁrst thing to consider in regards to data is the kinds of inputs and outputs that will be
fed into the system — in other words — what the agent will be able to observe, and how it will be
able to respond to these observations. In order to be eﬀective, these inputs and outputs need to
be carefully chosen to aﬀord the kind of experience the artist has in mind. Moreover, there needs
to be a way for the agent to make inferences, otherwise no learning will happen. For example, a
system that can only detect light cannot be asked to learn about the sounds made by visitors.
The set of sensors/observations/inputs and actuators/actions/outputs, and the way they are
embodied in the adaptive physical devices that are staged in an agent-based artwork, possibly
constitute the most important decision an artist has to make in the creative process, as it will
deﬁne the kind of space in which the agent can evolve, the sort of behaviors it can aﬀord.
Secondly, it is self-evident that the data distribution from which the examples are selected
has an important inﬂuence on the reactions and establishment of the system’s behavior. One of
the most dreaded issues in Machine Learning is overfitting, a problem that arises when a system
estimates “too perfectly” a speciﬁc dataset, thus becoming less eﬃcient at making predictions on
unseen samples (i.e., taken outside of the training dataset). While overﬁtting is a plague for data
scientists, it might actually be exploited creatively by artists, by hand-picking data (such as by
creating a constrained environment) in order to encourage a speciﬁc response in the system.
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Other Considerations
Both from a scientiﬁc as well as an engineering perspective, Machine Learning techniques are simple
in spirit, yet extremely complex when it comes to details. Many elements can inﬂuence the success
or failure of a particular algorithm on a particular problem, and much energy is spent in the ﬁeld
to compare strategies and try to extract general principles behind learning.
The biggest challenges are related to issues that arise when dealing with high dimensional data,
which becomes the case when dealing with image or speech recognition. These diﬃculties mainly
concern questions of generalization, that is, the problem of training a model on a speciﬁc set of
examples so that it becomes good at making predictions when faced with examples taken outside
of that dataset. An important conceptual issue is known as the curse of dimensionality. It spans
many unique problems that arise when dealing with high-dimensional data. One of the most
fundamental consequences of the “curse” is that the number of free parameters (which amount to
the representational power of the model) need to be tuned according to both the dimensions of the
input space and the size of the training database.38
(a) Linear model (e.g., percep-
tron).
(b) Nonlinear model (e.g.,
MLP).
(c) Nonlinear model overﬁtting
the data.
Figure 20: Example comparisons of how diﬀerent kinds of model classify data points in a two
dimensional space, including a case of overﬁtting.
It is largely beyond the scope of this dissertation to give a detailed account of these theoretical
concepts. However, artists should be aware that these techniques require at least some basic knowl-
edge if one wants to be able to manipulate them as creative tools and material. Unfortunately, there
38The curse of dimensionality is directly linked with issues of overﬁtting and its opposite, underﬁtting.
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exist almost no resources at the moment speciﬁcally dedicated to teach artists about ML,39 and
most of the tutorials require at least some degree of knowledge in mathematics and programming.
3.3 Conclusion
The history of computational synthetic agents after the post-WWII era runs across several disci-
plinary grounds. In this chapter, I examined this history through consideration of the notions of
adaptation and learning, mainly from the point of view of media art history and computer science.
A few features of these histories stand out, and need to be highlighted. Tensions between
opposing ways of thinking about body, mind, life, and intelligence act as the backdrop for these
historical markers. Computationalism — the concept that cognition is the same as computation,
that software precedes hardware, and that the Turing test is decisive in determining if an agent is
cognizing or not — is central, and has been espoused in particular by symbolic, “good old fashioned”
AI. Opposed to this computational theory of mind are views that argue for the importance of
the body in the performance of a cognizing system. Somewhere in the middle, are connectionist
approaches, which claim that intelligence is all about learning subsymbolic, statistical relationships
between the agent and its environment.
Cybernetics had a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the evolution of contemporary art in the 1960s.
Thinkers such as Roy Ascott and Jack Burnham explained the transformation of art in these
years as a displacement of the aesthetic locus from objects to processes, and described the art world
itself as a ﬂow of information and behaviors between a multitude of systems.
Adaptive devices were central to these visions. However, as the sweeping inﬂuence of rule-
based AI from the 1960s to the mid–1980s pushed away alternative approaches, it seems that the
importance of adaptive and learning systems in contemporary media art was equally diminished.40
Still, there remains a noticeable strand of artworks based on learning agents that runs through
history, dealing with similar questions and facing similar challenges.
39One promising initiative is a book in preparation by computer scientist and artist Gene Kogan, in collaboration
with designer and artist Francis Tseng (Kogan and Tseng 2016).
40As we will see in chapter 5 , in the 1980s–1990s, artists seemed to have moved away from AI towards the ﬁeld
of Artiﬁcial Life.
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In the second part of the chapter, I examined Machine Learning algorithms as described in
scientiﬁc literature, in an eﬀort to reveal their fundamental mechanisms, with the objective of
bringing out their aesthetic potential. I ﬁrst gave an overview of the three diﬀerent categories
of tasks that can be addressed by ML algorithms: supervised, unsupervised, and reinforcement
learning. Secondly, I described the diﬀerent components of such systems and how they interact.
In a typical ML algorithm, an optimization procedure is used to train a model over data using an
evaluation function (Alpaydin 2004). I provided several examples on how these diﬀerent elements
can be, and have been, exploited by artists working with adaptive agents.
These characteristics are not only important for understanding how such methods might have
aesthetic repercussions, but also demonstrate how diﬃcult it is to seamlessly move between the
lower level of choice of algorithm (or technique) and the higher phenomenological level of aesthetic
experience — something that I will pick up in the next chapter.
A crucial consideration is that ML algorithms are designed for optimization, which makes their
use in art counter-intuitive. Yet, there are multiple ways in which artists can appropriate these
techniques by doing what they do best: diverting the technology from its targeted application.
There is no such thing as the “best” or the “most aesthetic” behavior for a computational agent,
therefore there exists no objective evaluation for it. Yet, for example, it is possible for artists to
“toy with” the evaluation function of a learning system as a way to generate eﬀects, or to use the
fundamental properties of a model as a conceptual tool, or to choose the training dataset carefully
to produce speciﬁc content.
This set of tools allows one to better understand agent-based works such as the Absences series.
However, one of the characteristics of these works is that they were designed for the outdoors, with
no intention of being shown in front of an audience, aside from their documentation. What happens
when an adaptive agent-based installation is presented in front of a human audience? What eﬀects
are generated? How does the public react to such behavioral patterns?
The next chapter describes a collaborative robotic work that was created between 2010 and
2015. Called Vessels, it involves a ﬂeet of small autonomous water-dwelling agents, which create an
emergent, social behavior through their adaptation to their milieu and their peers. The piece, which
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can be shown either indoors or outdoors, allows the audience to directly observe their evolution
as they respond iteratively to their ecosystem. The question thus remains: what new kinds of
aesthetic paradigms do adaptive systems produce or generate in human perceivers, who themselves




Empty your mind, be formless, shapeless - like water. Now you put water into a cup,
it becomes the cup, you put water into a bottle, it becomes the bottle, you put it in a
teapot, it becomes the teapot. Now water can flow or it can crash. Be water, my friend.
– Bruce Lee
November 13, 2015. The sun is setting upon the solemn campus. In front of the Law School,
the Goddess Athena opens her arms to the “Nouvelle Cité”, heritage of the 1960s French marxist
revolution. Paris was attacked yesterday by groups of armed men. But we are in Strasbourg, and
the turmoils of last night have already settled, though a spectre of this violence seems to be walking
among us.
A woman asks if the robots are there in memory of the victims. She explains that she lives
in one of the condo towers in front of the fountain and that she noticed, from up there, the slow
oscillation of colored lights on the water. People have gathered on the eastern side of the basin,
where the wind was gently pushing the bots. A small grouping of the robots is slowly ﬂickering
in greenish blues; over there, three orange ones are hopping, moving in short, erratic bursts, their
motors roaring like a voice.
There, on the other side of the fountain, a single purple one looks like it’s slumbering, it’s pale
color slowly undulating. Parents are watching their two kids playing around it, gently pushing it
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when it reaches the border.
Insect sounds, responding to one another, like a choir of electronic crickets; whispers coming
from the audience, as new groups of spectators gather around the place.
A gust of wind blows, pushing them away. By now, menacing clouds have also appeared: pink
and orange, tinted by the smog-drenched light of the setting sun. Lighting bolts ﬂash over the
horizon: a storm is coming.
Fading colors.
The purple one has reached the rest of the group. All of a sudden, it starts squeaking now like
a fax machine. Three of them respond, then more. Binary codes echoing through space, a ballet
of colorful beings, all converging together as the ﬁrst drops of rain fall from the sky. Slowly, their
color changes, a new community is formed as the territory is collectively redeﬁned. People start
leaving, kids want to stay but they are scolded as the air gets thicker.
They take a break now. This one has started shining in a strange, whimsical way. This other
one shakes and pushes the other two. Their colors are now moving between green and orange.
Suddenly, the whole group starts moving towards the shore in unison. They bounce against the
border, pushing, as if in some kind of a panic.
Then, as quick as they began, they all stop. One of them leaves, changing back to a blueish
color. Then another one. And another. A sudden squeak, followed by screams of noisy binaries:
they all split up.
The clouds have passed. But everybody’s gone.
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Figure 21: Vessels (2015), L’Ososphère, Strasbourg, France. Photo: Philippe Groslier.
This chapter examines the research and creation process behind the realization of Vessels, an
artistic robotic installation consisting of large collectives of water-dwelling mobile robots, created
as a collaboration between myself, Samuel St-Aubin and Stephen Kelly from 2010 onward. As they
move over the water’s surface, the bots engage in diﬀerent forms of social interplay, inﬂuencing each
other’s behavior and appearance in oscillating movements of convergence and divergence. Moreover,
each robot perceives a speciﬁc dimension of its environment such as water quality (air temperature,
atmospheric pressure, or ambient light and sound) which inﬂuences its behavioristic character. For
example, a high temperature measured by one of the agents could make it increase its speed or give
it a preference for rotating clockwise. In turn, this individual change in behavior contaminates its
neighbors’ demeanor.
Over time, a collective behavior that is speciﬁc to the immediate environmental characteristics
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of the presentation site emerges from the agents’ socialization. The work thus acts as an organic
laboratory that responds to hidden features of the urban ecosystem by displaying emergent social
behaviors, oﬀering the viewers a new perspective on their living milieu and a model for cultural
exploration.
Figure 22: Vessels presentation at LABoral Centro de Arte y Creación Industrial (Gijón, Spain).
August 2013. Photo by Soﬁan Audry.
Here, I focus on the computational aspects of the project, in particular the use of Machine
Learning techniques. Vessels provides a valuable case study for applying the concepts developed
in the previous chapter. Specially, it highlights the diﬀerent challenges faced when making use of
such techniques in behavior-based artistic works. Furthermore, the project oﬀers an example of the
kind of aesthetic eﬀects that can be generated through such work.
One of my intentions in creating this work had been to use Reinforcement Learning as a way
to generate diﬀerent kinds of behavior in the robots. I explain how and why this approach was
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eventually abandoned for both technical and artistic reasons. In fact, it has already been pointed out
that the traditional inclination of AI towards problem-solving and optimization makes it unpractical
for creative applications (Eigenfeldt, Burnett, and Pasquier 2012; Mateas 2001). RL is particularly
challenging for artistic works because it is caught in a stark paradox: the traditional contexts in
which media art installations are produced and presented are particularly ill-suited for Machine
Learning in general, and Reinforcement Learning in particular. This is mainly due to the fact that
RL agents need to be exposed to a lot of data in order for them to learn. However, in a gallery
setting, the audience typically gives its attention to works of art for only a few minutes, which is
usually not enough for the learning process to complete.
I follow up by describing how we successfully made use of genetic algorithms by hooking into
the learning step as a way to evolve cohesive forms of behavior in real-time. GAs are the most-used
strand of ML methods employed in the creation of media art.1 In Vessels, we use GAs in a very
speciﬁc manner: as a way for robots to collectively self-organize so that a form of behavioral “family
resemblance” emerges from their interaction with one another and their environment.
Following these observations, I claim that one way of using Machine Learning methods within
the context of agent-based artworks is to provide an algorithmic framework which allows for the
generation of adaptive behaviors rather than the production of an eﬃcient solution to a deﬁnite
problem. Most learning algorithms deﬁne an iterative procedure where a model is reﬁned at each
step towards achieving a certain goal. By hooking into this process, an artwork can reveal to the
audience the process of adaptation itself, which can be made to be artistically compelling through
its evocation of familiar behavioral patterns usually displayed by living and/or sentient beings.
The ﬁrst section of the chapter describes the broad artistic goals of the project. I address issues
related to form, content and choreographic development in a decentralized collective of adaptive
agents. The second section provides an overview of the technical dimension of the work, with
some contextual insights on the practical reasons justifying the choices that were made. The third
section depicts the research-creation process, bringing in questions of methodology as well as both
practical and theoretical implications of the work. The chapter ends with a description of similar
1For examples of ways GAs have been used in visual arts and music, see (Johnson and Cardalda 2002).
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artistic installations involving collectives of agents and analyses the aﬀective experiences of Vessels
as reported by the audience.
4.1 Artistic Intent
Interactive media artist and theorist Simon Penny stresses the importance of establishing a rela-
tionship between the work, the viewer and the environment they share in works of art based on
artiﬁcial agents (Penny 2000). In Vessels, this interrelation is constructed from behaviors that occur
not only at the individual level, but foremost at the global, emergent level. The intention here is to
develop a kind of adaptive and distributed choreography; a social dance with no central conductor
that induces and maintains viewers’ interest by evolving constantly. My intuition is that this will
bring a sense of aliveness that will allow the audience to more intimately relate to the work, identify
with it, and ultimately to inspire the audience to reﬂect and question their own relationship with
their living environment and its inhabitants.
We addressed these challenges through three (3) major artistic objectives: (1) to dynamically
occupy space; (2) to create social interactions between the robots; (3) to establish a relationship
with the environment. These goals were deliberately meant to be blurry, allowing room for ex-
perimentation and creation. They are also incomplete and cannot, in themselves, fully encompass
the conceptual scope of the project. They serve primarily as anchor points and reﬂection axes for
supporting the creative process.
4.1.1 Occupying Space
Our general vision of the spatial disposition of robots was to create a constantly evolving mixture of
densities and colors, suggesting diﬀerent conﬁgurations of both collective and individual behaviors.
Agents in Vessels operate in territories over which spectators have a global perspective. One of the
important dimensions of the work is thus the way by which the robots spread across space. The
robots must neither constitute a cloud of detached individuals that moves randomly, nor must they
be assembled in a single, static mass. Their locations and movements should be diverse such that
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at any given time, the surface on which they dwell might display contrastive variations in density
and movements that evolve over time.
The idea of varying the ways robots occupy their living milieu is tied to one of the important
challenges described by Penny, which is to ensure that an agent’s behavior is diﬀerentiable from
pure randomness while still evoking a sense of mystery and uncertainty. Discussing his experience in
creating Petit Mal, a piece featuring a robot interacting with users, he explains that a fundamental
concern for artists is to generate “poetic richness which is clear enough to orient the user but unclear
enough to allow the generation of mystery and inquisitiveness” (Penny 2000, 441).
These considerations illustrate one of the biggest challenges in this project. The establishment
of complex rules in the system contribute to the unfathomable character of the work, but may also
come to unbalance the emergent behavior by making it indistinguishable from the purely random.
4.1.2 Generating a Social World
While the spatial distribution of robots in Vessels is related with sociability as the natural outcome
of individual inclinations, these dynamics are assuredly not the only aspects of the robots’ social
life that can be explored as evocative material. We decided early on that agents should have a way
to communicate with one another to generate diﬀerent kinds of social actions and events. Following
the same idea of a bottom-up approach, we designed a very simple process involving “social acts”;
kind of atomic behavioral building blocks by which robots could interact with one another.
Social acts would be triggered by a single robot who would lead the action through three (3)
diﬀerent phases: negotiation, action and release. At ﬁrst, the leading agent would call for peers to
perform the action. Those receiving the call would not send any messages back but would either
ignore it or start acting as temporary followers of the leading bot. While engaged in this follower-
followed relationship, the leading bot would have the option, from time to time, to activate a social
event. Examples include following or evading the leader, spinning clockwise or counterclockwise,
blinking lights or emitting sound. Finally, the leading robot could call oﬀ the action, releasing its
followers to their own inclinations.
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4.1.3 Interlacing Identity and Environment
Social interactions between the agents evoke a sense of a community, allowing the audience to
identify with the work. A ﬁnal objective of this work is to build on that bond, to oﬀer a space for
the public to reﬂect upon the urban environment by rooting the agents’ identity and behavior in
the human audience’s perception of underrecognized characteristics within their own milieu.
Installing the robots in an aquatic environments is directly linked to this ambition. Water car-
ries a strong poetic evocation, being both the quintessential source of life on earth, and sometimes
providing an unfathomable, possibly dangerous territory. Ponds and harbours in the urban envi-
ronment are places of gathering and reﬂection: places where one can evade the turmoils of city life
to meditate, observing birds and insects moving on the surface, listening to the sounds of wind and
lapping, dragging oneself into the ripples and vortices deep below the surface. Furthermore, the
water element contributes to an impression of fragility in the robots and makes their movements
imprecise, which gives them more personality.
Robots’ reaction to their environment is guided by a simple aesthetic principle: behavior dis-
played by the community should reﬂect the environmental characteristics of the location, thus acting
as kind of a dynamic “signature” of the milieu. This general rule can be expressed more or less as
the result of the tension between two sub-principles, namely; (1) an identity principle stating that a
community of robots presented in a given location, showing a speciﬁc set of environmental features,
will display an emergent behavior identical or similar if it is presented again in the same conditions;
and (2) a corresponding but opposite contrastive principle pushing robots towards engaging in a
different behavior when subjected to noticeably distinct environmental conditions.
In line with our bottom-up methodology, the relationship between the agents and their environ-
ment is ﬁrst and foremost expressed at the individual level. As previously mentioned, each robot is
equipped with a sensor that measures speciﬁc environmental data, such as air temperature, atmo-
spheric pressure, carbone dioxyde level, ambient light intensity or audio noise level. That speciﬁc
piece of data directly inﬂuences the personality of the robot, who adapts to it by transforming itself




The artistic intentions outlined in the previous section are intertwined with practical considerations
about the physical, hardware and software dimensions of the robots. Though this research focuses
mainly on the algorithmic aspects, I want here to give a sense of the agents’ capabilities by taking
a peek at their physical constituents.
Vessels’ robots were designed iteratively over the course of several years, with most of the work
occuring as part of short research and production residencies in diﬀerent artistic institutions. Some
points about the context of research-creation are worth mentioning in order to better understand
the choices that were made.
First, the fact that we operated under tight budgetary constraints — at least in comparison with
swarming robotics projects of comparable scope in science or engineering labs — had a tremendous
impact on the components we chose to equip the bots with. In general, we favored cheap solutions
that “do the job” and whose imprecision nevertheless added unpredictability to the piece, giving
robots a wider range of behaviors. Simon Penny expresses a similar idea when talking about the
“under-engineering” of his work Petit Mal, explaining how his approach of favoring cheaper solutions
which are “70% reliable” over more expensive ones that might be “90% reliable” actually expands
the “ﬁeld of possibility” (Penny 2000, 401) by adding noise to the system, thus giving it more
personality.2
These budgetary constraints forced us to carefully choose each component installed on the robots
in order to give them enough capacity to be able to achieve the artistic goals while keeping costs and
complexity low. We mainly focused our choices towards components that would give our agents;
(1) a sensorimotor “body” that allowed them to have some minimal awareness of their surrounding
2An important diﬀerence between our approarch and that of Penny is that we compensated for a lot of the
hardware’s lack of robustness through software, whereas Penny, whereas Penny prefers to work with the material
constraints rather than trying to overcome them with algorithms. His main critique is that “ﬁxing in software”
actually reduces the range of possibilities to be explored artistically. However, Vessels diﬀers from Petit Mal in
a number of ways, the most important one being the number of agents: whereas Petit Mal consists of only one
robot which could be ﬁne-tuned with a hands-on approach, in Vessels the large number of robots introduces a lot
of variability, thus the degree of robustness needed in the components is more critical, as ﬁne-tuning each robot
would be too time-consuming. One of the favorable eﬀects of developing these software algorithms is that our team
contributed a lot of open-source code to the community, as we favored simple, low-cost solutions over oﬀ-the-shelf
products.
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environment and also to move and avoid obstacles; and (2) a variety of media-generation means to
express a wide range of aﬀects.
Second, it is worth mentioning that we went through several mock-ups and prototypes to ar-
rive at the current design, and that there still remained space for improvement. At each step, we
have validated certain items and made corrections in interaction with the diﬀerent project partici-
pants. For example, software development at every step would reveal problems related to hardware,
suggesting changes in the electronics components and circuit in the next iteration.
This section gives an overview of the technical aspects of Vessels robots while drawing links
to the artistic intentions and to practice. I explain the propulsion and steering system, light and
sound components, environmental sensing system and the infrared messaging system.
4.2.1 Locomotion and Steering
The propulsion system was the ﬁrst element that we explored when we started working on the
project. The vast majority of current research on robotics focuses on ground robots that move
on wheels, or on ﬂying devices (i.e., drones). There are hardly any instances of projects involving
robots that move on water or other sorts of liquid.3
During our ﬁrst residency at the CFAT in August 2010, we started experimenting with diﬀerent
kinds of propulsion and directional systems. We came up with an air propulsion engine using a pair
of computer fans on servo-motors.4 However, the fans were not powerful enough to ﬁght against
the wind and water current, while their large size made the robots less hydrodynamic.
For our second prototype, we opted for an alternative design involving a pair of stationary
underwater pumps, which proved to work quite well. We also provided each bot with a magnetic
electronic compass, allowing them to readjust their propulsion to stay on course and thus avoid
spinning — an idea which proved to be more diﬃcult to implement than it looked, as we shall
see. We added an extra infrared distance sensor to the robots to give them a better sense of their
3During one of our public presentations at LABoral in 2013, an engineer working for one of the major petroleum
companies in Spain left me a business card. He was interested in our design as a way to explore pipelines and detect
cracks and other weak points.
4We came up with that idea originally because we feared underwater propellers could easily get stuck in aquatic
weeds.
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surroundings, facilitating obstacle avoidance among other things.
4.2.2 Expressive Gear
Some of the onboard components are speciﬁcally there to provide the robots with ways to manifest
their personality, state, emotions, etc. to spectators. The most evident of these components is
the color module, activated through three (3) RGB LEDs that allow the agents to display various
behaviors or states by means of colored light.5 A special routine running in parallel to the main
code allows smooth color transitions and oscillations, such as a rapid ﬂuctuation between red to
blue.6
The robots are equipped with another light-emitting component which adds to the range of
expressiveness. After the ﬁrst prototype, Samuel suggested that we add a series of eight (8) bright
white LEDs on the periphery of the printed circuit board. Unlike the RGB diodes, these LEDs can
be individually controlled using a shift register. The physical placement of these light sources on
the board opens up another layer of possibility: for example, we could now use these white LED
lights to give a sense of direction as the robots are navigating on water.
Additionally, robots are equipped with a separate circuit board with its own, on-board 8-bit
microcontroller and a small amplifying and ﬁltering circuit, allowing the robots to generate 8-
bit sounds at 16384 Hz. As I explain in the next section, this sound/environment board is also
responsible for measuring a speciﬁc environmental condition. The board allows real-time audio
synthesis of diﬀerent sound types. For example, we implemented some very simple sounds such
as white noise, as well as a more complex sounds such as the one generated through a genetic
programming procedure. In most cases, these sounds can be tuned using a series of parameters,
thus making it possible to generate an even wider range of audio eﬀects.
5Although there are many LEDs, they are all programmed to glow in the same color. We increased the number
of LEDs in each of our prototypes to achieve a satisfying level of brightness.
6In other words, rather than being limited to choosing one speciﬁc color, it is possible to create simple color
animations that run in the background.
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Figure 24: Vessels robot in action, showing the colored LEDs. Photo by Soﬁan Audry.




One of the core conceptual elements of Vessels is the interdependence between the robots and
their milieu. Each agent possesses a “piece of the puzzle”, a personal view over its environment
through a single sensor. These fragments of information are exchanged between the robots through
their behavior, generating an emerging “rendering” of the data in the form of a collective adaptive
performance.
Each robot is equipped with the exact same fundamental set of hardware and software (their
environmental sensor is the only exception to that rule).7 As each of these sensors can work quite
diﬀerently and therefore need speciﬁc hardware and software components to function properly.
In our ﬁrst prototype, we had to hard-wire sensors separately on each board, soldering speciﬁc
circuit components and uploading the appropriate piece of code to work with it. This increased the
risk of errors and made troubleshooting and maintenance more diﬃcult. In our second prototype,
we decided to create an external board which could be connected to the main one, a simple “plug-
and-play” interface that hides the complexity and particularities of the environmental readings.8
4.2.4 Communication
Let us take a moment to reﬂect on the robotic bodies of the agents that I have been described
thus far. A pair of water pumps are used to provide locomotion, colored and white LEDs for
generating light eﬀects, and an audio circuit for digital sound production. In terms of technology
that facilitates the robots’ perceptions, they are equipped with a compass for navigation, a pair of
range ﬁnders for obstacle detection and a single, unspeciﬁed environmental sensor.
Now, notice that the range of perceptual data an agent has access to does not include movement,
color, light nor sound. In other words, aside from the accidental case where the environmental
7In a given collective, there might actually be some sub-groups of robots who share the same kind of environmental
sensor. There are two reasons for this.
First, it would be expensive timewise to research and test a diﬀerent environmental sensor for each of our 50
robots.
Second, we actually believe it makes sense that some robots have the same kinds of perception, especially for
cheaper components such as light and sound perception while having less robots equipped with more “special”
sensors.
8As explained in the last section, we also thought it would be convenient to use the extra CPU power to run audio
synthesis, which is why we integrated both components on the same external board.
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sensor of one robot would be a microphone or a light sensor, these agents are unable to detect
the behavior of their peers. Even if they did, it would be extremely hard for them to extract the
complex information needed out of the ﬂow of incoming data.9
Imagine that a robot starts acting in a speciﬁc way, like twirling, changing its color to green,
or producing a chirping sound. How are its peers meant to react to these behaviors if they do not
even have the means to perceive them?
We came up with a simple solution for addressing this issue. Instead of having agents notice
what one of their peers is doing through a sensory system, we simulate the act of perception by
having the perceived robots send the information about their behavior or state of being through
infrared (IR) messaging.10
IR messaging systems are extremely popular in scientiﬁc swarm robotics applications for various
reasons (Kornienko and Kornienko 2011, 9–10). One of the main advantages of using IR instead
of radio frequencies (RF) is that it is possible to detect where the direction the message is coming
from, allowing agents not only to exchange data but to locate one another11.
As such, we equipped each robot with a series of infrared receivers installed around the perimeter
of a simple technique described in (Hoyt, Mckennoch, and Bushnell 2005) which basically compares
the intensity of the signal received from each sensor to estimate the angle and range of communi-
cation (Fig. 26).
There are, however, important limitations to using IR. Data transmissions are slow, short-
distance and prone to error. This is accentuated by the presence of other sources of infrared light,
with the consequence that we cannot show the work during the day due to interference from bright
sunlight.
Another caveat is that the low transmission speed of infrared messaging increases the risk of
message collision, which forces us to limit the frequency at which robots send signals. This is true
9Early on when, we started reﬂecting about the question of how the agents could socialize with one another, we
considered the idea of using a simple, physical modality, like sound. For example, the robots could have reacted to
audio signals coming from their peers or the audience. It could have been an interesting venue to pursue, but if we
did so we would never have been able to achieve the level of interactional complexity we wanted to have in the piece.
10For example, instead of having robot A looking at robot B and seeing it spin clockwise (which would only be
possible through a complex system of camera doubled with pattern recognition algorithms), robot B would send a
message to A that says “I am spinning clockwise”.
11It is also possible to guess the proximity of the sender using the infrared intensity of the signal.
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Figure 26: Diagram of the infrared guidance system. The sender robot (S) emits an infrared message
in all directions. Receiver robots (R) perceive the signal through their six (6) infrared sensors with
various strength. The relative signal intensities perceived by these sensors is used to estimate the
orientation and distance of the sender robot with respect to the receiver. Image courtesy of Samuel
St-Aubin.
for any application using IR, however the technology that we use is many times slower (2.4 kbps)
than what is normally used in scientiﬁc research. As a comparison, the ISIS communication system
for swarm robotics applications described in (McLurkin 2004) runs more than 100 times faster
than our system at 250 kbps. Depending on the quantity of robots in the space, we thus need to
limit the number of messages sent by a robot to about one every 20 to 30 seconds.
Distance also has an impact on the signal. In our tests, we could easily communicate up to 2
meters, but could hardly get to more than 6 meters while achieving the same results. However, we
eventually came to see this apparent limitation as bearing a strategic advantage, as it constrained
the agents in only communicating with their closest neighbors. We even lowered the IR intensity
to limit the range further, bringing the outer limit of the signal to about 1.5 meters. Thus when a
robot calls for peers to accomplish a social act, the radius of action of the signal naturally generates
a local sub-group by being limited to the sender’s immediate neighbors.
Quite interestingly, these technological limitations have forced us to address robots communi-
cations in a way that is actually much closer to the reality of biological systems. Living beings
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communicate using channels with relatively low bandwidth and range such as sound and gestures.
The constraints hence coincide with our original goals for enabling IR messaging as complement to
robotic action, which makes these actions perceptible to their peers. A faster, more expensive IR
communication system would have allowed our robots to send hundreds of messages per second,
but these messages would have been completely abstracted from the audience. In Vessels, this
slowness means that each message accompanies a slow-paced, palpable behavior, such as emitting a
particular sound or moving in a speciﬁc way, which brings the robotic communication to a “human
level”.
4.2.5 Control Unit
The behavior of agents is controlled from a central ATmega1280, an 8-bit microcontroller running
at 16 MHz. We selected this technology for its small cost, low power consumption, high versatility
and compatibility with the Arduino library12, a very popular open-source software suite among
artists and hobbyists.
Every piece of hardware is connected one way or another to this processing unit, and therefore
have a software counterpart in the source code. A large proportion of the code is meant to provide
a high-level interface to each of the subsystems to make them more robust and easier to work with.
The chips are fully programmable in a variant of C++, an extremely widespread and powerful
object-oriented language. As such, it allows us to integrate nearly any kind of algorithmic techniques
and structures, at least in theory. However, in practice, their low memory (8kB SRAM) and speed
makes some applications diﬃcult or even impractical, which excluded the use of some Machine
Learning methods.
To summarize, the agents in Vessels are equipped with a range of low-ﬁ hardware that “do
the job”, while being relatively imprecise when compared to more expensive commercial solutions.
This lack of robustness is partly compensated for through software, but leaves room for more
unpredictable behavior in the robots.
12The ATmega1280 corresponds to an Arduino Mega board. More information at: http://www.arduino.cc/en/
Main/arduinoBoardMega
113
Whereas some contextual elements have been introduced through this short technical overview,
in the next section we dig deeper into the research-creation process in an eﬀort to address questions
related to the practical aspects of using multi-agent systems and Machine Learning techniques in
Vessels.
4.3 Practice
Through this technical overview, we have started to look at questions of practice, though only on
the surface. Among other things, we have not really considered yet where the notion of adaptation
ﬁts in the project. I now want to start looking more closely at practice, describing in more details
some aspects of the research-creation through three important phases of the project.
First, I examine a series of computer-based simulations of the work that were designed during
Summer 2012. The simulations tried to give a sense of the global, emergent eﬀect of robots moving
over the water, directly addressing the artistic goals.
Second, I look at the way the control loop was implemented in the system. I explain how we
started with Finite State Machines (FSM) in the ﬁrst prototype and switched to a high-level goal-
oriented model known as Behavior Trees (BT) in the latest prototypes. I describe the experience
of working with these diﬀerent approaches in terms of authoring and meeting our goals.
Finally, I review two ways we worked with adaptive systems: an approach based on genetic
algorithms which was successful; and another based on reinforcement learning, which was not. I
explain the reasons that have led us to experiment with these approaches, what the caveats were,
and the ﬁnal resolutions.
4.3.1 Simulations
In Summer 2012, the progress on Vessels was very slow. We were working on a second prototype,
but had much trouble ﬁnding an appropriate physical space to experiment with such large groups
of robots — especially one where we could install a big enough indoors basin ﬁlled with water. It
was diﬃcult to even begin to understand what things such as “emergent collective behavior” or
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“distributed choreography” really meant without ﬁrst-hand experience with the installation.
In an attempt to make progress on the algorithms that could drive the piece, I implemented a
software model of the installation which would allow me to simulate experiments of the work in a
graphical interface using a 2D physics engine. The sensors, communication system and locomotion
capabilities of the robots, as well as various parameters such as surface friction and wind, could
be simulated in an integrated environment. The objective was not to create a perfectly faithful
simulation of the robots but rather to experiment with simple algorithms to validate general ideas.
These simulations allowed us to come up with a set of fundamental concepts and heuristics for
driving the work. First, the introduction of a high-level tension between sociability and solitariness
became a way to generate contrastive variations in densities across space. Second, an embryonic
notion of personality in the robots evolved through both social encounters and confrontation with
the environment. Third, negotiation and generation of subgroup behaviors lead through temporary
emergence of “leaders” in the community.
Solitary vs Sociable Robots
The ﬁrst problem that I approached using the simulation engine was to create a distributed chore-
ography of agents moving through space, seemingly governed by emergent, antagonistic movements
of assembly and dissolution. The goal here was to ﬁnd a simple self-organizing mechanism for gov-
erning how the robots occupy space, such that diﬀerent distribution patterns could appear (isolated
robots, sub-groups, etc.)
The basic concept that I experimented exploited the desire of the agent to either assemble with
peers or avoid them. Following this idea, a robot would always be in one of two states: solitary
(i.e., seeking loneliness) or sociable (i.e., looking for companionship). In the simulated experiment,
robots regularly update their peers about their current state and location by broadcasting messages.
Simple rules dictate the actions of a robot being in either state, based on direction of incoming
messages and objects detected using the range ﬁnder, as portrayed in Algorithm 1.
This simple algorithm inspires solitude-seeking robots to avoid objects, while sociable ones are
drawn to one another. To prevent robots from staying indeﬁnitely in the same state, I introduced an
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Algorithm 1 Basic decision algorithm based on agent’s sociability
if agent is sociable then ⊲ seeking company
if message received then
steer towards incoming message
start motor
else if object detected then
start motor ⊲ approaching
else
stop motor and steer clockwise ⊲ searching
end if
else ⊲ seeking solitude
if object detected then
stop motor and steer clockwise ⊲ avoiding
else
start motor ⊲ evading
end if
end if
additional “boredom” parameter representing how much the robot has become tired of its current
state, a value between 0 and 1 that slightly increases over time. The parameter is also inﬂuenced
by the presence of other robots detected during the reception of infrared messages. When a robot’s
boredom reaches 1, it changes state and the parameter is reinitialized to 0. Robots trying to be alone
will thus tend to become sociable through “peer pressure” if they move across a highly populated
area, whereas groups of friendly robots sticking together for too long will irremediable get bored of
each other after a while and split.
Once the experiment is launched, the robots start moving through space. Regions increase in
density as sociable robots coalesce, while their individualistic counterparts roam freely, avoiding
groups and taking refuge in deserted areas. Groups form, stick together for a while, then slowly
split and dissipate. As they disband, the territory becomes more chaotic as it ﬁlls up with runaway
robots running in all directions. Through their exploratory motion, these rogue robots reconﬁgure
the space as they attract friendly robots, inadvertently bump into groups, and eventually switch
states again and begin to seek new companions (ﬁg. 27).
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Values near 0 and 1 represent more extreme, marginal identities, whereas “normal” is implied around
0.5 (50%). Robots with similar identity are deemed to be alike and tend to tolerate each other more,
though they also get bored more easily if their resemblance is too strong. Conversely, robots with
very diﬀerent identities will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to stick together, though they might also be searching
for that diﬀerence.
Instead of using color codes to show the current state of the robots, I choose to use the simulated
RGB LED to represent the identity of the robot using a simple hue conversion. Agents near the
middle point (0.5) are cyan (180° hue) while extreme values (near 0 or 1) both tend towards red
(Fig. 28).
Figure 28: The hue scale, as used in the simulation engine to represent a robot identity.
Each robot is provided with an environmental sensor which also outputs a value between 0 and 1.
The basic, individual behavior of robots related to their current state of being (solitary or sociable)
remains unchanged from the last experience. However, the process governing the evolution of their
boredom is now aﬀected by both their identity as well as their environmental readings.
When a robot chooses to broadcast a message, the ﬁrst thing it does is to update its identity
based on the value of the environmental sensor using a simple adaptive rule:
identity ← identity − η(identity − environment) (1)
One will recognize here, the general form of the negative feedback, stochastic learning rule
introduced earlier, with a tunable learning rate η that can be adjusted to make the convergence
slower or faster (it was set to 0.1 in the simulations). This rule allows the smooth, asymptotical
convergence of the robot’s identity to match that of its sensor. One way to understand this process
metaphorically is that the value environment represents itself an identity that becomes the target
of the robot, meaning that if the agent was alone and if the measured variable would never change
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over time, the agent would eventually stabilize its identity to match that of its perception.
Once its identity is adjusted, the robot sends a packet containing its new identity value. Upon
receiving it, neighboring bots update both their boredom and identity parameters in ways that rein-
force unions with peers of akin temperament. One of the important consequences of this procedure
is that robots that assemble will tend to adapt their identity to one another using a learning rule
similar to equation 1. As members of a party exchange messages, their identity parameter tends
towards the group’s average. Since the individual identities of the bots are in turn strongly aﬀected
by their environmental sensor, the robots will lean globally in the direction of the average output
of the sensors.
For instance, if sensors are strongly biased toward zero, in the long run, the agents’ color will
be closer to orange and red. However, even if the mass eﬀect tends to move in a certain direction,
the spatial distribution of identities is subject to local variations. Thus, even if the global color
converges to red, there will still be variations at the individual and group levels. For example, a
party of robots with a higher identity parameter might gather in a safe spot, converging to blue or
purple.
This basic mechanism, allowing inter-robot personality exchange through mutual adaptation to
each other and their environment, would become the core principle behind the implementation of
collective, emerging behaviors in Vessels. As we will see in section 4.3.2, the simple principle of
mixing hues will later be augmented by the means of a genetic code in order to represent other
behavioral components such as sound and movement.
Leader Bots
Thus far in the experiments, intentional movement was mostly reserved to solitary agents, while
sociable robots stay more or less static once gathered in order to stick together. In a ﬁnal experiment,
I attempted to occasionally break from this principle by introducing a concept of leadership. From
time to time, when a group is formed, a leader stands out and directs the other group members to
swarm with it in its explorations of the space.




There were two things we wanted to explore with ML methods. First, we wanted to train robots
to maneuver across the surface of a water environment, eﬃciently avoiding obstacles in an eﬀort to
generate aesthetically compelling motion. I tried implementing this using reinforcement learning,
an approach that we ﬁnally abandoned.
Secondly, following our artistic objectives, we applied genetic algorithms to generate diﬀerent
forms of behavior that could evolve through time and be tied to the environmental readings. This
approach was quite successful, although it came with some limitations which I will discuss further.
Governing Towards a Dead-End
One of the biggest technical challenges that we faced with Vessels was how to eﬃciently navigate
the robotic agents through space. Their round shape and small weight combined with the low
viscosity of water made them extremely unstable and naturally likely to spin, sending them quickly
oﬀ course. Using compass data, I tried to design an algorithm that would allow them to complete
the seemingly simple, basic task of moving straight forward in a given direction.
I started with the most straightforward program I could come up with, which basically attempted
to readjust course by pushing the motors towards the target heading. In essence, the algorithm
says: “If you are currently bearing left of target heading, move clockwise. Otherwise, move counter-
clockwise.”
This approach would work relatively well if the robot were starting with a heading close to the
target heading. Otherwise, it would start making strong oscillations before adjusting or, in some
cases, start spinning indeﬁnitely.
The main issue here is that this approach does not take into account the angular velocity. If the
robots need to move clockwise, the algorithm had better check whether the robot is already moving
in that direction before pushing its motors to accelerate even more, making it harder to slow down
later on.
I thus designed a simple mathematical model of the physics involved and used it to implement
a new algorithm. It worked much better but it demanded that a number of parameters be set by
hand through trials and errors, such as the impact of the motors on acceleration.
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At this point, I started contemplating the idea of using reinforcement learning to automatically
learn the system dynamics. This was an interesting candidate for RL because it is a clear optimiza-
tion problem: the robot simply needs to be rewarded for keeping its current trajectory as close as
possible to the target. The learning algorithm would do the rest, ﬁnding an optimal way of steering
in any given circumstance. This could potentially save a lot of time and achieve better results as
compared to ﬁne-tuning a hard-coded program by hand.
While “moving straight” does not seem a particularly compelling aesthetic goal, I saw it as a
ﬁrst step in generating more complex and interesting behaviors in the robots. My hunch was that
we could use the same approach to train robots to move across the surface to achieve diﬀerent
objectives, such as avoiding all obstacles, running into them purposely, maximize movement, etc.,
simply by changing the reward function.
At the end of our residency at LABoral (Gijón, Spain) in Summer 2013, I managed to train a
system to move straight using batch RL (Lange, Gabel, and Riedmiller 2011). While those results
seemed promising, when I started working again on it a year later during our residency at Eastern
Bloc (Montréal, Canada), I found myself unable to reproduce them. All of my experiments yielded
poor performances on the task, usually leading to a dreaded spinning behavior. I still do not fully
understand what happened. My main hypothesis is that the environment we were in seemed to have
unusual magnetic properties, probably due to large metal beams which supported the ceiling. This
is demonstrated by the fact that as the bots moved on the surface, the magnetic ﬁeld seemed to
change the response of the compass, providing unreliable data which might have impaired learning.
I had already spent way too much time working this out, and in the mean time had come up with
an even better analytic solution to the steering problem which worked satisfactorily. As such, my
research in RL came to a halt, and I began to concentrate on other issues.
Of course, it would probably have been possible to train the robots in this task given better
conditions and more time. But we would then probably only have ended with similar results than
what analytic solutions such as the one we implemented allowed, and it would have come at a
much higher cost in terms of memory and CPU power. Furthermore, while the robots would have
moved more eﬃciently, that would also have removed some of their clumsiness, which gives them
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more personality. In other words, indeterminacy played in our favor in the aesthetic design of the
work. Again, this shows how the stakes in art and AI diﬀer from one another and often even play
antagonistically.
Nevertheless, as I mentioned earlier, learning the steering behavior was only a ﬁrst step to open
up a wide range of learned behaviors for the robots. But in the end, what would we gain from it,
really?
Answer: probably not much.
The best we could hope for would have been to generate a surprisingly “intelligent” behavior
for our robots, possibly evolving through time. But the truth is that (1) the physical limitations of
the microcontroller we used would likely have prevented or at least impaired it; (2) the necessary
time involvement was hard to estimate but possibly quite high; and (3) we could create something
fairly close to this result, and possibly with more aesthetic success, using less resource-consuming
methods.
This example once again points to an important limitation of ML (and of AI in general), which is
that these approaches are directed towards problem solving and optimization, whereas in creative
applications, the optimal solution is ill-deﬁned. There is no such thing as the “best” joke, an
“optimal” song or a “perfect” robotic behavior (Pasquier 2015). For instance, in Vessels, our
objective was not really to get robots to move on water without hitting one another: what we
are truly interested in was to generate a form of expressive behavior that matches our aesthetic
intention.
The “optimal” shape of an artwork — if such a thing is indeed possible — is an extremely
abstract concept even in the eyes of its creators. Were we to adopt an extremely naive conception
of the creative process, where an artist would have an a priori vision of what she wants to accomplish
and then materializes it in a work of art, that vision would necessarily be vague and diﬃcult to
express mathematically.
Of course, the reality is that artists usually do not know in advance exactly what they want
to achieve. Artmaking is an intricate process, an ongoing interaction with material agencies that
generally lead us to place we might have not anticipated. The “optimal” form of a work of art is
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often revealed by accident: you know it only when you see it.
The maladjustment of traditional AI to creative applications has been raised by a number of
researchers in the ﬁeld of digital creativity, a sub-ﬁeld of computer science that tries to address
the question of how we can make computers creative (Boden 2004). One of their critiques of AI
is precisely the fact that it has traditionally focused on a certain category of problems (i.e., those
that can be optimized) leaving aside a vast range of what the human brain can do:
Artiﬁcial intelligence addresses the problem of emulating intelligence by having the
computer achieve tasks that would require intelligence if achieved by humans. These
tasks are usually formalized as well-formed problems. Rational problem solving is then
evaluated by comparison to some optimal solution. If the optimal solution is theoretical
and not attainable, optimization and approximation techniques can be used to get closer
to the optimal, or at least improve the quality of the solution according to some metrics.
Computational creativity is faced with the dilemma that, while creative behavior is
intelligent behavior, such notions of optimality are not deﬁned. (Eigenfeldt, Burnett,
and Pasquier 2012, 144)
Reinforcement Learning is particularly challenging in artistic works because it is caught in a
paradox. Generating aesthetically compelling content is usually a diﬃcult, highly non-linear task
which thus requires a lot of data and capacity (i.e., number of parameters/weights) for learning
to occur.14 But artistic contexts rarely oﬀer these conditions. In the case of Vessels, for example,
while data can be more or less easily generated by having robots traverse the water, the information
was made too unstable to use because of the low-ﬁ nature of the sensors used. Furthermore, the
hardware running the algorithms was simply not powerful enough to handle it.
To summarize, in this ﬁrst step, I faced an important problem related to the nature of AI
research, which is that interesting artistic problems are intrinsically diﬃcult for these methods
to address, and at the same time, the kind of problems they are designed to solve are often not
aesthetically interesting in themselves. In the next section, I present how we successfully subverted
a genetic algorithm approach to generate a compelling evolution in behaviors by employing a set
of strategies, introduced in section 3.2, which consists in utilizing the model and the evaluation
function of a ML algorithm of an alternative way.
14Consider for example the curse of dimensionality, introduced in section 3.2.2 .
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Evolutive Family Resemblance with Genetic Algorithms
As my experiments with RL proved unfruitful, I switched my attention back to the larger picture. By
this point, we had implemented a basic, nonadaptive behavior that allowed the robots to occupy
space dynamically and engage in basic social interactions using behavior trees. There were still
important challenges to address. How can groups of agents evolve behaviors that converge to
some form of similarity while staying diversiﬁed? How to make these behaviors correspond to
the environmental conditions sensed by the robots? Moreover, how to accomplish this with a
decentralized control where each bot makes its own decisions?
Simulations drafted a very rough sketch of how to attend to these questions by introducing a
minimalist concept of “personality” or “identity” in the robots that would be adapted through the
interaction with peers as well as readings of the environmental data. This factor, however, remained
at the proof-of-concept level, only aﬀecting the robots’ color. But how to go further and allow for
a large variation in personalities while preserving the form of co-adaptation experimented in the
simulations?
Introduced in section 3.1.7, Genetic Algorithms (GA) oﬀered an inspiring and useful framework
for undertaking these challenges. The fundamental principles behind GAs were put forward by
computer scientist John Holland in his famous study on adaptive processes (Holland 1992). His
conception of adaptation is highly Darwinian, anchored in a certain idea about the evolution of the
species through the survival of the ﬁttest. Holland’s contribution was to provide a mathematical
framework for this process, turning it into an optimization method.
One way GAs have been utilized by artists is by tweaking the ﬁtness function to match it to
aesthetic preferences, a procedure known as Interactive Genetic Algorithm (IGA) (Dawkins 1986).
Karl Sims’ 1997 installation Galápagos is emblematic of this approach in new media arts. In this
work, visitors can look at twelve (12) screens that display artiﬁcial 3D life forms. They can push
a pedal located in front of each screen to select their favorite creatures, and a new generation of
virtual beings is created based on that input.
Sims therefore lets visitors act as the ﬁtness function: the GA is used directly to try learning
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“user preferences”, whatever that means. Hence, despite its innovative character, I always found
this piece to be quite didactic and artistically limited. Good art is not about providing people
with a chance to conﬁrm their preexisting tastes and preferences, but about bringing them into an
experience that will surprise, move and, hopefully, transform the way they feel about the world.15
What I want to focus on here is another fundamental property of GAs, which is the ability
to transmit genes from one generation to the next. This is typically accomplished by a crossover
operator which takes the chromosomes from the parents and recombines them, producing oﬀsprings
that share genetic material with their progenitors. In other words, the recombination step (which
is normally used as part of an optimization procedure) can be seen as a way to exchange genetic
patterns among members of the population, resulting in the evolution of a “family resemblance”
between them as they reproduce with one another. Thus, if we tweak or remove the selection
step, we can end up with an algorithm that is no longer trying to optimize anything, but rather is
furthering circulation of genetic information among agents.
This is what we did in Vessels. The idea is that each robot’s personality would be represented
not as a single real value — resulting in a color hue as its phenotype — but as a binary genetic
code that would deﬁne every aspect of the robot’s behavior and appearance. The same would also
go for environmental measurements, each measurement being associated with its own virtual DNA
(one way to see this is that each environmental measure has its own personality or identity).
When an agent encounters another agent, it mixes its own genetic code with its peer’s, with the
intention that its DNA moves a little bit towards that of its sibling; the same goes when it performs
an environmental reading. We achieve this by performing one step of the genetic algorithm and
selecting only the oﬀspring whose DNA is the closest to the original code by deﬁning our ﬁtness
function as the number of bits diﬀering between the oﬀspring and the original robot’s DNA.
In other words, we hooked into the procedure and subverted it. We took took advantage of
the particular qualities of the model (the binary DNA stream), removed the selection part of the
optimization procedure, and used an evaluation function that would ﬁt our aesthetic needs. We
15The installation Performative Ecologies (2008–2010) by architect Ruairi Glynn employs GAs in a similar fashion
as Sims but in a much more experiential, less didactic way. In the work, which won the VIDA 11.0 award for art
and artiﬁcial life, dancing robots compete for the audience’s attention. Their behaviors are implemented using GAs.
The ﬁtness function here is the attention level of the public during each robotic performance (Glynn 2008).
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thus tweaked the standard approach — whose aim is to converge to an optimal solution among the
space of possible genetic codes — in order to use two features of the algoritmic process that we were
interested in, namely (1) the recombination operation that promotes “family resemblance” between
the bots, attached to the environment measurements; and (2) the iterative nature of the algorithm,
which makes a form of narrative of adaptation unfold before the eyes of the audience.16
The manner in which to use ML in artistic contexts is not obvious, as most of the scientiﬁc
research in the ﬁeld has focused on applications whose needs are much diﬀerent from those of
artists. It does, however, provide interesting tools that allow the implementation of conceptual
and formal ideas. In particular, adaptive computational strategies were used in Vessels to respond
to the artistic intend of designing a collective and evolving emergent behavior that attempted to
match, or tend towards, a set of environmental variables (which were potentially in constant ﬂux).
But after considering all these practical questions, how do people react when confronted with
these behavioral patterns? What kind of agency do they attribute to these robots, both at the
individual and group levels? Does the use of adaptive and ML methods change anything in regards
to an uninitiated human’s perception? From an aesthetic perspective, how do these behaviors diﬀer
from other, nonadaptive emergent processes?
4.4 Ecosystems
Vessels is an instance of an approach that has been successfully applied over the years that in-
volves bringing a large number of agents into an environment. This is reminiscent of the kind
of artiﬁcial ecosystems projects carried out by ALife researchers such as Thomas S. Ray and his
Tierra platform. Australian artist Jon McCormack is one of the leaders of this approach. One of
his most important works, Eden, is an “evolutionary sonic ecosystem” that represents agents on a
16In addition to that general “personality-evolution” process, an important component of the sounds produced
by the robots used another form of genetic learning. Stephen Kelly, who created this part of the program, used an
evolutionary approach known as Genetic Programming (GP). A variant of Genetic Algorithms, the DNA of a GP
system encodes sequences of instructions, which usually involve simple, low-level manipulations of memory registers.
Kelly used that system to manage the evolution of simple sound parameters controlling oscillators, such as ampli-
tude and pitch. This results in a diversity of sounds that stay in the same recognizable range, giving an identity to
the whole piece while allowing suﬃcient divergence to introduce novelties. In the most extreme cases, some robots
adopt really bizarre, loud voices, or shrieking cries that range from adorable to annoying.
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two-dimensional lattice, in a similar fashion as cellular automata. The agents react to one another
and to their environment using a set of rules that are encoded as binary chromosomes, which are
then evolved using a Learning Classiﬁer System (LCS), a Machine Learning technique invented
by John Holland with close ties to both reinforcement learning, supervised learning and genetic
algorithms (McCormack 2009; Holland 1992; Urbanowicz and Moore 2009).
The work takes the form of an audiovisual installation in which the agents and their environ-
ment can be experienced as they move, mate, eat and communicate with one another using sound
signals. Contrary to Karl Sims’ Galápagos, in which the audience is asked to directly inﬂuence the
evolutionary process by acting as the ﬁtness indicator, here the agents react only indirectly to the
visitors whose presence is necessary to add “food” to the environment, while the movements of the
audience increase the mutation rate (McCormack 2009).
As for the public reception of the work, McCormack notices that while most people “are not
aware of the learning system, camera sensing, even the fact that what they are experiencing is a
complex artiﬁcial life system”, the system does seem to “interest and engage the audience”:
Since the system is reactive to people (rather than interactive), there is no correct or
incorrect way to behave except to appreciate the experience. Anecdotal accounts from
people who have experienced the work describe it as “having a sense that it is somehow
alive,” or “like being in a strange forest at night.” In a number of exhibitions, people
returned to the work over a period of several days, to see how the qualitative behaviour
of the virtual environment had changed. In one recent exhibition, a local businessman
visited the work during his lunch-hour every day for 3 weeks, describing the experience
as “fascinating. . . one that made me more sensitive to my own environment.” While
these are, of course, subjective evaluations, it does appear that Eden is able to adapt
and evolve to create an ongoing interest for its audience. (McCormack 2009, 411)
Performative Ecologies (2008—2010) by architect Ruairi Glynn, is described by its author as “an
ongoing investigation into the design of conversational (interactive) environments” (Glynn 2008).
Inspired by the work of Gordon Pask, especially his 1968 installation Colloquy of Mobiles, Glynn’s
installation creates a conversational space in which dancing robots evolve in constant interaction
with one another and with the public.
The performances are generated from a gene pool of evolving dances functioning in
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a Genetic Algorithm (G.A.) which uses facial recognition to assess attention levels &
orientation of the audience before & after each performance as a way of assessing &
assigning a ﬁtness value to each new choreography. Over time successful maneuvers are
kept & recombined to produce new performances while less eﬀective ones are discarded.
Mutation in the G.A. ﬂuctuates based on how successful the sculptures become. If they
get a lot of attention, mutation levels rise as if they are getting arrogant & as a result
be come more experimental. (4—5)
When no one is around, the robots start communicating with one another, sharing information
about their most successful moves. New performances are evolved through genetic crossovers:
They take the suggestions of their surrounding partners & compare their gene pool of
performances to their partners suggestions. If they are comparatively similar then they
are accepted & replace a chromosome from their own pool. If they are too diﬀerent they
are rejected as if they dislike the partners dance moves. (5)
Performative Ecologies somehow lies between situated robotics, ecosystems installations and
interactive genetic algorithm systems such as Karl Sims’ Galápagos. Building upon the legacy of
artist David Rokeby through his “experiments in complexity” (3) and Gordon Pask’s Conversation
Theory (which suggests a way for humans and machines to interact within their shared environ-
ments), it uses Machine Learning as a way to engage the public in sophisticated interactions with
machinic systems.
Another example of an artistic installation driven by a virtual ecosystems is Richard Brown’s
2000 piece Biotica. In this one-person immersive environment, it is once again the presence and
movement of the participants that impact the growth and evolution of virtual 3D creatures. The
piece integrates diﬀerent methods borrowed from AL and AI, such as systems theory, genetic al-
gorithms, L-Systems and Kauﬀman networks. Interestingly, agents in Biotica are modeled using
simple neural networks that are evolved with a genetic procedure (Brown et al. 2001).
In an honest self-critique of his work, Brown highlights important diﬃculties in the research-
creation process. In particular, he explains how the system interactions often resulted in chaotic
behaviors that were too random, therefore impossible to stabilize. There were some “promising
glimmerings” of emergent properties but in the end, in far too many instances, “the system had to
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be painstakingly coaxed, and behaviour had to be explicitely programmed to a degree that would
not warrant the description emergent” (78).
In the case of Vessels neither the agents nor the enviromnent are simulated, as the piece stages a
large group of situation robots that interact within their environment. In a similar fashion as Eden,
the work uses genetic computation to evolve a group behavior that reacts to the characteristics
of its milieu. A common feature of these works is that they presume a certain degree of loss of
control from the artist, and their complexity cannot be easily grasped by the audience. How does
the presentation context inﬂuence visitors’ experience of such works? Do they require technical
explanations to appreciate them? What are their ﬁrst impressions, and how do these evolve as they
spend time with the work?
4.5 Experiencing Vessels
At the moment of writing this thesis, Vessels has been presented on multiple occasions. In this
section, I describe the experiences of the audiences in two of these showcases: one where the work
was shown indoors as part of a gallery exhibition; and another where it was installed in the public
space during a new media art festival.
In February 2015, a group of ten (10) robots was shown at the Eastern Bloc gallery in Montréal
(Canada) as part of a group exhibition titled “Robotis Personae”. The piece was thus presented
intra muros, running during the space’s normal daily opening hours. The reduced number of
agents diminished opportunities of emergent phenomenon, and the gallery setting induced a certain
expectation of reactivity that was not present. The context of an indoors exhibition did not favor
the kind of detached, contemplative mindset the piece was designed for — which can be more easily
found in people approaching an outdoors water feature in the city to eat a sandwich.
The most interesting perspective shared as a result of exhibiting this artwork came from a fellow
media artist, Audrey Samson, who was doing a residency at Eastern Bloc while the exhibition was
taking place. Because she experienced the piece on a daily basis, her experience was fundamentally
diﬀerent than that of most people who came to see the work in the gallery. She contacted me to
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tell me that, while she was unsure at the beginning, as she went pass the piece to get to the coﬀee
machine, she became increasingly familiar with it and started noticing patterns. In particular, she
explained that as a given day would go by, it seemed that the behaviors became less and less random
and seemed to converge and stabilize into more recognizable, interesting patterns.
Several months later, we showed the piece at University of Strasbourg (France) as part of
L’Ososphère, a public art festival running on the campus in November 2015. There, we exhibited
twenty (20) bots in a public fountain set in front of the Law School, near a large and busy boule-
vard. The piece was shown for four (4) consecutive evenings and attracted passers-by and festival
attendants alike.
In this case, the robots gave rise to a number of diﬀerent social interactions and impressions
in the recipients. One of the unexpected phenomena was that people, especially children, were
immediately drawn to physically interact with them, either pushing them away, or even “testing”
them with the hand or foot. We even had two cases were robots were ﬂipped over, putting them into
immediate risk of damage. I have mixed feelings about this: in one way, it got me exasperated, but
on the other hand, it shows the diﬀerent beliefs people have about AI, which range from curiosity
and love, to fear and anger. In particular, the apparent fragility of these robots asks for a sense of
responsibility in the face of their precariousness.
Children loved to help the robots escape from the sides of the fountain (a tendency they have
due in part to their incapacity to move backwards) by pushing them away, usually gently enough
that they would not tilt over. One night, two kids played for over half an hour with a single outlier
robot who had run to the other side of the pool, apparently not caring much about the rest of
the robotic community. It became a kind of game, and French philosopher Michel Serres’ concept
of quasi-objects immediately came to my mind. According to Serres, such quasi-objects are what
“trace” relationships between members of a collective, like the ball in a soccer game. Through these
interactions, they actually deﬁne the collective (Serres 1982).
People of diﬀerent age and apparent socioeconomic and racial backgrounds made remarks that
were more than often related to attributions of emotions and feelings in the agents. When asked
about the installation by a group of baby boomers that had been observing and photographing the
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piece for half an hour, I responded by reversing the question, asking them what they felt the piece
was about. They then started to describe all kinds of relationships that they imagined between the
bots. For instance: there was a couple forming over there, these three were dancing together, this
one was a loner, etc. We discussed whether one of the robots, who had got away from the rest, was
alone by choice or because it had been left alone by his comrades.
On the last night, a 10-year-old girl arrived with her mother and seemed really intrigued with
the piece. When told that the robots could communicate, the child asked whether the one receiving
a message could tell that it was another robot who was contacting it. She also asked if a robot
could tell another one that it was beautiful.
Many people (especially those who had just arrived at the site) asked whether the robots’
behaviors were “random”. I was surprised by this remark, because in my extensive experience
working with the behavior of technological agents, I experience randomness — for example, the
pattern generated by a random walk, where a completely random decision is taken at every step
— as having a distinctive “feel” to it, which is quite distinct from that in Vessels. When asked
what they meant exactly by that statement, many seemed to deﬁne “randomness” as oppositional
to “programmed”. What I understood by further discussing with them was that in their mind,
randomness meant total chaos, meaning no perceivable pattern spatially and temporally; while a
programmed behavior was to be naturally ordered and comprehensible, a set of deﬁned steps, like
a kitchen recipe.
Once explained that they were imbued with some degree of indeterminacy but yet had “per-
sonalities” and “desires”, they often started looking at them diﬀerently, attributing more human
characteristics. A visual artist told me that her perspective changed once she read the description
of the piece. It seems that many people interpret such robotic systems using a mechanistic view.
At best, the most informed people might think of a logical, rule-based, deterministic process. But
until they are informed of the details of ML involved in the work, most people do not seem to be
aware of the possibility that the robots might be adaptive, or emergent, that they might have their
own agenda, that they might be shifting from chaos to order in performances that appear relatively
seamless to the human eye.
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Periods of social harmony in the robots contrasted with the clashing behavior of outlier agents.
While the robots seemed to reach points of stability, most noticeably in the tint of their colored
light, over time they evolved and transformed, not only in their individual expression, but also in
response to the wind and water current which directly inﬂuenced their spread across the surface,
which correspondingly inﬂuenced the distribution of spectators. In this way, the robots perhaps
became a reﬂection of their human counterparts. A passerby even suggested that they might
actually be the ones observing “our” behavior as the work of art.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examined the agent-based installation Vessels in an attempt to address issues
related to the use of Machine Learning in agent-based artistic installations. We started by dis-
cussing the authorial intentions behind the piece, namely (1) the dynamic occupation of space; (2)
the generation of social interactions; and (3) the creation of a relationship between the robots and
their environment. We then focused on the diﬀerent hardware and software components of the
piece, trying to contextualize these choices as part of the broader artistic research and development
process. I explained how budgetary and human resources, time constraints, and goals of the en-
terprise diﬀerentiated it from most commercial or scientiﬁc swarm robotics projects, resulting in
technological choices that favored expressivity over physical eﬃciency.
We then moved on to the crux of the chapter, looking directly at the storyline of some of the
important practice-based research that was carried over as part of the work. We examined how
high-level solutions were ﬁrst considered through simple algorithms in a simulation environment.
We inspected the diversiﬁed structure of the program which intermixes a nonadaptive, goal-oriented
system with adaptive procedures.
I examined two strategies of using ML in the work. The ﬁrst one, which tried to employ a RL
approach to address the problem of moving eﬃciently across space, failed for both technical and
artistic reasons. As I explained, this points towards the fact that, as other researchers have noticed,
the trouble with using AI methods in art is that their goals mismatch. Indeed, AI is traditionally
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aimed at rational problem solving and optimization, whereas artistic applications have more murky
objectives.
In response to this, I came up with a second stratagem using GAs, which involved hijacking the
learning loop, using the iterative, hill-climbing nature of the algorithm to induce small adaptive
changes that move towards a “family resemblance” over time, the objective of which was to allow
learning to be “felt” by the audience over time.
From a broader perspective, my analysis points towards a way of using ML artistically in agent-
based artworks by revealing the learning behavior itself to the audience in real-time, an antipodal
approach to traditional AI, which is (supposedly) interested in an algorithm’s outcomes rather than
in the process itself. I showed one very speciﬁc way one could hook into the optimization loop by
tweaking the returns function (i.e., the ﬁtness in the case of GAs and the reward in the case of RL).
Yet, the ﬁnal use of ML in Vessels has many caveats. First, while we did approach the project
from the perspective of ML, our reliance on Genetic Algorithms puts the piece in the space of
evolutionary devices such as Artiﬁcial Life ecosystems, which we will discuss in the next chapter.
Thus, it is possible that we could have come up with a similar system if we had an approach that
was not explicitly based on ML but rather on self-organization and complexity.
Secondly, as the work already had too many degrees of freedom due to the water environment
and the lo-ﬁ sensors and motors, we ended up relying on a form of adaptation whose outcome was
disconnected from the embodied reality of the robots. This is indeed what was attempted through
the use of RL (but this approach eventually failed): to allow the robots to generate their own
movements under constraints. Instead, the GAs are used here more as a content generation device
that allows for similarities to emerge than as a way for agents to come up with their own, creative
behavior.
Finally, the aesthetic eﬀect of the robotic agents’ behavioral patterns, and how adaptiveness
contributes to it, are still unclear. If we are to understand how people react to adaptive behaviors,
we have to discern how they react to artiﬁcial agents in general, and what roles are played by
notions such as autonomy, emergence, self-organization and adaptation in the generation of such
artiﬁcial behaviors.
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In the next chapter, I introduce a parallel strand of research to AI and ML which deals with
questions of aliveness and embodiment using a bottom-up approach. I dig more deeply into the rich
conceptual soil surrounding lifelike agents in art and science, showing the relationship of notions
such as autonomy and emergence with adaptation and learning. Finally, I use the morphologi-
cal diﬀerences between processes generated by adaptive and nonadaptive systems to construct a
aesthetic framework for agent behaviors.
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Chapter 5
Aesthetics of Behavior in
Agent-based Art
As observers we expect the environment to change and try to describe those features
that remain unchanged with the passage of time. An unchanging form of events due
to the activity within an assembly is called a behavior. The behaviour of a steam
engine is a recurrent cycle of steam injection and piston movements that remains
invariant. The behaviour of a cat is made up of performances like eating and sleeping
and, once again, it is an invariant form selected from the multitude of things a cat
might possibly do. The behaviour of a statue is a special case, for the statue is im-
mobile, or to use an equivalent formalism, it changes at each instant of time into itself.
– Gordon Pask, An Approach to Cybernetics
The ﬁrst chapter of this dissertation explored the research-creation project Absences, a series of
site-speciﬁc environmental works using electronic agents installed in outdoor spaces. The evolution
of the project through the ﬁve (5) interventions that were realized demonstrated the origin of the
current research project while also opening up several problems and questions.
In the second chapter, I uncovered part of the historical background surrounding the algorithms
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employed in Absences, and I introduced a framework for understanding the use of Machine Learning
in art practice through an analysis of their innate properties as scientiﬁc objects.
The third chapter focused on the swarm robotics installation Vessels, showing an in-depth
research-creation project that began with the premise that it would employ adaptive methods. It
oﬀered an opportunity to apply the framework built in the previous chapter, showing its forces
and limitations. It ended by looking into the aesthetic eﬀects such adaptive behaviors generated
in a human audience, expanding this into possibilities for how audiences might react in future
applications..
The current chapter follows from its predecessors in its attempt to tackle the question of aﬀects
and experience through a study of real-time behaviors in agent-based systems. In other words, it
completes the theoretical framework of chapter 3, which focused more on the question of practice
(i.e., the artistic dimension), by looking more closely at the question of experience (i.e., the aesthetic
dimension). It does so by exploring the concept of behavior in art and science, using adaptation as
a way to reﬁne existing frames of reference.
In other words, this chapter presents an aesthetics of adaptive agent-based installations through
a morphological analysis of their behavior. Following Kwastek (2013), the word “aesthetics” is used
here as a ﬂuctuating notion that ranges from “perception mediated by the senses” (aisthesis) to
“theory of art” (aesthetics) (66). My main objective is to provide a description of the experiential
mechanisms that are made possible by adaptive systems in media installations. I am especially in-
terested in connecting the dots between the scientiﬁc perspectives of such systems and the aesthetic
eﬀects they aﬀord. While artistic media installations cannot be separated from their visual and
aural qualities, here I am interested in another dimension, which is about the behaviors that guide
how these sensual elements manifest themselves in time, through the actions of an agent responding
to its environment.
This chapter introduces a number of missing concepts in the history of adaptive systems that
are necessary to understand my own aeshetic of behavior: Second-Order Cybernetics and Artiﬁ-
cial Life (Langton 1989b; Helmreich 2000; Varela and Bourgine 1992; Maturana and Varela 1980;
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Whitelaw 2004); the question of embodiment in enactivist theory and Nouvelle AI (Varela, Thomp-
son, and Rosch 1991; Brooks 1987; Penny 1997); the notions of emergence and self-organization in
agent-based systems (Cariani 1989; Soler-Adillon 2015); and the importance of authorship and be-
lievability in designing such systems (Bates 1994; Downie 2005; Breazeal 2002; Mateas 2001). I then
contextualize adaptive behaviors within the scopes of analysis of social robotics through the work
of Sherry Turkle (Turkle 2006) and performativity theory using Andrew Pickering’s posthumanist
ontology (Austin 1962; Pickering 2010). Following this, inspired by the work of Iannis Xenakis
and Agostino Di Scipio on generative music, as well as on the writings of Cariani on adaptive and
emergent systems, I suggest a simple aesthetic framework for understanding behaviors based on
their morphological unfolding through time.
5.1 Second-Order Cybernetics
The historical review of chapter 3 followed a speciﬁc stream of Machine Learning, looking at its
origins in Cybernetics and AI. However, in the artistic world, another strand of research that has
ties with Cybernetics has been much more inﬂuential than AI: that of Artiﬁcial Life (AL, or ALife).
This strand of research is marked by an interest in generative and evolutive processes rather than
adaptive ones, and favors a “bottom-up” approach (as opposed to “top-down”).
In the 1960s, some cyberneticians had started to distance themselves from the original movement
of the 1950s because of an important philosophical limitation of the homeostatic model: the problem
of the observer. The ﬁrst wave of cyberneticians kept the observer outside the system, a shortcut
that allowed for elegant mathematical modeling, among other things. But as Katherine Hayles puts
it, the problem is that “feedback can also loop through the observers, drawing them in to become
part of the system being observed.” (Hayles 1999, 9)
Austrian-American scientist Heinz von Foerster called at the end of the 1960s for a new wave
of Cybernetics by proposing to reinstate the observer in the homeostatic model by including it as
part of the system. In other words, the cybernetician had to take his or herself into account for
Cybernetics theory to be complete (Clarke and Hansen 2009). As the author would later put it,
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“Cybernetics then becomes cybernetics of cybernetics, or second-order cybernetics.” (von Foerster
2003, 287). Thus, as Hayles puts it, in this second movement of Cybernetics, reflexivity took the
place of homeostasis as a central concept.1
It is during that period that Chilean biologist Humberto Maturana and his student Francisco J.
Varela put together the concept of autopoiesis, a reﬂexive and self-organizing model of the living,
which quickly became extremely inﬂuential in the ﬁeld (Maturana and Varela 1980). The link with
homeostasis is clear: autopoietic systems are homeostatic, however, all homeostatic systems are not
autopoietic. In autopoietic systems, the variable that is kept constant through homeostasis is none
other than the organisms’ own organization (79).
Maturana and Varela’s main interest is to establish a common ground for living systems. They
take, as the cornerstone of their theory, the unitary character of every living system. Although their
approach is mechanistic, they emphasize that their interest is not “in properties of components,
but in processes and relations between processes realized through components” (75). Autopoietic
machines are closed, autonomous systems that maintain their individuality and their unity by a
process of self-production that constantly builds and rebuilds the components that make up their
organization.2
Thus, contrary to what Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow suggest, living systems are not deﬁned
by their purpose, nor by their inputs and outputs: these features belong to the domain of the
observer, not to the phenomenological domain of the autopoietic system.
Purpose or aims [. . . ] are not features of the organization of any machine (allo- or
autopoietic); these notions belong to the domain of our discourse about our actions,
that is, they belong to the domain of descriptions, and when applied to a machine, or
any system independent from us, they reﬂect our considering the machine or system in
some encompassing context. (85)
Another consequence of their deﬁnition is that although the authors recognize the link be-
tween autopoiesis and self-reproduction in the history of evolution (106), they do not consider
1This ﬁrst-order vs second-order cybernetics dichotomy, taken for granted by Hayles and other scholars, has been
criticized under both historical and conceptual grounds. For example, read Cariani (2016).
2German biologist Jakob von Uexküll’s notion of umwelt can be considered a precursor to the autopoietic theory.
Von Uexküll notes that animals are engaged in a functional loop where perceptions control actions that contribute
to change the world they live in, which is completely diﬀerent from the world of the observer (von Uexküll 1957).
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self-reproduction to be a necessary condition of life. For a unity to reproduce, it needs to exist
ﬁrst and foremost. Thus, self-reproduction is “operationally secondary to the establishment of the
unity” and, for the authors, should not be part of the deﬁnition of living systems (100).
5.2 Artificial Life
As second-order Cybernetics re-introduced the observer into the system, by removing self-reproduction
as a central feature of life, it failed to take the evolution of living systems into account, especially
in the context of complex, non-linear dynamics. Starting in the 1980s, a new approach known as
Artiﬁcial Life — or ALife for short — developed in response to these caveats (Hayles 1999, 222).
In the 1970s, chaos theory and complex system theory had revealed how highly non-linear
systems often display emergent properties, that is, unpredictable behavior as the result of simple
interactions between a large number of entities. Emergence challenges directly the distinction
between human and machine because we can now, starting from simple rules, simulate complex
and unpredictable behavior on a computer.3 Thus, in this third wave of Cybernetics, according to
Hayles, reﬂexivity gives way to virtuality. To understand Hayles’s deﬁnition of virtuality, one need
only think about an immersive game where a human body is put in a feedback loop with a 3D
simulation on the computer. The game thus happens at the intersection between the real and the
virtual:
Virtual reality technologies [. . . ] make visually immediate the perception that a world
of information exists parallel to the “real” world, the former intersecting the latter at
many points and in many ways. (14)
It should have become quite apparent by now that this kind of computationalist conception that
supposes a clear separation between the informatic world and the material world is a powerful thread
in the history of computing. In particular, it is clearly manifested in Christopher G. Langton’s
opening opus to the proceedings of the ﬁrst Interdisciplinary Workshop On The Synthesis And
Simulation Of Living Systems at the Santa Fe Institute (Langton 1989b). In this foundational
3Emergence is a key concept of complexity sciences, such as chaos theory (Gleick 2008), which were very inﬂuentual
on the upbringing of Artiﬁcial Life (for example, see (Langton 1990)).
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paper (incidentally titled “Artiﬁcial Life”) Langton frames the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Life as a synthetic
approach to biology.
Langton explains that biological sciences are anchored in an analytic methodology that tries to
understand life by looking at the only forms of living systems that we know of: carbon-based life
on Earth. This limitation to terrestrial examples of life makes it hard to derive general principles
for biology. Artiﬁcial Life proposes to overcome these constraints by creating “life-like behaviors”
within the computer. This new “biology of possible life” thus supplements traditional biological
sciences with a synthetic approach: “By extending the empirical foundation upon which biology
is based beyond the carbon-chain life that has evolved on Earth, Artiﬁcial Life can contribute
to theoretical biology by locating life-as-we-know-it within the larger picture of life-as-it-could-
be.” (Langton 1989a, 1)
Although this broadened picture should theoretically encompass hardware-based as much as
software-based systems — not to mention synthetic forms of carbon-based life, often called “wet-
ware”, inclusive of cyborgs and other hybrids — Langton gives little importance to the material
support of living systems, whether it be sillicon chips, biochemical structures or mechanical devices.
ALife, he explains, is rooted in the history of computing and more especially in the switch from a
mechanical to a logical — in other words, computational — conception of life (13).
Langton’s support of the computational approach can be seen in his appraisal of John von Neu-
mann’s theory of self-reproducing automata, the “ﬁrst computational approach to the generation
of lifelike behavior” (13). Von Neumann, a genius of his time, had been a key player in early Cy-
bernetics and in the design of modern computers. In the early 1940s, with his student Stanislaw
Ulam, he designed a theory of cellular automata as a computational model of living systems. A
cellular automaton is a set of discrete cells arranged into a grid, each of which can be, at any given
time, in only one of many states. Cells change state according to a set of rules that depends on the
states of its immediate neighbors (von Neumann 1951).
Von Neumann was interested in the capacity for such an automaton to self-reproduce. He
set out to design a cellular automaton capable not only of reproducing itself, but also any given
automaton. Von Neumann called that automaton a “universal constructor”. Unfortunately, he died
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before he was able to publish his research. It is Arthur W. Burks, a computer scientist who had
worked on cellular automata in the 1940s and who contributed to the design of the ﬁrst general-
purpose computer, who in 1966 edited a posthumous publication of John von Neumann’s research
on self-reproducing automata (von Neumann 1966).
In a 1984 paper, Langton designed a simpliﬁed version of von Neumann’s automata. The
universality condition was dropped: the automaton should only reproduce itself, although it should
do so in a non-trivial manner. The resulting structure consists of a dynamic “loop” that stores
its own description. Reproduction occurs by the loop extending into an “arm” (ressembling an
umbilical cord), which in turn carries the code for creating another loop (Langton 1984). These
“Langton’s loops” thus exhibit a life-like behavior that is reminiscent of the steps of a biological
life cycle (143).
In his 1989 article “Artiﬁcial Life”, Langton’s bias towards the computationalist view of life
displays itself not only in his depiction of ALife’s origins in von Neumann’s theories, but also in
the examples he chooses to describe the ﬁeld. Most of his attention is focused on purely compu-
tational models of life, like Lindenmayer’s generative grammars that grow artiﬁcial trees (Langton
1989a, 25), cellular automata (28—30), Reynolds’ ﬂocking “boids” (30—31) and genetic algorithms
(35—38). To his defense, Langton does venture into hardware-based artiﬁcial life in the post-war
period, such as Grey Walter’s electronic tortoises (18) but he clearly insists on the primacy of be-
havior over matter: “Life is a property of form, not matter, a result of the organization of matter
rather than something that inheres in the matter itself.” (41).
The Tierra system, designed by ecologist Thomas S. Ray in the early 1990s at the Santa Fe
Institute, is probably the most emblematic example of this computational view of life (Ray 1991).
In this experiment, Ray raises the question: what would life look like in the universe of a computer?
To address this question, he establishes a metaphor in which processes reproduce, mutate and evolve
within computer memory. He thus establishes a direct parallel between organic and digital life.
Organic life is viewed as utilizing energy, mostly derived from the sun, to organize
matter. By analogy, digital life can be viewed as using CPU (central processing unit)
time, to organize memory. Organic life evolves through natural selection as individuals
compete for resources (light, food, space, etc.) such that genotypes which leave the
143
most descendants increase in frequency. Digital life evolves through the same process,
as replicating algorithms compete for CPU time and memory space, and organisms
evolve strategies to exploit one another. CPU time is thought of as the analog of the
energy resource, and memory as the analog of the spatial resource. (Ray 1991, 373—374)
By running this program, Ray observes the occurrence of phenomena that he himself had not
foreseen, such as the emergence of diﬀerent forms of parasitism (383—387). Here I want to draw
attention to the fact that, for Ray, the creatures that dwell in Tierra are real life forms. Tierra is
not a simulation of life, but rather a ground for the emergence of digital life form, as he expresses
very clearly in his introduction: “The intent of this work is to synthesize rather than simulate life.”
(111).
Thus, many ALife scientists share a computationalist vision of life, in which information sub-
sumes matter. But as Hayles rightfully claims, others are opposed to this view. In his book Silicon
Second Nature, Stefan Helmreich gives an anthropological account of Artiﬁcial Life research at the
Sante Fe Institute (SFI) where he highlights the largely computationalist nature of ALife in the US.
In the last chapter of the book, however, he contrasts it with a “European school of Artiﬁcial Life”
that has its own historical track. Whereas the US/SFI school of ALife is usually associated with
Langton, the European school is associated with Varela and reclaims its historical links with Walter
and Ashby’s cybernetic creatures, distancing itself from the computationalist tradition (Helmreich
2000; Varela and Bourgine 1992).
Like Cybernetics in the 1960s, the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Life would open up a whole new territory for
artists after this period of growth in the late 1980s. In his Ph. D. dissertation, new media theorist
Mitchell Whitelaw attemps to deﬁne this area of artistic practice. He remarks that Artiﬁcial Life
(ALife) is an area of experimental science which is less preoccupied by observation and representa-
tion than by by intervention and action. He also opposes it to the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence (AI)
which promotes a “top-down” rather than the “bottom-up” approach of ALife. Tracing through
the interests of art in regards to synthetic life over time, in artists and thinkers such as Goethe,
Malevich, Klee and Schöﬀer, he hypothesizes that “a-life art” might just be the latest addition to “a
modern creative tradition that seeks to imitate not only the appearance of nature but its functional
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structures” by using or appealing to technology. ALife might then just be the true destiny of art
and the realization of Jack Burnham’s vision of a “living, cyborg art form”. (Whitelaw 2004, 19)4
5.3 New AI
Inﬂuenced by approaches in both Machine Learning and Artiﬁcial Life, as well as by the work of
Maturana and Varela (Maturana and Varela 1980), MIT robotics scientist Rodney Brooks chal-
lenged classical AI by proposing a “New AI” or Nouvelle AI at the end of the 1980s. According to
this view, living systems should not be seen as the mere substrates on which a disembodied series
of symbolic manipulation happens. On the contrary, Brooks proposed that the behavior displayed
by living beings results from an embodied, situated interaction with their environment which does
not have a need for intermediate representations of the world (Brooks 1987).
Brooks’ robotic systems bear many resemblances to the works of early cyberneticians such as
Grey Walter, who created in the 1950s a couple of electro-mechanical turtles that could accomplish
complex, life-like behaviors through the use of a simple set of procedures that took into account
their speciﬁc bodily attributes (Walter 1950). Brooks’ subsumption architecture, which allowed
him to create his ﬁrst walking robot, Genghis, displays learning capabilities and has some close
ties with Reinforcement Learning.5 It is built upon a bottom-up approach whereby the engineer
iteratively adds control layers to the robot, reﬁning its behavior at each step. Lower-level layers
such as collision detection take priority over higher-level operations such as identifying objects and
reasoning about their behavior. (Brooks 1986; Brooks 1989; Maes et al. 1990; Maes 1994; Brooks
2002)
As an eﬃcient, bottom-up approach to robotics, Nouvelle AI had an important inﬂuence on
ALife robotic art in the 1990s. Artists such as Louis-Philippe Demers, Bill Vorn, Ken Rinaldo and
Simon Penny claim Brooks as a direct inspiration for their work (Rinaldo 1998; Demers and Vorn
4According to Whitelaw, Karl Sims (see section 3.2.1) was one of the ﬁrst artists to relate his practice to the ﬁeld
of Artiﬁcial Life (p. 25).
5It is important to make a clear distinction between connectionism and New AI. Although conectionism in the
ﬁeld of AI is in direct opposition to the symbolist nature of GOFAI, it shares the same objective of resolving real-life
problems in a disembodied, algorithmic way. As such, it is still part of the AI tradition that Brooks aims to challenge
through his reclamation of the importance of the body in relation with the real world.
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1995; Penny 1997). For example, Penny discusses in a 1997 paper how the Nouvelle AI paradigm
contributed to the development of his work Petit Mal:
My project owes a great deal, of course, to Brooks iconoclastic proposals of the 80’s
such as ‘the world is the map’. My goal has been to focus on the social and cultural
aspects of the question ‘how much can be left out’ by concentrating on the dynamics of
projection and representation (I mean this latter in a visual and critical theory sense).
The tool for this exploration was Petit Mal, an autonomous Robotic Artwork. Petit
Mal constitutes an Embodied Cultural Agent: an agent whose function is self reﬂexive,
to engage the public in a consideration of the nature of agency itself. (Penny 1997)
Over the course of the 1990s, Rodney Brooks and his colleagues would develop several robotic
projects using these kind of embodied interactive architectures, both with MIT and with the com-
pany iRobot, which Brooks founded in 1990 with Colin Angle and Helen Greiner; the same com-
pany that released the robotic vacuum cleaner Roomba a decade later. In the late 1990s, Cynthia
Breazeal, who had helped on the development of humanoid robot project Cog together with Brooks
at the MIT’s Humanoid Robotics Group, created a robot called Kismet that was able to detect and
display emotional states. Brazeal has since founded the Personal Robots Group at the MIT Media
Lab, where she studies social and emotional robots, such as the robotic pet Leonardo or the smart
driving assistant AIDA.6
5.4 Enactivism
Nouvelle AI and the aesthetics of behavior have many points of similarity with the concept of enac-
tion, ﬁrst articulated by Francisco J. Varela, Evan Thompson and Eleanor Rosch in their landmark
work The Embodied Mind. The book oﬀers a critique of computationalism — the dominant ap-
proach in cognitive science, which they refer to as cognitivism — by bridging Eastern and Western
philosophies. Plagued by the image of a pre-existing world whose features are represented by cog-
nitive systems, the authors demonstrate the failure of cognitivism to account for the bidirectional
6These systems are known to rely on Machine Learning algorithms, but not so much on connectionist models or
reinforcement learning.
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nature of interactions between action and perception from the embodied perspective of an agent
evolving in the real world (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991, 8).
As explained earlier, connectionism contrasts with the local and symbolic representation model
of cognition proposed by the computationalists with distributed and subsymbolic representations
learned by self-organizing systems such as neural networks. While the authors recognize the contri-
bution of connectionism to the ﬁeld, they argue that distributed and numerical representations are
still representations. Connectionism thus repeats the same mistake as cognitivism, failing to grasp
the importance of the situated body in cognition (9).
The authors thus propose enactivism as an alternative to both viewpoints. Based on Mahayana
Buddhism, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, and autopoiesis theory, this approach
suggests to replace the centrality of representation in cognizing agents by recognizing their active
involvement in the construction of meaning through autonomous coupling with their environment.
In this view, cognition should not be seen as the mere “representation of a pregiven world by a
pregiven mind” but rather as the “enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the
variety of actions that a being in the world performs” (9).
Philosopher and neuroscientist Christine A. Skarda believes that the enactivists’ critique of
connectionism partly misses the target by conﬂating two distinct types of connectionist structures:
parallel distributed processing (PDP) and self-organized systems (Skarda 1992). While she agrees
that the former, exempliﬁed by feedforward pattern recognition neural networks such as the Multi-
Layer Perceptron (MLP), suﬀers from the same representationalism curse as cognitivism, the latter
emergentist systems are compatible with enactivism:
It is misleading to identify, as Varela does, connectionism with self-organizing, emer-
gentist systems, and to say that all connectionist systems are still wedded to the rep-
resentations of traditional cognitivism. Some connectionist models are self-organizing,
but others are not. All connectionist systems use distributed, highly parallel processing,
but that is not the same thing as being self-organizing. PDP systems are susceptible to
Varela’s attack on representations, self-organized systems are not. I believe that Varela’s
distinction between emergent and enactive systems is ultimately intended to capture the
same fundamental distinction, but it is mistaken to equate emergent systems with con-
nectionism as a whole and set all connectionist systems against the enactive approach.
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This dichotomy is a false one. (266)
Artiﬁcial neural networks have been traditionally associated with PDP systems. They are mostly
used in supervised learning applications, where they are trained to classify or give an estimate,
usually based on data tagged by a human “teacher”. In other words, they basically learn to give
the closest answer to what is expected from them by a human expert. However, what is less known
is that MLPs and other neural-inspired variants can be used in a number of unsupervised and
self-organized ways, such as the Self-Organizing Map (SOM).
Furthermore, of neural networks can be used as function approximators in reinforcement learning
applications involving real-life agents, where the agent is not trying to recognize speciﬁc patterns
chosen by human “supervisor”, but rather, uses the adaptive qualities that it collects through its
connectionist architecture as part of the embodied action-taking process.7 Therefore, while Skarda
stands with the enactivist critique of the PDP branch of connectionism, she also believes that the
self-organizing properties of some connectionist systems are “a step in the direction of deﬁning a
nonrepresentational alternative in cognitive science” (267).
The vision of an embodied mind that enacts a world of meaning by autonomously coupling
with its environment both sustains, criticizes, and feeds upon theories of adaptive systems from the
Cybernetics era and 1980s connectionist learning research alike. Indeed, its sheer rejection of the
traditional view of enactivism sheerly rejecting connectionism is overblown, and merits reﬁnement.
What enactivisists seem to be more accurately in opposition to are certain forms of representa-
tionalist connectionism — on the other hand, nonrepresentational neural architectures that rely on
self-organization do not seem incompatible with enactivism.
5.5 Coupling
Two concepts lay at the heart of enactivist theory: coupling and autonomy.
Enaction has been developed over the years as an alternative view to cognition based
on minds as abstract symbolic systems, whose fundamental constitutive mode is that of
7This is the approach that I took in programming the RL systems described in this research, such as the Fifth
Absence (2011), n-Polytope (2012), and Plasmosis (2013).
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a mental representation as a semantic-like correspondence with the world. In contrast,
enaction is based on situated, embodied agents, whose world of signiﬁcance emerges
along their active living (?) [sic], not as a representation system, but as constrained
imagination, (which the name enaction evokes). More precisely its core theses are
twofold: (a) On the one hand, the ongoing coupling of the cognitive agent, a permanent
coping that is fundamentally an active embracing of the world in order to in-form it with
sense, not a passive reception of it [. . . ] (b) On the other hand, the autonomous nature
of the cognitive agent understood as an self-produced identity providing a concern (?)
[sic] or perspective, an ongoing endogenous activity that it conﬁgures into meaningful
world items in an unceasing ﬂow. This identity is at the same time natural, since it
is based on endogenous conﬁgurations (or self-organizing patterns) of complex bodily/
neural activity, yet is also in direct line to subjectivity (Cohen and Varela 2000, . . . )
These two aspects of enactive behavior are complementary to one another. On the one hand, the
agent continuously maintains and regenerates itself, keeping its own structure stable while resisting
outside perturbations. This autonomy is what allows it to deﬁne itself as a separate unit from its
environment, and to adapt to environmental changes. At the same time, the organism also depends
on its milieu to survive. It needs to maintain its coupling with the environment since it is precisely
in relation to this very environment that it emerges as an embodied entity. “In deﬁning what it is
as unity”, argues Varela, “in the very same movement it deﬁnes what remains exterior to it, that
is to say, its surrounding environment.” (Varela 1992, 7)
Coupling is an important concept in phenomenology and embodied interaction. It refers to the
way by which an object becomes an extension of the human body, not unlike a stick that aids one
in moving forward in the dark (Dourish 2001). It is similar to Heidegger’s concept of an object
being “ready-to-hand”. For Heidegger, this happens when the object somehow “disappears” into
the background when one is using it. The philosopher gives the example of a hammer. As one
interacts with it, as one uses it, it becomes an extension of one’s body and one ceases to notice it.
However, if one needs to ﬁnd a way to use the hammer diﬀerently, it suddenly “reappears” in the
foreground. It is separated from one’s body again and one looks at it with a completely diﬀerent
attitude, which Heidegger calls “present-at-hand” (Heidegger 1972).
A distinctive characteristic of adaptive agents lies precisely in their ability to adapt so tightly
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to objects in their environment that they become “ready-to-hand”. In that sense, adaptiveness
is a necessary condition to coupling. A compelling consequence, if one considers the case of an
adaptive agent’s environment as populated by other adaptive agents, is that agents can also become
coupled to one another as they adjust to each other’s presence. To this end, an adaptive agent is
not exactly exactly akin to a hammer or a stick: as one “uses” it until it “disappears in the
background”, one is also being “used” by the agent: both become “ready-to-each-other’s-hand”,
so to speak. This is especially interesting in the context of interactive interactions, as it shows
the potential for nonhuman adaptive systems to generate a diﬀerent range of aesthetic experiences
through bidirectional coupling with human actors.
5.6 Autonomy
Autonomy seems to be a recurring property of intelligent and lifelike systems. In the introductory
article to the Proceedings of the First European Conference on Artificial Life, Francisco J. Varela and
cognitive scientist and economist Paul Bourgine describe the autonomy of agents as the fundamental
principle behind Cybernetics and ALife “creatures”. “Autonomy in this context”, they claim, “refers
to their basic and fundamental capacity to be, to assert their existence and to bring forth a world
that is signiﬁcant and pertinent” (Bourgine and Varela 1994, xi), a statement which echoes Varela’s
enactivist theory. Based on this premise, the authors argue that ALife should move away from
trying to understand life by synthetizing its behaviors in software, and rather should engage more
seriously with lifelike processes that “assure the key features of autonomy” (xi).
Margaret Boden, an eminent cognitive scientist at the University of Sussex, delineates three
diﬀerent aspects of autonomy in living and artiﬁcial systems. First, she claims that autonomy
implies an indirect response to the environment, where reactions are modulated by experience.
Second, autonomy supposes a self-generated control mechanism, as opposed to one that would be
pre-given or scripted — such as emergent behaviors that appear in artworks involving SOMs such
as Yves Amu Klein’s Octofungi (Klein 1998; Klein and Hudson 2003) or Nicolas Baginsky’s The
Three Sirens (1992—2005). The third component is deﬁned by Boden as “the extent to which inner
150
directing mechanisms can be reﬂected upon, and/or selectively modiﬁed” to adapt to the current
context (Boden 1996, 104).
The ﬁrst and third facets of autonomy seem directly connected to adaptation and learning:
simple experience-driven reactions in one case, and the more complex ability to analyze one’s own
behavior in the other. Yet the second aspect described by Boden concerns the emergent properties
of the system, which also happens to be a crucially important idea in the study of adaptive artiﬁcial
agents.
5.7 Emergence
Emergence refers to the mechanism whereby higher-order forms or processes emanate from the
complex interactions of lower-order units. Emergence has been widely studied by scholars interested
in questions of artiﬁcial cognition and living systems. It is often associated with self-organization,
such as in the work of ALife researchers, cyberneticians and connectionists. However, emergence
also evokes an idea that goes beyond the automated conﬁguration of a system: the generation of
novelty (Soler-Adillon 2015).
Peter A. Cariani is an interdisciplinary researcher who has developed one of the most compelling
theoretical model on the role of adaptation in cybernetic and ALife systems through an original and
constructive critique of computationalism (Cariani 1989; Cariani 1990, 1991). He has contributed
a uniquely stimulating taxonomy of artiﬁcial systems that establishes a clear relationship between
adaptation and emergence. Through the precision of his theorectical framework, he distances
himself from phenomenological critiques of computationalism such as Dreyfus’ What Computers
Can’t Do (Dreyfus 1979) or Searle’s “Chinese room” (Searle 1980), and rather situates himself in
the tradition of American pragmatists such as William James and John Dewey.
Cariani diﬀerentiates cybernetic devices on the basis of their adaptive qualities, identifying
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three kinds of such systems: formal, adaptive and evolutionary. Formal devices are purely (formal-
computational) or partly (formal-robotic) symbolic apparatuses that respond to a ﬁxed set of in-
structions: thus, they are nonadaptive. Adaptive systems are capable of adapting their computa-
tional structure based on experience, but are limited by their ﬁxed semantical components (sensors
and eﬀectors). Machine Learning models such as MLPs, GAs, and even adaptive robotic agents are
part of that category.
The third category, which Cariani calls evolutionary devices, are able to adaptively construct
their own sets of sensors and eﬀectors based on their interactions with the environment. Such
devices thus consist of “a set of sensors, a set of eﬀectors, a computational part, a performance
measure, and an apparatus for constructing new sensors and eﬀectors” (Cariani 1989, 132).
This category can be reﬁned by considering systems that have adaptive semantics but a non-
adaptive syntactic part, such as the immune system. General evolutionary devices are those that
are both adaptive and evolutionary: in other words, general evolutionary devices that display both
semantic and syntactic adaptiveness, and there are plenty of examples of such systems in the biolog-
ical world. However, there exists to the author’s knowledge only one example of such a human-built
system: Gordon Pask’s electrochemical adaptive assemblage which allowed the evolution of a prim-
itive “ear” (27).
The main “advantage” of evolutionary devices as compared to adaptive or formal systems lies
in their open-endedness, in other words, their ability to generate novelty, which Cariani directly
associates with the question of emergence.
The problem of emergence is useful in evaluating the open or closed nature of the
devices in our taxonomy precisely because it relates to the problem of novelty in the
world. If we want to enlarge our own capabilities and free ourselves of the burden
of complete speciﬁcation, our devices must be creative. If we want our devices to
be creative in any meaningful sense of the word, they must be capable of emergent
behavior, of implementing functions we have not speciﬁed. Our emergent devices must
not be prisoners of our notational systems if they are to aid us in our own break-out.
(148)
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Device type Plasticity Capacities Limitations
Formal-
computational
Fixed syntax Reliable execution of pre-
speciﬁed rules






Reliable execution of ﬁxed
percept-action combinations







Limited to percept and ac-






Creation of new percept and
action categories;
Performance-dependent op-
timization within these cat-
egories
Time to construct and test
new sensors/eﬀectors may be
very long
Table 3: Summary of Cariani’s taxonomy of devices.8
Three major theories of emergence are examined by Cariani: computational emergence, ther-
modynamic emergence, and emergence relative to a model. Computational emergence stands for
the computationalist theory of self-organizing systems, similar in viewpoints to those held by pro-
ponents of “strong ALife” like Langton and Ray. It assumes that all emergent behavior at the
macro level is reducible to micro level rules. Furthermore, proponents of this viewpoint argue that
emergent structures such as living systems can actually be realized by such symbolic operations
themselves, not just in the mind of the observer. Thermodynamic emergence theories attempt to
describe emergence employing diﬀerential equations such as those used in physics. Contrary to
computationalists, proponents of thermodynamic emergence do not suggest that the computation
of these equations should be considered as actualizations of the emergent systems they describe.
Emergence relative to a model (or “observer-centric emergence”) was ﬁrst developed by theo-
retical biologist Robert Rosen and deﬁnes an emergent event as “a deviation of the behavior of the
physical system under observation from its predicted behavior” (30). In other words, emergence
comes from the fact that since we dispose of only a ﬁnite number of observable dimensions, in a
universe which contains a potentially inﬁnite number of attributes, it follows that our models of
the world are always incomplete accounts of it. (157)
Emergence relative to a model, then is a result of the ﬁnite and hence incomplete
character of all models of the world. At some point in time we can, if we are fortunate,
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construct a model which will deterministically capture the behavior of the physical
system. The behavior predicted by the model will, for some period of time, correspond
to the observed behavior of the physical system, because it was constructed to do so.
But eventually, if one waits long enough, all physical systems will diverge from their
models, but some will diverge before others. (157)
Emergence relative to a model allows an integration of adaptation and emergence in a compre-
hensive framework. The taxonomy of adaptivity at the core of Cariani’s theory can now be attached
to the emergent qualities of a system’s behavior:
When the behavior of the physical system, in this case the device itself, bifurcates from
the behavior of the model, another model will have to be constructed which will capture
subsequent behavior of the physical system/device. [. . . ] We will call the situation where
changing the computational part of the model is suﬃcient to recapture the behavior of
the physical device syntactic-emergence. Only new syntactic linkages need be formed.
We will call the situation where adding new observables is necessary to recapture the
behavior of the device semantic-emergence. These types of emergence correspond to
device types in the adaptivity taxonomy. Formal devices are nonemergent. Adaptive
devices have syntactic-emergent behavior. Evolutionary devices have semantic-emergent
behavior. (158)
This “bifurcation” from the model’s behavior is thus, according to Cariani and Rosen, the
locus of novelty emergence in the agent’s behavior. Emergence is realized by the agent through its
adaptive capabilities, either syntactic, semantic, or both. As such, one could say that adaptivity is
the means by which emergence is realized in adaptive and evolutionary systems. In that context,
adaptivity is seen not just as a way for agents to self-organize, but as a necessary condition for
creativity.
Cariani’s viewpoint on the central role of adaptation in the emergence of behavior of agent-
based systems is particularly enlightening. It has an important consequence in terms of aesthetics.
Emergence is a necessary condition for adaptation in emergent-relative-to-a-model systems, because
adaptation is precisely what steers the self-organization of such agents. Yet, emergence is not a
suﬃcient condition for adaptation. Indeed, most emergent systems found in nature are nonadaptive.
For example, consider thermodynamic complex systems such as meteorological phenomena (e.g.,
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cloud formation, precipitations, hurricanes, etc.) and gravitational systems such as solar systems
and galaxies, or computational simulations of such phenomena (e.g., particle systems in physics
engines).
Now, following a similar set of intuitions, one can infer that adaptation is a necessary, yet
insuﬃcient, condition of life. On the one hand, adaptation seems to be a deﬁning feature of life
(this is one of the central claims of Cybernetics and Artiﬁcial Life), appearing ﬁrst and foremost
through evolution, and, in the most advanced systems, in real-time.9 On the other hand, there
exist adaptive systems whose status as living beings is at the very least frought, such as Cybernetics
devices like Ashby’s homeostat and Pask’s artiﬁcial “ear”.
Hence, while adaptation is not enough to deﬁne life, it lies “one step closer” to it than emer-
gence. That is not to say that emergence has a less important contribution than adaptation to the
lifelikeness of an artiﬁcial behavior — intuitively, I would be inclined to think that it contributes to
most of it. Instead, emergence implies that self-organizing behaviors without adaptive properties
might lack some of the aﬀective components possessed by living entities, which would give a more
substantial impression of being in the presence of one. This is signiﬁcant for this study, as it points
towards the importance of adaptation in the building of lifelike artistic systems.
5.8 Authorship
Digital artist Marc Downie, who worked early on several interactive pieces with artiﬁcial social char-
acters such as alphaWolf (Tomlinson and Blumberg 2002) and The Music Creatures (2000—2003),
brings an interesting perspective to the question of agent-based behaviors. He criticizes two of the
most common concepts in the ﬁeld of interactive art: mapping and emergence.
Mapping is a very common metaphor in media art. It represents a transformation of one signal
into another, which Downie ﬁnds extremely limiting. He suggests, as a replacement, the concept of
an agent, which has the capacity to be embedded into its world.
However, Downie explains that emergence is also problematic in artistic creation when contrasted
9As brought up above, Margaret Boden mentions how real autonomy in agential systems requires adaptation (Bo-
den 1996).
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with the question of authorship. He argues that emergence-based approaches try to avoid the
question of authorship altogether by trying to create processes that work by themselves, without
human intervention (Downie 2005, 29). Yet, despite decades of eﬀorts, we are still waiting for the
advent of higher-order emergent artiﬁcial life structures (Bedau 2000).
Some of the motivation for the agent-based — and other distinct but related trends in
the 80s and 90s such as connectionism and artiﬁcial life — came from an often open
and explicit authorship twist: that reactive, connective, adaptive or behavior-based
systems avoid the burden of knowledge engineering (i.e. knowledge authorship) and
exploit a far closer relationship with statistical machine-learning techniques to avoid
the hand-tuning, assembly or even creation of systems altogether. (Downie 2005, 29)
Moreover, as Downie claims, the main diﬃculty faced by digital artists is not so much in “gener-
ating potential”, because this is the part made relatively easy by computer technology. The trouble
is rather to put that potential to work in the creation of a piece of art. Therefore, “there is no need
to be excited should it turn up or rather emerge without much eﬀort on our part.” (36) According
to this logic, we should instead focus on hybrid systems that make integrate adaptive systems with
more traditional AI such as rule-based and goal-drected components.
In other words, once the artist’s fascination for emergence drops, what really matters is the
aesthetic experience of the work, which, for Downie, is sourced from the artist who authored the
work through the creative process. The question is not so much how autonomy, adaptation and
open-endedness aﬀect our relationship with cultural agents per se. Rather, it concerns the kinds of
eﬀects that can be created by integrating them in a creative practice of artiﬁcial agents in an eﬀort
to provoke evocative relational experiences.
So when thinking about such adaptive agents, what an artistic researcher should focus on is the
sociocultural context in which the artist intervenes in relation with the data that is available. By
nature, adaptive agents come with distinctive authorship questions. What are the possible actions?
What data will be fed into the system? With what criteria are the agents trained (i.e., what is the
evaluation function)? How do the adaptive features of the agent help (or hinder) what is meant
to be expressed by the system? In particular, the adaptive nature could lead to tighter autonomy,
and may give a sense of precariousness and uniqueness to the work: which are strong features that
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can be exploited by artists in the production of aesthetic experiences.
5.9 Believability
So what exactly does the authoring adaptive agents entail? What are the characteristics that one
should look for when designing such agents? Downie points to the research on interactive drama
carried in the 1990s at Carnegie Mellon under the scope of the Oz Project as oﬀering potential
leads. The research program, led by computer scientist Joseph Bates, tried to develop technologies
that would allow artists to design complex dramatic interactive ﬁctions. In his famous paper “The
Role of Emotions in Believable Agents”, Bates suggests that researchers in AI are wrong in trying
to create machines that act like humans trying to reproduce thinking, reasoning, and learning.
Instead, he proposes they should follow in the footsteps of artists who rather attempt to make their
characters believable by having them display recognizable emotional states (Bates 1994).
Bates describes how he combined a goal-directed, representation-free architecture inspired by
Nouvelle AI with an emotion generation architecture to implement an ensemble of “believable”
characters called “Woggles” in a 1992 piece called Edge of Intention. Recalling the work of Disney
animators Thomas and Johnston, Bates claims that what makes us care about artiﬁcial characters
lies in what we recognize as their emotions and desires. “If the character does not react emotionally
to events, if they don’t care, then neither will we. The emotionless character is lifeless, as a machine.”
(123)
By turning the discussion on intelligent agents towards emotions, Bates echoes an interest in
Aﬀective Computing, a ﬁeld that ﬂowered in the mid–1990s. The mother of this ﬁeld, Rosalind
Picard at the MIT Media Lab, claims that emotions are an essential part of human intelligence and
should thus be considered at least on equal grounds with rational and abstraction capabilities by AI
scientists (Picard 2000). Social robotics expert Cynthia Breazeal considers that autonomy alone is
not “suﬃciently life-like” and argues that believability is an important aspect in the design of social
robotic agents because it projects the “illusion of life” and gives the agent a personality (Breazeal
2002, 8).
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Following Bates, Michael Mateas adopts a more general point of view by associating the focus on
authorship adopted by artists such as Downies with a novel branch of research he calls Expressive
AI that lies between traditional AI (GOFAI) and Nouvelle AI (which he refects to as interactionist
AI ). Expressive AI practictioners are created cultural artifacts that behave in a seemingly intelligent
way within a speciﬁc sociocultural situation (Mateas 2001). In such a setting, the system “expresses
the author’s ideas within a performative space and is both a messenger for and a message from the
author.” (150)
This suggests that Machine Learning systems such as neural networks might be giving us a
false impression inherited from GOFAI, that impression of being neutral structures that can learn
almost anything. Sure, these systems are powerful models, able to perceive correlations out of high-
dimensional data streams; but their performance is nonetheless extremely inﬂuenced by the kind of
data that ﬂows into them. In other words, choosing diﬀerent inputs and outputs in these systems
comprises an important editorial decision, as it will directly modify the resulting predictions of the
neural net, hence the behavior of the agent in the reinforcement learning systems.
5.10 Social Agents
Science and technology theorist Sherry Turkle has studied the social dimension of computational
agents and robotic systems throughout her career. In particular, she studied the eﬀect of interactive
toys such as Furby, AIBO, Pleo, and “My Real Baby”; a class of technological devices that are
designed for social interaction. Turkle refers to these toys as “relational artifacts”, and suggests
that the traditional view in computer science, which posits that computational tools such as these
items “do things for us”, is ﬂawed. These agents rather “do things to us” by changing the way we
perceive ourselves and our sociotechnical environment. Their dissemination in households might
even be fostering a new “robotics culture”. (Turkle 2006, 1)
These agents, Turkle claims, act in two ways. First, aﬀectively, by being things on which
we simply project our emotions—a phenomenon which Turkle refers to as the “Rorschach eﬀect”.
This is the space occupied by traditional computational objects such as the artiﬁcial chatterbot
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ELIZA (Weizenbaum 1976). Second, Turkle claims that contemporary relational objects such as
AIBO and Pleo allow a move from this projection-based, individualistic perspective to that of a “psy-
chology of engagement”, an “evocative object eﬀect” that is cognitive more than aﬀective (Turkle
2006, 2). These two eﬀects — projectional/aﬀective and evocative/cognitive — are not incompatible
nor completely independent, but are perhaps best described as strongly interrelated in human-robot
relationships (4).
Turkle notices that autonomy (c.f., section 5.6) in artiﬁcial agents is often associated with
aliveness (the property of being alive) as if these agents were “alive in a way” (Turkle 2006). This
belief, and the way it is expressed, directly contrasts with people’s relationship with computers
or other technological devices that are not inherently social nor autonomous in of themselves.
Describing a change from people’s (especially children’s) beliefs about computational artifacts in
the early 1980s and robotic creatures of the mid–1990s onwards, she writes:
With relational artifacts, the locus of discussion about whether computational artifacts
might be alive moved from the psychology of projection to the psychology of engage-
ment, from Rorschach to relationship, from creature competency to creature connection.
Children and seniors already talk about an “animal kind of alive” and a “Furby kind of
alive.” The question ahead is whether they will also come to talk about a “people kind
of love” and a “robot kind of love.” (8)
Can adaptation in artiﬁcial agents contribute further to their aliveness, and thus to their propen-
sity for evocation? The learning capabilities of AIBO and Furby seem to be key features of their
commercial success, and also seem to add value to their long-term appreciation. Being patented
commercial products, it is diﬃcult to access the precise methods for how their softwares are im-
plemented. However, ﬁrst-hand experience with these toys suggests that they rely to a very large
extent on a relatively closed form of adaptation that is simulated rather than enacted: in other
words, they all seem to be pre-tuned for learning certain speciﬁc things through their interaction
with humans. This can reduce their value over time once their owner has explored all of the
possibilities oﬀered by these devices.
In other words, these electronic “pets” lack the kind of indeterminate and open-ended qualities
that seem to be present in many of the works considered in this thesis which allow for a wide range
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of social interactions to happen, rather than being constrained to a limited number of possibilities.
How does this open-endedness aﬀect social interactions with the robotic agencies in question?
Addressing this question adequately would require experimenting with agents embedded in everyday
life for long periods of time, which is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, an indeterminate and
complex nature of Machine Learning agents, the particular goals these agents would aim to achieve,
and the way that agent behavior unfolds through time are all important items for consideration
when studying their social impact.
5.11 Performativity
One last concept worth examining is that of performativity, which originated in the 1950s through
the work of language philosopher J. L. Austin. Defying analytic philosophy, Austin argues in How
to Do Things With Words that most assertions made in discourse are not statements describing a
reality, but are rather doing something in the world. Austin introduces iterability as a necessary
condition of a successful “performative utterance”: the citation or reiteration of a sentence — such
as the “I do” sealing a marriage — is what makes it eﬃcient as a “speech act” (Austin 1962).
There are parallels to be drawn between adaptive behaviors and iterability. In response to
environmental changes, adaptive agents such as those who use Reinforcement Learning (see section
3.2.1) tend to develop and repeat strategies it believes are best ﬁt to the situation, often in the
shape of recognizable patterns of actions. From time to time, it explores new actions and if they
appear to have good results, it will tend to promote these new actions in the future: otherwise, the
agent will strengthen its current strategy.
The agent thus works smoothly and continuously to the articulation and re-articulation of
contingencies, patterns and regularities of its world, through its behavioral model. Each action has
an inﬂuence on its world as it changes both its environment and its internal structure (and logically,
its future behavior).
At each step, the agent performs a more or less approximate citation of a single action or sub-
sequence of actions performed in the past. These past actions are also based on previous actions and
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so on. In short, every action can be seen as a modiﬁcation of a pre-existing citation, of a “script”
that is constantly actualized. We can therefore say that such an action is repeatable, readable,
contextualizable.
Performativity has become, over the years, an attractor for a vast body of research in various
disciplines, such as performance studies (Turner 1982; Fischer-Lichte 2008; Schechner 2003), gender
studies (Sedgwick 1993; Butler 1999, 2004), and economics (Callon 2006). One of its great strenghts
is to provide an alternative to representative accounts of science, society, and cognition. Andrew
Pickering describes this “performative move” in his analysis of human relations with its environment.
Discussing his theory ﬁrst put forward in his book The Mangle of Practice, he explains that the
“key move” was for him to “focus on performance rather than cognition”.
We have all been taught to think of science as primarily a cognitive activity – the
production of knowledge about the world – but my argument was that if you want to
understand scientiﬁc practice, you should start by thinking about (a) the performance
of scientists – what scientists do; (b) the performance of the material world – what
things do in the lab; and (c) how those performances are interlaced with one another.
He relates his conception of performativity to that of agency, a term which to him refers “directly
to action, doing things that are consequential in the world”. He uses these notions to describe the
interactions between humans and nonhumans in scientiﬁc practice as a performative, embodied
interaction: a “dance of agency” (Pickering 2013, 1–2).
Of particular interest to this study is Pickering’s more recent application of this theory to the
case of Cybernetics, a “postwar science of the adaptive brain” (Pickering 2010, 6). Cyberneticians,
he claims, did not see the brain as an apparatus able to generate representations and manipulate
them in an orderly manner — as would be the case for most of their successors — but rather as
an active organ that does things in the world. In summary, Pickering claims, “the cybernetic brain
was not representational but performative” and “its role in performance was adaptation." (6)
Pickering highlights the peculiar character of adaptive systems as introduced by cyberneticians:
There is something strange and striking about adaptive mechanisms. Most of the exam-
ples of engineering that come to mind are not adaptive. Bridges and buildings, lathes
and power presses, cars, televisions, computers, are all designed to be indiﬀerent to their
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environment, to withstand ﬂuctuations, not to adapt to them. The best bridge is one
that just stands there, whatever the weather. Cybernetic devices, in contrast, explicitly
aimed to be sensitive and responsive to changes in the world around them, and this
endowed them with a disconcerting, quasi-magical, disturbingly lifelike quality." (7)
What is especially compelling about Pickering’s analysis is that what he says about scientiﬁc
practice can also largely be said about the art practice of adaptive embodied agents, which deploys
technical creative methodologies similar to those used by cyberneticians such as Ashby, Pask and
Walter. Pickering’s posthumanist perspective harbors a non-anthropocentric vision over agency,
which suggests that in the context of an agent-based installation, both the artist, the recipients,
and the artiﬁcial agents are all considered active participants in the unfolding of a performative
aesthetic experience. This suggests an alternative perspective over artmaking, and the relationship
between art and science, which I will further discuss in chapter 6.
5.12 Behavior Morphologies
Now that the notion of adaptation has been more precisely deﬁned, it is important, before moving
forward, to describe in more detail what is meant by “embodied” or “situated” in regards to agents
in an artistic context. The aesthetic framework that I want to articulate here resonates with the
work of Simon Penny. Directly inspired by Rodney Brooks’ revolutionary work on situated robotics
from the late 1980s that critiques representational systems in AI, Penny argues for a new “aesthetics
of behavior” that contains a rejection of computationalism:
I felt that underlying the fundamental premises of computer technology is the acceptance
of Cartesian dualism, the separation of the mind and body. This separation is written
right into the technology as hardware and software. It is inscribed into the fundamental
premises of computer science.
He further explains:
Part of my project has been to try to ﬁnd theoretical resources to build a new aesthetics
around a rejection of these premises to formulate what I refer to as an ‘aesthetics
of behavior’. It is premised on the idea that when we use real time computational
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technologies for cultural practice we are doing a new aesthetic practice, which involves
the designing of behavior. We are somehow building a contingent model for what might
happen in the world, and how our system might respond in order to direct the aesthetic
attention of the user to a direction consistent with the artwork itself. It is a complex
and new aesthetic negotiation of the dynamics of interaction and authorial intent. (Kim
and Galvin 2012, 138)
Penny hereby joins Brooks and Dreyfus in their critique of the dualistic vision of behavior
and cognition that taints classical AI. Behavior, he claims, should not be understood as a purely
computational, disembodied thing called “software”, but rather needs to be grasped as a situated
process running through an agent’s body. Or course, behavior in a computational-based artwork
has algorithmic components, however, in the hands of the artist the code becomes another material,
with its own speciﬁc characteristics to be integrated with visual, sonic and physical components in
the construction of a global aesthetic experience.10
Whereas both Brooks’ Nouvelle AI and Penny’s behavior aesthetics are characterized by their
reliance on a “bottom-up” approach to technical practice directly inspired from ALife research, their
strong anti-computationalist stance is also directed at the rampant computationalism characteristic
of 1980s ALife. Thus, both Nouvelle AI and behavior aesthetics rearticulate concepts of emergence
and self-organization in ALife by integrating them in a performative theory of behavior that places
the agent’s body at the center of the equation. As such, Penny’s proposed artistic framework is
constitutionally diﬀerent from concurrent disembodied artforms such as Algorithmic Art — that
essentially aim to produce stabilized forms, usually computer-generated images — and an important
part of Artiﬁcial Life Art that generates time-based simulations on the computer.
As an artist working with agent-based systems, I concur with the anti-computationalists: life
and cognition are not “pure” processes that can be separated from a sensorimotor body running
in the physical world. I hereby align with Harnad’s claim that cognition is at least partly non-
computational, though some computation (i.e., rule-based symbol manipulation) might be involved
in it (Harnad 2001, 2008). I join my voice with that of Simon Penny, arguing for a new ﬁeld of
aesthetics opened up by computer technologies, with behavior as its central concept. Yet, I believe
10Questions regarding the material practice of programming artiﬁcial agents for media installation is further dis-
cussed in chapters 4 and 6.
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there are still important missing pieces in our understanding of the actual aesthetic qualities of
such behaviors.
Gordon Pask’s own deﬁnition of behaviors, which he detailed in his 1968 book on Cybernetics,
oﬀers a visionary perspective over behaviors that connect well with Penny, while still allowing for a
formalization in terms of their morphological evolution. In line with his view, I argue that behaviors
are best deﬁned not as algorithmic recipes, but rather as real-time material patterns as they are
recognized by an observing entity. As Pask writes:
As observers we expect the environment to change and try to describe those features
that remain unchanged with the passage of time. An unchanging form of events due to
the activity within an assembly is called a behavior. (Pask 1968, 18)
There are two important implications of this deﬁnition. First, while an agent’s behavior involves
a sequence of events that constantly change over time, its behavior has a recognizable “shape” that
remains temporally invariant. Pask gives the example of a cat, which consists of “performances like
eating and sleeping and, once again, it is an invariant form selected from the multitude of things a
cat might possibly do” (18).
Second, while a behavior is always generated by a system — which could, but need not be,
computational — it only exists through its perceptual eﬀect on an observer. This implication is
particularly appropriate to an aesthetic framework, as it focuses on the phenomenological experience
generated by the agent-based performance, as it unfolds through time and space in the material
world. This connects directly, in fact, to the pragmatic aesthetics of John Dewey, who claims that
works of art should not be thought of as objects, but really as “reﬁned and intensiﬁed forms of
experience” (Dewey 1959, 3).
I posit that diﬀerent categories of system architectures allow for diﬀerent kinds of behaviors,
thus allowing the emergence of diﬀerent aesthetic experiences. What interests me here is to further
analyze Penny’s artistic frame of reference by looking more closely at embodied agents with adap-
tive qualities. Existing taxonomies of Cybernetics systems have mainly focused on relational and
structural aspects of these systems (Rosenblueth, Wiener, and Bigelow 1943; Cariani 1989). In this
section, I propose a ﬂexible taxonomy of embodied systems that focuses on the aesthetics of agent
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behaviors as their shape unfold in time.
The “zero-degree” of that categorization is the “behaviorness” of the system, that is, whether
it should be considered to have a behavior or not. The initial diﬀerentiation criterion, I argue,
lies in the structural capacities of the system, more precisely in the existence of an internal state.
Stateless devices are akin to mathematical functions: their outputs/actions only depend on their
inputs/observations. By design, they are incapable of accumulating experience.
Such systems are known in the the ﬁeld of digital media art as mappings. Their widespread
popularity is evidenced by the prevalence of data-ﬂow softwares such as Max/MSP or PureData,
often appearing under names such as “visualisation” or “soniﬁcation”. Downie heavily criticizes this
hegemony of mapping in interactive arts. He argues that its apparent generality, which is seen as
beneﬁcial, makes it ineﬀective and sterile: precisely because its deﬁnition has “no limits” it also has
“no use”. He writes:
In practice one can sense in this “function-like” aspect of mapping is a kind of college-
level, piecewise linear or otherwise smooth, locally stationary, state-less, typically de-
composable relationship between input and output. Such a vision acts as a normative
idea of how, in this ﬁeld, numbers get transformed into numbers. The best work in the
ﬁeld, of course, pushes against this central tendency, but the rules and arena remain
ﬁxed. (Downie 2005, 17)
Devoid of any kind of autonomy and agency, mapping-based devices are behaviorless, their
conduct relying almost entirely upon the data that is fed into them. Whatever sense of aliveness
associated with them truly lies in the system that generates this data, be it a human performer or
a natural phenomenon. Their statelessness imprisons their “performance” into the instant: their
world, if they have any, is a succession of independent moments. They are, in other words, zero-order
behaviors (i.e., “nonbehaviors”).11
Agent-based systems, which are the focus of both this dissertation as well as Downie’s, are
behaviorful in their ability to extend their world into the past through the use of some kind of inner
structure. These stateful devices possess some sort of “memory” (whether it is discrete, continuous,
11[Pask’s example of the “behaviour of a statue” is an extreme case of such a “nonbehavior” (which he actually
chooses to ignore). (Pask 1968, p. 18)
166
long or short) which is modiﬁed by their interactions with the environment. In other words: their
past experiences inﬂuence their present actions (at least within a certain time window).
This statefulness, which in other words implies some form of structure or trace, can be found
in a side variety of computer programs. For instance, formal devices as deﬁned by Cariani can
possess states, typically recognizable in computer code as named variables of diﬀerent types (i.e.,
booleans, integers, ﬂoats), however these syntactic components are ﬁxed. Behaviors generated
by these systems are thus bound within a certain domain. Hence, while an agent’s response to
sensory data may change depending on context, its behavior itself does not change through time.
Given enough time, it will, inexorably, come to repeat similar patterns. We will thus refer to these
conducts as ﬁrst-order behaviors.
To understand this idea better, consider how a behavior can have a certain, recognizable mor-
phology that exists in a domain diﬀerent from other forms of non-computational, “stabilized” media,
so to speak, such as an image or video, or even, as I explained earlier, real-time mappings such as
soniﬁcations or visualizations. The shape of a behavior is parameterized by the sensors, eﬀectors
and processing capacities of the system that generates it, and evolves within a certain space-time
territory. Morphology and morphological processes have been used to describe time-based behav-
iors in the writings of contemporary music composers such as Iannis Xenakis and Agostino Di
Scipio (Xenakis 1981a; Di Scipio 1994; Solomos 2006).
Because of their inability to generate new forms and/or to transform their own form, I argue that
the behavioral morphologies produced by formal, rule-based systems, are fundamentally diﬀerent
from those produced by adaptive and evolutionary agents. The latter produce second-order behav-
iors (i.e., “metabehaviors”), which involves the coming-into-being, and possibly transformation, of
their own (ﬁrst-order) behavior. They therefore exist in a “diﬀerent time” than their formal/ﬁxed
counterparts, which aﬀects the overall aesthetic eﬀect they can engender.
I propose to use the concepts of morphogenesis, morphostasis and metamorphosis to further
characterize the diﬀerent processes by which behavioral morphologies exist, emerge and/or change
over time. These notions are related, each in their own way, to ideas of emergence, self-organization,





into being. These systems are often referred to as “generative”: they evolve behaviors regardless of
their ﬁtness or value (Bown 2012).
Adaptive systems, on the other hand, evolve their morphologies in relationship to a usually
indeterminate “ideal” (i.e., optimal in regards to whatever the evaluation function is) behavior,
which they try to approach and match. In this, they diﬀer from nonadaptive second-order behav-
iors. Adaptation, like intentionality, requires an object: systems do not simply adapt, they adapt
to something. Adaptive systems are relational devices by deﬁnition: they are governed by their
coupling with another behavior, which in turn can be of zeroth-, ﬁrst-, or second-order. Their
experiences eﬀects their inner structure so as to improve their prospective performances. In other
words, their past feeds their future.
Typically starting from a state of pure randomness, adaptive agents run through a learning
process of morphogenesis where they progressively and asymptotically modify the shape of their
behavior to better perform in relationship to their evaluation function. When they reach their ﬁnal
form, they enter a state of morphostasis, exploiting the stabilized, learned behavior which they
converged to. Some adaptive systems have the ability to depart from this crystalized demeanor,
either as a result of an internal intentionality, or as a response to environmental changes that require
drastic adjustments to their performance.
The aesthetic experience of these behaviors is dependent on a number of factors. The ratio
between the magnitude of change and the time period necessary to perform it during metamorphosis
— which in the case of Machine Learning systems is directly related to the learning rate — can be
used as a measure of intensity. Abrupt, fast changes can bring a sense of astonishment or angst in
the viewer that artists working with interactive media have learned to exploit.
In contrast, longer yet steady and noticeable changes can evoke curiosity, anxiety, and uncanin-
ness. For example, in Vessels, the robots are always in a state of ﬂux, which might explain the
feeling of estrangement inspired in some members of the audience. As the audience is never fully
able to observe a recognizable behavioral pattern, to some of its members, the robots’ behavior
seems purely random.





the face of changing environments.
Finally, these categories can (and should, when appropriate) be mixed together. Most agent-
based adaptive installations actually bring together a mixture of diﬀerent systems, staging diﬀerent
kinds of zero-, ﬁrst- and second-order behaviors, intertwining phases of morphological stasis, genesis
and transformation intervening at diﬀerent rates.13 The use of lower-order behaviors gives the
artist more direct control over the outcomes, which is often crucial for the success of a work.14
For example, chapter 4 describes the swarming robotics installation Vessels, which integrates a
formal-robotics structure known as a Behavior Tree and adaptive systems (Genetic Algorithms) in
a distributed, evolutive choreography of autonomous agents.
This categorization is not meant as a systematic classiﬁcation scheme, but rather as a frame of
reference, a ﬂexible analysis tool for artists and theorists. It gives an angle, a way to think and
discuss about agent-based systems in art practice, that I hope can contribute to the language of
new media as practitioners attempt to imagine new experiences and communicate their views with
their peers.
5.13 Conclusion
This chapter focused on the notion of behavior in agent-based systems in general, and more specif-
ically in works of art. I examined how properties such as embodiment, emergence, autonomy,
adaptation and learning play out aesthetically in behavioral patterns, and proposed a set of theo-
retical tools with which to understand them.
I began by introducing fundamental notions related to agent-based systems in general, looking
at a strand of research that took its origin in Cybernetics and GOFAI but ran in parallel to the
history of Machine Learning which was explored in section 3.1. This historical analysis brought
forward two signiﬁcant considerations for a study of behavior aesthetics:
13Indeed, while recent research in the ﬁeld of robotics suggests that the use of Machine Learning in robots is key
to the advancement of the ﬁeld, it seems to work better when used in combination with rule-based systems, at least
at this point in time. In most studies, learning is used as a way to reﬁne hand-coded processes or perform speciﬁc
pattern recognition tasks. (Quinlan 2006; Chalup, Murch, and Quinlan 2007)
14This is, in essence, Downie’s argument: he critiques both mapping (0th order behaviors) and emergence (2nd
order) in favor of authorship in the design of programmed agents (of the 1st order). (Downie 2005)
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1. A behavior consists in a pattern of events generated by an agent, as it is perceived by an
observer who experiences it through its own sensory surfaces.
2. Behaviors do not exist as purely informational constructs, but are rather produced through
the interactions of situated, embodied entities with their environmental surroundings.
New media art seems to have been much more inﬂuenced by this stream of research, which
includes Artiﬁcial Life and Nouvelle AI, than by Machine Learning, at least until now. The key
concepts of autonomy, embodiment, and emergence that run through it have been taken over by
a number of artists and media theorist interested in the creative potential of such technologies as
ALife and Nouvelle AI, which both seem to answer Roy Ascott’s call for a new “behaviorist art”.
Yet, it seems to be disconnected in large part from the question of adaptation and learning in
computational agents.
In an attempt to ﬁll that gap, I examined Cariani’s taxonomy of systems which brings together
emergence, adaptation, and evolution in a uniﬁed framework. I connect it with Simon Penny’s
aesthetics of behavior and Soler-Adillon’s take on emergent and self-organizing systems, looking at
how adaptation and emergence play out in the generation of behaviors. In particular, I examined
the temporal aspect of adaptive behaviors through the evolution of their morphology. I suggested
to classify behaviors under three classes: (1) nonbehaviors (also called mappings, or zero-order
behaviors); (2) behaviors (of the ﬁrst order); and (3) metabehaviors (or second-order behaviors).
The latest category involves processes whereby the agent’s behavior itself undergoes morphological
changes in time. These transformations include (1) morphostatis; (2) morphogenesis; and (3)
metamorphosis.
I explained how adaptive processes pertain to the category of second-order behaviors and dis-
play morphogenetic patterns that lead to morphostasis once the agent has converged to optimum.
Metamorphosis can be more or less abrupt, happening across diﬀerent time spans, which inﬂuence
the experience of these systems. Moreover, most successful artistic installations use a melange of
approaches, possibly bringing the agent through diﬀerent stages of evolution and stability, in an
eﬀort to generate a speciﬁc experience for the viewer.
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In the next chapter, we approach these questions through a conclusionary analysis of the artistic
work N-Polytope: Behaviors in Light and Sound After Iannis Xenakis (2012) on which I collabo-
rated. This work rests largely on real-time generative behavioral patterns, some of which employ
Machine Learning methods. As N-Polytope employs both adaptive and nonadapive approaches, it
will act as a kind of test scenario for the proposed aesthetic theory of behaviors. I describe the
process by which they were elaborated, looking at questions of practice. I analyze their outcomes,
testing the application of the key concepts developed so far, examining the diﬀerences between the




A complex sound may be imagined as a multi-colored firework in which each point of
light appears and instantaneously disappears against a black sky. But in this firework
there would be such a quantity of points of light organized in such a way that their
rapid and teeming succession would create forms and spirals, slowly unfolding, or con-
versely, brief explosions setting the whole sky aflame. A line of light would be created
by a sufficiently large multitude of points appearing and disappearing instantaneously.
– Iannis Xenakis, Formalized Music
In this chapter, I examine the installation/performance work N-Polytope: Behaviors in Light
and Sound After Iannis Xenakis. A 2012 work created by Chris Salter in collaboration with myself,
Marije Baalman, Adam Basanta, Elio Bidinost and architect Thomas Spier, N-Polytope brings
the audience into an immersive, spectacular experience: a reinterpretation of famous composer
Iannis Xenakis’s series of large-scale media installations known as the Polytopes. The work received
a special mention at the VIDA Art and Artiﬁcial Life International Awards and an honourable
mention for the Prix Ars Electronica in 2013.
Focusing on the algorithmic dimension of the piece, I examine three diﬀerent adaptive procedures
that were used as ways to generate spatial patterns that unfold in time in a particular way. I
compare these approaches to a nonadaptive algorithm using the morphological behavioral aesthetic
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framework introduced in the previous chapter, looking at the fundamental temporal qualities that
diﬀerentiate adaptive from nonadaptive patterns in the work. I contextualize my analysis in terms
of practice by investigating the work of Iannis Xenakis, his use of stochastic processes, and how he
was inﬂuenced by Cybernetics. In particular, I oppose the notions of command and autonomy in
Xenakis’ work (Solomos 2006), contrasting it with works by early British cyberneticians and with
our own approach in designing N-Polytope. I explain how Xenakis, while calling upon stochastic
processes which were revolutionary for his time, guided by a notion of randomness, was indeed
obsessed with keeping a strong, overseeing control over his pieces, a trait which directly inﬂuenced
his vision of the relationship between art and science. Finally, I show how my approach to adaptive
systems in artmaking can be interpreted as a hybrid between Iannis Xenakis’ and John Cage’s
perspectives on indeterminacy.
In this chapter, I start by explaining the inception of the work, focusing on the relationship
between the work of Xenakis and Cybernetics and explaining how this inspired our own work in
N-Polytope. I give a short, high-level technical overview of the piece and then proceed to examine
the core algorithmic realizations — contrasting adaptive and nonadaptive processes, looking at how
they were used and what eﬀects they had — using the aesthetic framework developed in the previous
chapters. Finally, I conclude by addressing questions of control and time in adaptive agent-based
installations, discussing important issues about audiences’ expectations in traditional presentation
contexts of new media art.
6.1 Xenakis, Cybernetics, and the Polytopes
Xenakis used stochastic methods for the ﬁrst time in his 1956 piece Pithoprakta. He created the
score based on a model of gas particles’ speed and densities known as the Maxwell-Boltzmann
distribution (Xenakis 1992). Here, gas particles were replaced by pizzicato glissandi sound grains
whose steepness corresponded to the velocity sampled from the random distribution, resulting in a
cloud of swarming sounds ﬁlling up the air.
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Stochastic laws provided a way for Xenakis to generate compositions out of indeterminate sys-
tems, extirpated from directive human control. However, they still respond to macroscopic statis-
tical laws and are thus still determinate at the global level, in the sense that they are statistically
predictable.
The main interest of Xenakis in using these probabilistic approaches thus seems to be linked to
the notion of entropy, which represents the degree of disorder of a system. He is interested in the
potential for these distributions to generate “highly improbable events” that can result in sudden,
“explosive” deviations from the average. While entropy is a concept borrowed from physics, it
is especially interesting to notice it was one of the building blocks of early cybernetician Claude
Shannon’s information theory.
In his 1948 paper A Mathematical Theory of Communication, Shannon formulates the basic
problem of communication as the transmission of a message from one point to another, going
through a noisy channel (Shannon 1948). He posits that information is a quantity that corresponds
to the minimum number of bits needed to encode a message. Showing how highly predictable
messages can be encoded using less bits of information than unpredictable ones, Shannon points
out that the amount of information needed to encode a message is directly related to its degree of
unpredictability, which is mathematically equivalent to the entropy of the message.
Shannon’s work had a tremendous impact on the way digital communication systems would be
developed in the 20th century, as well as in a number of disciplines ranging from neuroscience to
quantum physics. The simplicity of the model, its strong mathematical ground and its immediate
applicability in the development of communication technologies of the time all contributed to its
phenomenal success. Shannon’s impact was so strong that his model gave rise to a whole new
research ﬁeld that ostentatiously labelled itself “information theory”. However, one should notice
that early cyberneticians were largely aware that Shannon’s immensely reductive deﬁnition could
only account for a facet of what information could be.
In fact, in his deﬁnition of Cybernetics, Wiener was referring not only to the Shannionian
concept of information, which stays in the purely syntactic realm, but also to the semantic aspects
of messages and their potential role in the control and regulation of machines, humans and society.
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Indeed, Wiener coined the term “cybernetics” in reference to an 1867 article on feedback regulation
mechanisms in boat governors from James Clerk Maxwell, the physicist who originated the theory
of gasses (Maxwell 1867). “We have decided to call the entire ﬁeld of control and communication
theory, whether in the machine or the animal, by the same Cybernetics, which we form from the
Greek kubernetes, or steersman. In choosing this term we wish to recognize that the ﬁrst signiﬁcant
paper on feedback mechanisms is an article on governors, which was published by Maxwell in 1868,
and that governor is derived from a Latin corruption of kubernetes." (Wiener 1961, 11–12)1
Wiener was interested in Shannon’s theory because it provided a probabilistic framework for
understanding how messages circulate between a system such as the brain and its environment. Yet,
he was even more interested in how such systems would relate to their environment in a purposeful
— one could say, meaningful — way by engaging in a self-regulating exchange with it. In this
context, information acts as an active code that takes part in a control loop. Such systems, in
their initial state, are highly entropic. Information ﬂowing through negative feedback introduces a
“degree of order (control)” since “information reduces uncertainty and contributes to order.” (Smith
1974, 3)
An exception exists in some of his late works with algorithmic music composition. Xenakis
used a self-organizing system known as cellular automata to produce the scores of his 1980s works
Ata and Horos (Solomos 2006).2 Cellular automata are “discrete dynamical systems with simple
construction but complex self-organizing behaviour” (Wolfram 1984) which were ﬁrst deﬁned in
the 1950s by von Neumann as a way to study artiﬁcial self-reproduction (von Neumann 1966) and
extensively studied in the 1980s by people such as Christopher Langton (Langton 1984, 1986) and
Stephen Wolfram (Wolfram 2002).3
According to Xenakis specialist Makis Solomos, the composer’s idea of automata is related
to Wiener’s concept of autonomy, a vision that emphasizes the self-organization of the systems, as
1Interestingly, Maxwell’s theory of gasses was an important inspiration for Xenakis. For example, in his mas-
terpiece Pithoprakta (1955—1956), each instrument was acting like a molecule obeying the Maxwell-Boltzmann
distribution, which models the speed of gas at a given temperature. (Xenakis 1981b, 29)
2Cellular automata were introduced earlier in the work of Artiﬁcial Life pionneer Christopher Langton. See section
5.2 .
3For the sake of clarify, notice that standard cellular automata are deterministic and thus cannot be considered
stochastic processes. However their properties can make temporal structures emerge that makes some of them good
candidates to be used as pseudo-random generators (Wolfram 1986).
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opposed to the command perspective of von Neumann which is rather linked to a militaristic, “black
box” model of machinic control. However, Xenakis does not fully endorse the idea of autonomy and
seems to be interested mainly in using cellular automata as a tool that helps him shape his scores
but over which he still maintains high levels of authorial control. Solomos explains: “Xenakis’
manual interventions are very important; sometimes they destroy the nature of cellular automata.
And, of course, they are far away from the idea of something that works alone, of an automaton,
from which an autonomous meaning emerges.” (Solomos 2006, 16)
We can only conjecture as to the reasons behind the relative absence of such autonomous
systems in Xenakis’ work up until the 1980s. The most logical explanation comes down to a
question of means and intention. As an artist, he was interested in massive spectacular works
that demonstrated complex, electrifying tensions between chaos and order such as the Polytopes
and the Diatope. The kind of self-regulated, autonomous algorithms existing in the 1980s were
just too simple and “toyish” to fulﬁll that vision. Furthermore, during the 1960s and 1970s eras,
where Xenakis was the most proliﬁc, connectionism and other forms of self-regulated systems were
marginalized in favor of symbolic AI. Finally, the technology available to Xenakis was not advanced
enough to allow real-time processing of large-scale input-output systems. Picture how most of
his works were using cutting-edge resources, often running on university servers overnight, using
FORTRAN programs encoded on perforated cards. The use of these systems by Xenakis as oﬄine
compositional tools thus comes at no surprise: there was really no other way.
As artists, this was our point of departure in creating N-Polytopes. We reﬂected on the kind of
work Xenakis would have created if he had access to the technology we have today, which permits
massive real-time computation involving large-scale arrays of sensors and actuators. We posited
that his interest in stochastic processes actually originates from an interest in the complexity of
nature in both space and time. We thus supposed that, following the changes that happened in the
scientiﬁc world from the 1980s onwards, he would have been more interested in the behavioral and
complexity dimensions of Cybernetics and not only in its informational and probabilistic aspects.
In particular, however, we were interested in questions related to how emergent systems are
felt by the audience, as well as an exploration of the continuum between order and disorder. The
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(a) LABoral (Gijón, Spain) (2012). (b) LABoral (Gijón, Spain) (2012).
(c) Darling Foundry (Montréal, Canada) (2014). (d) Darling Foundry (Montréal, Canada) (2014).
(e) Vitra Design Museum (Weil am Rhein, Germany)
(2014).
(f) Nuit Blanche (Paris, France) (2015).
Figure 38: N_Polytope (2012) as shown in diﬀerent venues. All images by Thomas Spier.
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work of the late neuroscientist Walter Freeman on the brain as a dynamic system was an important
source of inspiration (Freeman 1995, 2000). Freeman claims that brains function most of the time
in a noisy manner except when cognitive acts take place: then neurons self-organize and random
patterns settle into some kind of order. We were interested in the idea of phenomena that appear
impermanently at the edge of order: the minute you think you have recognized them, they are gone.
In order to approach this, we worked with diﬀerent kinds of real-time stochastic processes
known as Markov processes. Named after Russian mathematician Andrey Andreyevich Markov,
these random processes are characterized by their memory-lessness, meaning that the probability
of future states depends only on the current state of the system (and not on the full history of
preceding events). Markov processes are an important part of Xenakis’ work and formalized music
theory (Xenakis 1992). The most important extension to Xenakis’ practice in N-Polytope lies our
use of Markov decision process through reinforcement learning. A Markov decision process is a
kind of Markov process that takes into account actions and rewards as part of the decision of a
stochastic, memoryless agent, whereas reinforcement learning is an approach to address the decision
problem when transition probabilities and rewards are unknown (Sutton and Barto 1998).
One of the main consequences of our approach is its impact on practice. Working with such
autonomous devices transforms our relationship with matter, as it puts it out of our direct control.
This suggests a reply to Xenakis’s claim about art and science. As I already argued, Xenakis was
not a scientist: he was an artist who used science and mathematics as a means to an aesthetic end.
Xenakis recognized the growing importance of opening the dialogue between art and science. In
a 1981 seminar at IRCAM, he proposed the establishment of a new relationship between art and
science in which art would “pose problems that mathematics should solve” with the creation of new
theories. He claimed that the “artist-designer” should be trained in various scientiﬁc ﬁelds ranging
from mathematics to genetics, humanities and history, so that he acquires a kind of “universality”
based on forms, architecture and morphology (Xenakis 1981a).
Xenakis’ claim that artists need to come up with problems for science reveals, in my opinion,
an asymetric relationship that does not match my own experience and vision as an artist trained
in science. I suggest instead a relationship where science and art are willfully engaged into an
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embodied dialogue that goes both ways. In my experience, while it is true that scientiﬁc methods
are used to respond to artistic problems, it is equally true that artistic questions are more than often
inspired by scientiﬁc techniques. It is not a unidirectional process, but really a process of coupling,
a performative endeavor that does not exist as a rationally organized communication system with
clearly deﬁned compartments, but rather as a blurry, embodied dynamics involving negotiations
between matter, techniques and agents.
In the next section, I provide some details about the technical dimension of the piece, focusing
mostly on the broad components and how they interrelate. This will provide some background for
understanding the diﬀerent processes that were implemented as part of the work.
6.2 Technical overview
Before we proceed into the heart of the chapter, let us ﬁrst brieﬂy sketch out the technical aspects
of the work. N-Polytope consists of twelve (12) steel cables forming a customizable topological
surface that is adapted to each venue. This architectural choice was not arbitrary but based on
Xenakis’ interest in projective geometry and ruled surfaces. On each cable are attached four (4)
modules (or nodes) equipped with a Minibee board, an AVR-based microcontroller coupled with
an XBee wiﬁ technology developed by LabXmodal.4 These modules form an ad-hoc network and
can thus be controlled wirelessly from a central computer, either individually, as a group, or as
sub-groups. Each module controls three (3) LEDs (light) and one speaker (sound) and observe
data about their surrounding through a photocell (light) and a microphone (sound). A total of
fourty-eight (48) nodes can thus be activated simultaneously, controlling up to 144 LEDs using
pulse-width modulation.
Following Xenakis’s own Polytope de Cluny (1972), a set of Minibee-controlled lasers are dis-
tributed across the space in speciﬁc spots together with both ﬁxed and rotative mirrors, enabling
the creation of geometric projections of concentrated colored light. A smoke machine can be acti-
vated to plunge the room in a hazy atmosphere that diﬀuses the light, contributing to the sense of
4See: http://sensestage.eu.
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immersion and enhancing the lasers deﬁnition and intensity.
The piece can run in two diﬀerent modes. In the installation mode, it employs more ambient and
subtle sounds and light eﬀects, without much evolution. Using a reduced set of algorithms, it aims
to bring the spectator into a contemplative and reﬂective mood. Once every hour, the piece switches
to its performance mode which runs for about 15 minutes. That version is more orchestrated, with
a pre-rendered soundtrack and pre-deﬁned cues that trigger other light and sound events, activating
the hazing machine and the lasers, launching the diﬀerent artiﬁcial agent-based algorithms across
the cables and space, bringing the audience in more of a Wagnerian gesamptkunstwerk.
The algorithms, which were designed by myself, are used to activate light and sound spatially
at a very coarse level, while a computational layer allows for their reﬁnement in real-time before
the ﬁnal rendering. I examine some of these algorithms in more detail in the next section.
6.3 Adaptive Processes in N-Polytope
We now move to the core section of this chapter. Here, I review the computational composition of
N-Polytope, focusing on four diﬀerent agent-based algorithms which were used in the construction of
the behavioral patterns that appear in the piece. The ﬁrst procedure is nonadaptive and will be used
as a point of comparison with the two other procedures. The second uses a simple adaptive feedback
procedure applied to generate emerging synchrony between a large group of agents, whereas the
third and last use reinforcement learning as a way to spawn dynamic patterns of light.
6.3.1 Drunk
The ﬁrst algorithm that we implemented was named Drunk. It is a global-level agent that outputs,
as its actions, intensities for all of the 144 LEDs using a hierarchical, one-dimensional random
walk procedure. Random walks have been studied for more than a century. They represent a
simple process where a variable changes its value by taking small, random steps, resulting in a
staggering motion (hence the name “drunk”). Random walks are a kind of Markov process, a class
of memoryless stochastic algorithms used by Xenakis in many of his works where the distribution
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of future states depends solely upon the current state and possibly a deﬁnite number of steps in
the past, but not on the entire history of past states the algorithm has gone through (in the case
of a random walk, the next state is only dependent on the current one).
The most simple way to apply this procedure to N-Polytope is to make a random walk in the 144-
dimensional space of light intensities. However, there are other ways to do it as well, by grouping
LEDs in diﬀerent fashions and doing a random walk for each group. This is what was done in
the case of Drunk. We created three diﬀerent kinds of groups: 48 node groups (each controlling
their 3 LED), twelve (12) line/cable group (each controlling 12 LEDs) and one (1) global-level
group (controlling all 144 LEDs). These groups are mixed using four (4) parameters (one for the
individual LEDs, one for the nodes, one for the cables and one for the global-level), allowing us to
have a ﬁne-grained control over the light environment generated by the procedure. For example,
by setting the parameter controlling the global-level to 100% and the others to 0%, all the LEDs
will have the exact same intensity which will stagger according to the random walk. If we set both
the cable-level and the LED-level parameters to 50% and the others at 0%, we will see each line of
LED staggering approximately at the same pace, with small variation for each LED. By setting all
parameters to 25%, we get a mix of the four levels of control. We can think of this procedure as
a hierarchical set of nested agents, with a global-level agent setting the general motion while the
sub-level agents reﬁne this motion down to the level of individual LEDs.
Thus, this procedure can be said to transform through time, bridging together past, present
and future in the most simple of ways. It is not merely a mapping of something else, but rather a
state-based behavior that displays some form of structured randomness. However, that structure
does not evolve through time: observing the behavior after a minute, an hour or a month gives a
similar impression. While the image is dynamic, constantly changing, the behavior itself is as still
as a photograph.
Hence, applying the morphogenetic framework proposed in the previous chapter, we can classify
Drunk as a very simple ﬁrst-degree behavior. It is therefore morphostatic, since the patterns it
generates do not change in time.
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As time passes, we begin to perceive an interaction between the agents. Some agents seem to
be starting a chain reaction, where their ﬂashing triggers their immediate neighbors, which in turn
activate their neighbors, generating cascades of light bursting in massive ripples. Two, sometimes
three such networks form, linked through space but separated in time. As they tend to reﬁne their
synchrony, suddenly, there is a long, dark silence. The room is ﬁlled with emptiness and time is
frozen until, in a spectacular tempest of cold, white light, all the agents start ﬂashing at the same
time.5
This Fireflies algorithm works with either light or sound. At the beginning of the installation’s
12–16 minute compositional cycle, we employ the same Fireflies technique on the audio component
of the piece, which is synthesized directly from the 48 microcontroller nodes with similar results.
In the case of audio, the synchronization is less perceptually discernable because the agents’ sounds
are mixed within the global background soundscape. However, the propagation eﬀect of sounds
responding to one another creates a strong immersive impression : the eﬀect is uncannily similar
to that of walking in a ﬁeld of cicadas, or hearing frogs singing in a pond.
The procedure evolves from a chaotic, distributed, microscale behavior to a disciplined, singular,
monumental one. Agents here have inputs (photocell/microphone) and outputs (LEDs/speakers)
which are related through a feedback loop that pushes them to act the same way, in other words,
to become a singular entity. Thus, one could say that as the system becomes increasingly ordered,
it also becomes more monolithic. What is interesting from an aesthetic point of view is clearly not
the purpose of the agents (which is to attain this perfect synchrony) but rather the process of going
from discord to unison, which happens through the emergence of ephemeral temporal patterns.
As we did in Vessels, we are hereby revealing the stochastic, adaptive procedure in its real-time
unfolding as a way to create an aesthetic eﬀect.
These agents can be said to be adaptive in the cybernetic sense, since they are engaged in a
feedback loop where their own actions have an impact on the environment, which in turn inﬂuences
their own future actions. Hence, the patterns they generate at the global level are diﬀerent from
5I ﬁrst used this algorithm in the media installation Trace (S) (2008) produced in collaboration with Jonathan
Villeneuve. In that piece, a set of twenty-eight (28) cube-shaped devices hooked to the gallery wall synchronize using
LEDs and photocells while pulsing air using computer fans.
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those of Drunk, because there is an evolution in the light and sound that unfolds through time,
embedded in a narrative of optimization. The behavior of the system as a whole is of second order.
What the observer gets to experience is not only a certain real-time, recognizable pattern (like
Drunk) but rather, a pattern which is a metamorphosis of patterns, transforming dynamically as
it moves from chaos to order.
A relationship can be established between these very simple units and neurons. Indeed, the
algorithm driving Fireflies is a form of “integrate-and-ﬁre” oscillating neuron (Campbell, Wang,
and Jayaprakash 1999) whose origin can be traced back to early 20th century French neuroscientist
Louis Lapicque (Abbott 1999). This category of time-based, asynchronous6 neural models is widely
diﬀerent from Perceptrons and MLPs, which are synchronous by deﬁnition and are targeted at
pattern recognition rather than biological simulation and temporal integration. In the ﬁeld of
neural computation, these models are often called Spiking Neural Networks (SNN) (Maass and
Bishop 2001), a connectionist model of biological neurons that adds a conception of time. In
(Thivierge and Cisek 2010), the authors describe how such models can be trained to recognize and
generate synchrony. Here the evaluation function is the time diﬀerence between an observed ﬂash
and the phase of the agent, and the update rule consists in slighly changing the phase so as to
match it more closely with the perceived phase of the ﬂashing neighbor.
6.3.3 Boosters
The third algorithm, called Boosters, works in a similar fashion to Fireflies, although it utilizes
RL techniques: there is one agent for each light and sound node, each of which can emit ﬂashes of
light as well as perceive the brightness of its neighbors. Agents in Boosters accumulate energy in
a virtual “battery” while they are at rest, collecting the light emitted by their neighbors. At each
step, the agents can choose to either stay at rest or emit a burst of light. If they choose the latter,
the sum of the energy they have accumulated is spent to produce the burst with the intensity of
the light emitted being proportional to the spent energy.
6By this, I mean that the neurons ﬁre independently at their own rythm, however as we have shown it is possible
for them to learn how to ﬁre synchronously.
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Boosters agents get rewarded for producing a ﬂash, however, they receive an even larger reward
for producing a more intense one. Their best strategy is thus to wait until their battery is full before
taking a ﬂash action. Since there is a “blind” relaxation period after emitting a burst during which
the light perceived from the environment does not add to the energy, the agents’ best strategy as
a group is also to intersperse their ﬂashing. From a visual point of view, the perceptual impression
that results is one of a mass of individual lights pulsating over a range of diﬀerent intensities only
to occasionally burst and blank out for a moment in order to again return to their struggle.
The Boosters, however, seemed to be rather unable to learn even this apparently simple proce-
dure. I suggest this could be attributed to the fact that the space of inquiry (in other words, the
number of possibilities to consider for each agent) is too large for them to learn in real-time because
they aren’t exposed to enough data in the time during which they run.7
If that is true, being able to witness a learning process happening in real time using generic
learning approaches such as RL would require that the problem to be solved by the agents stays
relatively simple (small search space). That would, in turn, completely defeat the purpose of using
ML techniques in the ﬁrst place. The curse of dimensionality therefore creates a nasty situation for
artists wanting to exploit such methods by building of aesthetic experiences through the staging of
real-time adaptive behaviors.
6.3.4 Chasers
The last procedure, called Chasers, simulates agents moving across the installation’s cable structures
using a reinforcement learning algorithm combined with an artiﬁcial neural net. Here, instead of
working with continuous properties like light intensity and sound amplitude, we are rather using
a discrete representation of the agents’ position in space. Each cable represents a one-dimensional
“world” with twelve (12) discrete locations/cells. The world “wraps-around” at the end, meaning
that the ﬁrst cell is considered to be adjacent to the last one. At any speciﬁc moment in time, an
agent occupies one and only one of the twelve cells and can choose to either stay in place or move
7Looking backwards, we could perhaps have managed to train them using an oﬄine technique such as Batch
RL (Lange, Gabel, and Riedmiller 2011).
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to one of the adjacent cells. The only information (observation) the agent receives is the distance
(in number of cells) between itself and the next agent, in both direction. The agents’ positions are
represented by lighting the corresponding LED on the cable (stacked agents result in a brighter
light).
The reward function is the sum of three diﬀerent components:
• The reward on touch (rt) rewards the agent (or punishes it) for being on the same spot as
another agent.
• The reward on move (rm) rewards the agent for moving in a given direction (and punishes it
for going the opposite way).
• The reward on stay (rs) rewards the agent for staying put (and punishes it for moving).
These parameters can be used independently (by keeping the other ones to zero) or they can be
combined to foster diﬀerent behaviors in agents, as demonstrated in the following table:
Table 5: Example reward functions for the Chasers procedure, with corresponding expected results.
Touch (rt) Move rm Stay (rs) Resulting behavior
1 0 0 Try to catch other agents at all cost.
-1 0 1 Try to evade from other agents and otherwise stay still.
0 1 0 Move left-to-right no matter what.
2 -1 0 Try to catch other agents ﬁrst and foremost, but with a
preference for moving right-to-left.
-1 0 -1 Always move but avoid collisions.
Furthermore, we can achieve more variation by combining agents with diﬀerent reward functions
on the same cable, thus generating diﬀerent kinds of movements such as predator-prey “chases” and
other adaptive dances. In the installation, we start by adding a few agents and allowing them to
stabilize, which happens rather quickly. We then manipulate the tension between chaos and disorder
— an important aesthetic dimension of the work — in two diﬀerent ways.
First, we took advantage of a feature of the RL optimization procedure which was introduced
in section 3.2.2: the exploration-vs-exploitation criterion. A parameter ǫ ∈ [0, 1] controls the
probability that the agent will, at any given step, “explore” its environment by taking a completely
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random move, as opposed to “exploit” its current knowledge by taking a “greedy” action (i.e.,
moving in the direction it thinks will yield the highest reward). Choosing a low value for ǫ typically
yields more structured, “smart” moves (especially after the agents have been given enough time
to learn) while a high value will generate chaotic behaviors. By playing with ǫ we can inﬂuence
the behavioral shapes visible to the human audience, moving them instantly between order and
disorder.
The second strategy is used when agents have “stabilized” into an ordered, “smart” behavior,
entering a phase of morphostasis. By increasing the number of agents in the space, we make the
problem more diﬃcult and confuse the agents that are already there. It also raises the density of
light sources activated along the wires, until the structure becomes saturated both spatially and
temporally, shifting the patterns towards chaos. In this sense, the shift in the behavior of the agents
gradually results in a growing sense of disorder, achieved by sudden discontinuities in the rhythm
of their movement up and down the lines and thus, making it increasingly diﬃcult for observers to
recognize their patterns.
In the various contexts in which N-Polytope was presented, the audience seemed to be dragged
into the piece, often describing it as compelling and hypnotic. Many viewers stayed for extended
periods of time, lying down under the structure, engulfed into the cosmic spectacle oﬀered by the
piece. Chasers and Fireflies seemed to be particularly eﬀective as methods for inspiring this general
awe in the viewer, for what I believe to be two diﬀerent reasons.
What made Fireflies compelling was that one could experience the actual learning process,
the slow adaptation of agents to one another where they auto-organized in real-time. This was
particularly eﬀective as it happened at the beginning of the sequence, allowing a slow ramping
up towards higher energy movements. As Chasers happened in a later, climatic segment of the
show, it was tuned to learn faster, and was also augmented with additional light eﬀects that made
the behavior less “pure”. Due to this it was harder to see the learning process happening because
the agents quickly stabilized into an optimal pattern, and the deﬁnition of their movements was
blurred by the added spectacular eﬀects. Nonetheless, the rapid movements of the agents underlying
their actual representation follow behavioral patterns that, although hard to discern, are somehow
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evocative of recognizable shapes.
6.3.5 Discussion
This report described a number of diﬀerent approaches that make use of adaptive and Machine
Learning algorithms as part of agent-based artworks. In particular, it shows one instance of using
reinforcement learning with success8 as part of a media installation. At the broad level, the strategy
is similar than that employed in Vessels for the co-adaptation of behavioral patterns using genetic
algorithms, in the sense that we can play on two diﬀerent levels.
First, by hooking into the adaptive loop, we can unfold it before the eyes of the audience,
revealing the learning process itself as a behavior. This is particularly true of Fireflies, which opens
the show by allowing groups of agents to self-organize temporally, moving from chaos to order.
Here, the time span is much shorter than for Vessels, the adaptation happening over a period of
2–3 minutes (compared to 10–15 minutes in Vessels for a noticeable change to happen). The result
is impressive, as one gets to experience the real-time, incremental adjustment of light and sound
agents surrounding them, building up a dramatic transformation from individuality to unison.
Reinforcement Learning in Chasers goes even faster, as the agents converge after about a minute.
So the strategy diﬀers from Fireflies: agents learn an optimal behavior, and it is this stabilized,
morphostatic performance that is revealed before the eyes of the audience. In N-Polytope, this
seemed to work out, although it is not absolutely clear why given the triviality of the learned
behavior. The software layer built on top of the behavior generation system, which augments these
temporal patterns with diverse ﬁne-tunings and eﬀects at both the local and the global levels,
makes it diﬃcult to analyze what aspect of the general experience can be attributed to the learning
algorithm itself.
So it seems that we are confronted again with the same paradox. On the one hand, the kind
of problems that are interesting aesthetically are often very high dimensional and complex. Hence,
these are also the problems for which Machine Learning is useful, as compared to more traditional
8In fact, n-Polytope is, to my knowledge, one of the rare documented works of art employing RL, along with some
of my most recent works Fifth Absence (2011) and Plasmosis (2013).
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approaches. However, the context of artistic works that run in real-time is improper for training
these systems under the time constraints oﬀered by traditional new media presentation contexts.
In the kind of scientiﬁc applications which they were designed for, Machine Learning algorithms
are usually trained oﬄine, learning oﬀ disk-based databases, running as fast as the computers on
which they run can crunch the numbers. Naturally, this kind of computational power is not yet
fast enough or small enough to drive a live artistic event such as N-Polytope which runs over a time
span of about 15 minutes in performance mode.
Though it leaves a number of questions open, this research has at least the merit of highlighting
important distinctions between adaptive and nonadaptive algorithms. Stochastic processes such
as the multi-stage random walk implemented in Drunk, which is rather emblematic of the kind of
algorithms Xenakis was interested in, exist in a domain that is essentially distinct from adaptive
algorithms such as Fireflies and Chasers. While they could all be said to pertain to the category
of behavior-based aesthetic, they certainly diﬀer in their temporal unfolding. Whereas Drunk is a
temporal process that creates a strong impression in the eyes of an external observer, the structure
that supports it does not adapt or evolve over time. Despite its strong temporal dimension when
considered over a short period, it is still ﬂat and static when taken from the perspective of a longer
span of time.
Fireflies and Chasers pertain to another category of behaviors. Because they can adapt their
structure over time, and that this structure in turn determines their behavior, their relationship
with time is of a very diﬀerent nature. The GA employed in Vessels for the evolution of the
behaviors is similar, however, we could even make a further distinction between algorithms such as
the one in Vessels, which changes behavior over time but without a deﬁnite goal, from Chasers and
Fireflies, which have precise goals.
Applying the morphogenetic framework proposed in the previous chapter, we can classify Drunk
as a very simple ﬁrst-order behavior. It is therefore morphostatic, since the patterns it generates
thus do not evolve in time. In comparison, the three other algorithms are behaviors of second order,
or metabehaviors, because their dynamic shapes evolve in time. Chasers and Fireflies are both
characterized by an adaptive optimization narrative, their behavior being iteratively constructed
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in time (morphogenesis) until the system reaches an stable equilibrium (morphostasis). However,
in the case of Chasers, this process happens much faster, almost instantly, so we do not really
get to see the adaptive process. Here the changes and the way they are impacted by learning are
more blurry, as there are many variables that come into play (the variation of ǫ and the adding of
agents which impact the environment in which they evolve). Fireflies thus oﬀers, in my view, a
much more “pure” example of the aesthetic eﬀects of an adaptive metamorphic process involving
embodied agents. Furthermore, the behavioral properties of Fireflies allow it to learn over a short
time span of a few minutes, giving the audience an opportunity to experience the synchronization
of adaptive units in real-time.
Audiences respond to the piece with a feeling of enthrallment. It is not rare, during presentations,
to see people staying for extended periods of time, ranging from tens of minutes to hours, which is
rarely seen in new media artworks. Many people have described that the patterns unfolding before
their eyes seemed elusive, eﬀervescent, always on the verge of being grasped, then dissolving. Trying
to make sense of what steered he system, what were the entities behind it, audience members would
make often turn up to analogies of living systems to make sense of the patterns observed in the
work: swarms of insects, ﬂocks of birds, shoals of ﬁshes, moving and scintillating in a way that
felt lifelike, yet never fully graspable. It may be possible that the force that kept these audiences
in thrall was that of being witness to alien modes of being and behaving that lie beyond human
understanding.
6.4 Control and Time
Temporal morphological characteristics of processes such as the ones that were explored in N-
Polytope inspire important questions about the use of adaptive agents in new media art installations.
What aesthetic eﬀects do these morphological movements activate? How does working with partially
uncontrollable and indeterminate agents aﬀect practice?
As a way to approach these questions, I will use as a complementary example Stephen Kelly’s
piece Open Ended Ensemble which was brieﬂy introduced in section 3.2.1. Kelly is one of my
196
collaborators on Vessels, and has a background in both art and science, as he is currently completing
a Ph. D. in computer science at Dalhousie University (Halifax, Canada) in the ﬁeld of Genetic
Programming. The latest version of his piece involves two agents that adapt concurrently, a strategy
similar to the one I used for my 2013 underwater installation Plasmosis. The ﬁrst agent consists in
a set of four pairs of neon lights that can choose to switch oﬀ one (only one) pair of ﬂuorescents.
The second agent controls inaccurately the movements of a magnet moving near the ﬂuorescents,
trying to ﬁnd the spot with the lowest magnetic “noise”. The sound of the magnetic ﬁelds is directly
transmitted through a guitar amp of the artist’s making.
I interviewed him in June 2016 about his work which was displayed at Hamilton Artist Inc.
in Hamilton (Canada). Asked about how the audience experiences the piece, and how Machine
Learning plays into it, he says:
Working with such technologies involves a loss of control on the part of the artist, a
strategy which is very common in media art these days. And by doing that you are re-
introducing elements of uncertainty in a piece, you are giving it the potential to surprize
you. Something is controlled, but not by the audience nor the artist, so in a way it is
more “democratic”, it lies outside of the control of anyone. And that in turn speaks to
how people experience the work: you cannot understand it right away, even if you read
about the piece, and even as its designer. You need to get to know it. So in that sense it
is a very durational experience. It is common in many media art works but even more
so with adaptive systems.
As a point of comparison, Kelly mentioned the research of Adrian Thompson, a scientist at
the University of Sussex who is considered to be a pioneer in the ﬁeld of evolvable hardware. In
1996, he used a Genetic Algorithm to evolve a circuit known as a Field-Programmable Gate Array
(FGPA) to discriminate between a 1kHz and a 10kHz tone (Thompson 1996). After the circuit
evolved into an optimal discriminator, in order to simplify it, he tried to prune out the parts of
the circuits that were not contributing to the output. Contrary to Thompson’s assumptions, some
parts of the circuits that were completely disconnected from any path that could inﬂuence the
output, were actually crucial to the discrimination process, probably through some forms of local
magnetic interactions. In other words, the adaptive agent that controlled the evolutionary process
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had learned a solution to the problem that made use of the intrinsic, embodied, physical properties
of the circuit and that no human could possibly have come up with.
Similarly, human observers of adaptive or evolutionary works such as Open Ended Ensembles,
Vessels, or N-Polytope cannot understand their behaviors rationally, because the underlying pro-
cesses that govern them follow non-logical rules. Works that are based on mappings and ﬁrst-order
behaviors can be rationally explained and understood: for example, this photocell triggers that
sound eﬀect, that microphone activates that video sequence, that gestures causes the agent to start
running in circle for a minute, etc. But in order to experience second-behaviors in all their richness,
one needs to “get to know them” phenomenologically, through her own sensorimotor body. One
needs to adapt to it, to change herself, to become attuned to it until the behavior reveals physically
itself in all of its unfathomable nature.
I posit that this is a direct consequence of two important features of adaptive systems that have
been highlighted earlier. First, the way by which their morphology evolve in time may contribute
to their mystifying nature. As was pointed out before, adaptive systems go through periods of
morphogenesis, metamorphosis and morphostasis. During their transitive phases, their behavior
lies in a state of ﬂux, making its shape diﬃcult to grasp by external observers.
Second, as they become better at performing the task they are trained for, Machine Learning
models grow into complex and intricate architectures that are more than often unintelligible to
humans. This is particularly true of neural networks, where large numbers of independent units
(neurons) work together to solve a problem, yet, it is diﬃcult if not impossible for a human observer
to ﬁnd out which neuron is responsible for what, because decisions are usually diﬀused across the
network. Adrian Thompson’s genetically evolved FGPA is another good example of how Machine
Learning agents ﬁnd their own way through problem-solving, often moving beyond human logic.
Incidentally, this structural complexity is precisely what allows these systems to be eﬃcient,
evolving intricate behaviors that often make them perform better than humans. It is thus not
surprising that the morphological patterns emerging from these architectures (once they stabilized)
remain perplexing to human observers.
More importantly, one should not forget that the human observers experiencing these systems
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trained to interact with mapping and formal systems, which can be grasped quickly. As always, it
is diﬃcult to convince a large public to make an eﬀort to understand an artwork, and most people
will leave a work that they cannot grasp within a frame of a few minutes.
Since adaptive systems require a lot of data to learn how to react to complex situations, they
usually require a lot of time, enough that they can have access to many diﬀerent experiences. In this
way, they are very similar to complex living systems. Consider for example the time it takes for pets
and even humans to learn about things that seem relatively simple, such as walking. Strategies can
be deployed to prevent the audience from leaving too early. For example, in N-Polytope, a number
of nonadaptive eﬀects are used to immerse the audience into the work, such as a smoke machine and
an underlying music score. The audience is informed that the piece runs in an installation mode
followed by a 15 minutes performance mode, which makes them want to stay long enough to “see
everything”. A set of carpets and comfy bean bags are dispersed under the structure, providing a
very simple yet eﬀective way to increase the time spent with the work.
But this also suggests that the new media art scene is perhaps not currently adapted for these
works. The new aesthetic experiences these pieces oﬀer necessitate a change, both in the way new
media institutions present and mediate them to the public, and in the expectations of the audiences.
It is possible that audiences have become accustomed to a certain type of new media artwork that
works well within a festival-oriented art network, and that might have been fostered in parts by the
popularity of mapping and interactive art in the last three decades. Long-form, evolution-centric
works such as Vessels and Open Ended Ensemble places value on duration and contemplation,
making them more akin to performance art practices where similar concerns of embodiment and
performativity come into play.
Furthermore, aside from these changes, we need to create new contexts that would allow these
for these new forms of experience to unfold naturally, such as take-at-home agents that would
evolve inside one’s living quarters over weeks, or public art monuments that would adapt to their
environment over the scope of many years, allowing the public to develop a relationship with these
systems so that they can “get to know them” and experience their adaptiveness.
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6.5 Indeterminacy
It is commonly known that visionary composer Iannis Xenakis was inspired by the aspect of Cy-
bernetics that concerns the probabilistic nature of information, which would later be known as
Claude Shannon’s information theory. It is less known that his interest in Cybernetics extended to
Wiener’s notion of control in autonomous systems.
Quite interestingly, while Xenakis was keen to employ probabilistic methods in his work, demon-
strating his fascination with chaos and order, he was also extremely demanding, and controlled each
aspect of his work with extreme precision in a top-down manner that is related to von Neummann’s
command perspective on Cybernetics.9 In realizing N-Polytope, we have been leaning more towards
the Wienerian notion of autonomy, allowing our agents to move freely, working with a much more
bottom-up approach.
This was both an eﬀect of vision and means. As an artist working with technology, my own
practice has always been deﬁned by the mise en scène of artiﬁcial computational agents, and
autonomy is a deﬁning feature of my behavior-based aesthetics. This, of course, largely inﬂuenced
our decisions in the kind of algorithms that were implemented as part of the work. It was a
response to the question: “What would have Xenakis done if he had access to the technology
that we have?” The technology Xenakis was working with could not generate things in real-time:
everything needed to be pre-rendered, which suggested making changes to the score, because there
was time to react. That limitation has been largely alleviated nowadays, allowing for large-scale
real-time media processing like was used in N-Polytope.
This is not to say that N-Polytope is a purely autonomous work. The behaviors that were de-
scribed in this chapter were integrated inside a traditional score, with predeﬁned cues that triggered
the various events that gave form to the piece. This is particularly true in the performance mode
9In a personal conversation during the presentation of N-Polytope at the Darling Foundry in Montreal (2014),
Robert Dupuy, who worked as an assistant for Xenakis on the Polytopes, seemed to suggest this. Recalling the times
where he worked for the artist, he explained that, as a programmer, he would write a program and run it, generating
a new score — a process which would take 24 hours. Then Xenakis would look at it and ask for some speciﬁc
and precise parts to be changed, such as one or two notes that he would not ﬁnd satisfactory, requiring Dupuy to
perform yet another round-the-clock iteration. Dupuy’s story seems to support the claim that while Xenakis was
using stochastic systems as part of his creative process, he also took a strong authorial position, not allowing for
much autonomy or control in regards to the machines.
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of the work, which runs for a deﬁned period of time. Nonetheless, while the performance itself is
predeﬁned at a higher level, the artiﬁcial actors that create the performance are never doing the
exact same thing, which contributes to the natural feel of the piece.
The investigation of N-Polytope in the current chapter shows the advantages as well as the
limitations of the tools developed in this dissertation. In particular, when working with emergent
systems, a tension always exists between the artiﬁcial systems, the audience, and the artists. While
I agree with Downie and Xenakis in reaﬃrming the importance of authorship when working with
self-organizing agents, I dissent with them in regards to the way to enact that authorship. Both
Downie and Xenakis emphasize the role of the artist as an arbiter, with an unequivocal right to make
choices among the various contents generated by computational processes. In the case of Xenakis,
this seems to come down to an almost divine right, which is well rendered by the composer’s ﬁnal
words in his thesis defense. Replying to Bernard Teyssèdres who asked him about the importance
of the ability for the composer to “select” preferred sonic versions generated by stochastic programs
of his design, as opposed to leaving them out of his control, he stakes:
But it is my right, my privilege. It’s my task to prefer one thing over another. (Xenakis
and Messiaen 1994, 98)
This tension between autonomy and command in Xenakis’ work echoes his conception of inde-
terminacy and the impact of Western philosophy and modern science on his work. Musicologist
Kostas Paparrigopoulos has contrasted Xenakis’ approach to chance and disorder with that of ex-
perimental composer John Cage. Both Cage and Xenakis made use of indeterminate processes in
their work, but in a diﬀerent fashion. While Xenakis aimed to use science as a way to control
chance and shape it to its will, Cage saw in the unpredictability of nature an opportunity to break
free, leaving sounds out of his direct control. (Paparrigopoulos 2011)
Cage’s reasoning is based on the observation that sound exists beyond human intention. De-
scribing his visit into an anechoic chamber at Harvard University, he explains he could still hear
the sound of his circulatory system and a very high-pitched sound which he claimed came from his
nervous system.10 “Until I die there will be sounds. One need not fear about the future of music.”
10Cage most certainly did not hear his nervous system in that chamber. What he might have been hearing is
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Cage continues:
But this fearlessness only follows if, at the parting of the ways, where it is realized
that sounds occur whether intended or not, one turns in the direction of those he
does not intend. This turning is psychological and seems at ﬁrst to be a giving up
of everything that belongs to humanity—for a musician, the giving up of music. This
psychological turning leads to the world of nature, where, gradually or suddenly, one
sees that humanity and nature, not separate, are in this world together; that nothing
was lost when everything was given away. In fact, everything is gained. (Cage 1961, 8)
Given this conundrum, the composer thus has two options. If he refuses to let go of his eﬀort
to control sound, he can do as Xenakis, seeking complex techniques as ways to better approximate
nature. Otherwise, he can choose to “give up the desire to control sound, clear his mind of music,
and set about discovering means to let sounds be themselves rather than vehicles for man-made
theories or expressions of human sentiments” (9).
Free will being incompatible with determinism, and freedom being the prime substance of orig-
inality and creativity, both Cage and Xenakis wanted to use indeterminacy as a path to escape
their own individuality and channel larger powers in the universe, to “go beyond themselves”.
While Cage, inspired by eastern philosophies, sought to attain this freedom through the aban-
donment of control, giving their full autonomy to sounds, Xenakis, in his attempt to deconstruct
the determinism-indeterminism opposition, always stayed on the side of western philosophy and
science. (Paparrigopoulos 2011, 3)
These divergences resonate with many of the dilemmas that have followed us throughout this
research: determinism versus indeterminism, command versus autonomy, computationalism versus
enactivism. On the one hand, the instruments and methods of science allow us to create repre-
sentations of natural processes that can grant us control over them. On the other hand, we are
confronted by the fact that nature is out of control, that we can never fully know it, and that
our best shot at dealing with it is to boldly accept it as it is, or, as Cage says, to “let things be
themselves”.
My own perspective in regards to these quandries faced while working with computational
tinnitus, which often results in a high frequency sound. (McElhearn 2016)
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behaviors stands somewhere between a Cagean and a Xenakisian approach to indeterminacy. My
interest in Machine Learning as a way to generate self-organizing dynamics in agent-based systems
resonates with Xenakis’ usage of stochastic science as a way to bend randomness to his own will.
However, echoing Cage, I want to leave the agents “be themselves” and “live their artiﬁcial life”, so
to speak. Still, there is more of a blurring between human and inanimate in my work than in Cage’s
work, who wants to limit as much as possible human intervention to allow chance to take its course.
I see my role as an artist less as a director around which everything else revolves, and more as a
collaborator negotiating with other human and nonhuman agencies in the production of artworks.11
As an alternative to rule-based AI, Machine Learning — and, in particular, Reinforcement Learning
— is situated in the middle ground between these two visions, as it allows for a certain degree of
control over outcomes by giving the artist the right to design goals, while leaving the learning agent
the responsibility to ﬁnd the way to reach them. There is a huge diﬀerence between the use of coin
ﬂips (in Cage) vs a system that is based on experience. There’s a diﬀerence between a set of rules
vs a system that learns by experience, vs using a system based on randomness.
I recall here Andrew Pickering’s nonmodern ontology, which conceives the world as “built from
performative dances of agency”. Pickering remarks, following Latour, that modernism is built on
an “asymmetric dualism” that considers humans are the only beings able of true agency, thus
positioning humanity above other animals and things.
But then comes the twist. The great discovery of science studies was that in practice
the sciences themselves fail to exemplify this ontology. It turns out that in their own
laboratories the scientists are far from calling all the shots. They do not dominate
their materials through knowledge; instead they engage in rather symmetrical open-
ended and performative dances of agency, trying this and that in their struggles with
machines and instruments, finding out what the world will do in this circumstance or
that, and responding to what emerges in a process that I call mangling. [. . . ]
So studies of scientiﬁc practice conjure up a new ontological vision, a quasi-biological one,
of the world as itself as a lively place, itself a reservoir of agency, that can always surprise
us in its performance, and that we always have to get along with and accommodate
ourselves to, rather than seeing through and controlling. We are always, so to speak, in
11Indeed, collaboration has always been an integral and important dimension of my art practice, a particularity
which directly stems from my background in science, where collective work is the norm rather than the exception.
204
the thick of things. (Pickering 2009, 198)
This idea directly resonates with my own artistic approach, and provides a strong argument
for addressing the problematics that this dissertation brings forward in trying to understand the
worldview that adaptive systems come to generate. Art is not meant to provide answers or to be a
vessels of communication, but rather a space of encounter, a theater where there diﬀerent agencies
co-adapt: the work, the artist, but also the audience. So perhaps this is what adaptive systems
suggest when used in the arts: both in terms of experience and practice, they are the quintessence
of life’s unfathomable nature: open-ended, muddy, indeterminate processes, which we can never
fully know, let alone control.
6.6 Art and Science
This discussion suggests a review of Xenakis’ perspective over the relationship between art and sci-
ence. Xenakis claimed that while both art and science could construct objective forms of knowledge
by drawing out ideas through empirical observation and rational thought (inference) and putting
these ideas to test using experiments (experimentation), only artists had the power to attain subjec-
tive truths through the process of revelation. Xenakis proclaimed the advent of an artist-engineer
who would need to be “simultaneously rational (inferential), technical (experimental) and talented
(revelatory)” (Xenakis and Messiaen 1994, 5–6) in order to implement a merging of art and science.
Xenakis sees this artist-engineer as an interdisciplinary researcher and practioner, trained in
a wide range of scientiﬁc and artistic ﬁelds. He argues in favor of a new relationship between
science and art where the artist-originator would invent artistic problems that she would then
try to solve using mathematics and science (Xenakis 1981a). He claims that the numerous failed
attempts at making music using computers at the time were either due to musicians’ relative
ignorance of basic notions of mathematics, physics and acoustics or to scientists’ general lack of
points of reference when it comes to aesthetic creation. To him, art and science form an alloy, an
heterogenous substance whose properties are diﬀerent than those of its constituents (Xenakis and
Messiaen 1994).
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Xenakis’s vision is very noble: that through artists creating problems for science to solve, art
and science are forming “alloys” with each other possessing new emerging properties (similar to
that of bronze, which has other properties than copper and iron). This being said, Xenakis’ vision
fails to account for the sociopolitical context in which these ﬁeld interoperate, in particular within
the millenial context of socioeconomic power relationships between art, science, and capitalism.
For example, the corporatization of academia has utterly transformed scientiﬁc research since
the 1970s. The contemporary context marked by an extreme pressure to succeed in their disci-
plinary ﬁeld makes it diﬃcult for scientists to get involved in projects involving interdisciplinary
research with artists because the return on investment remains unclear. There are almost no eco-
nomic incentives for scientists to shift into the arts. In counterpart, artists moving into scientiﬁc
environments are still subject to the ﬁnancial and power unbalance described above, and are thus
at risk of ﬁnding themselves either used as contributors that can “think outside of the box” for a
cheap wage, or be forced to abandon their art career in favor of a more sustainable job as scientists
or engineers. Xenakis’ idea that artists should lead humanity’s quest for truth by creating questions
for science to solve thus seems hardly imaginable in the current situation.12
The performative ontology brought forward by Andrew Pickering in The Cybernetic Brain,
explored in section 5.11, suggests an alternative to Xenakis’ alloys that I ﬁnd more fruitful (Pickering
2010). In his book, Pickering turns towards early British Cybernetics as an alternative approach
to modern science, which engaged directly with matter in often strange ways, such as through the
creation of bizarre apparatus such as Ashby’s homeostat, Walter’s tortoises, and Pask’s Musicolour.
At the most obvious level, synthetic brains—machines like the tortoise and the home-
ostat—threaten the modern boundary between mind and matter, creating a breach in
which engineering, say, can spill over into psychology, and vice versa. Cybernetics thus
stages for us a nonmodern ontology in which people and things are not so diﬀerent after
all. (18)
12Perhaps Xenakis, an immensely successful architect and composer sitting at the top of the world, had trouble
seeing the power relationships induced by the forces of capitalism the way most artists do. Perhaps he was able to
pull these forces his way: but an exception is no rule, and more than often, scientists nowadays either do not have
time for artists, or when they do, it is more than often in situations where the power relationship is unbalanced
in their favor. This asymmetry in economic conditions is one of the social factors that prevent Xenakis’ alloys to
happen in the contemporary world. In a way, one can see how Xenakis’ alloys are a tribute to an idealized modernist
vision of art and science that fails to take into account the socio-historical reality in which they are embedded, and
the diverse actors that participate to their construction.
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Following that perspective, Xenakis’ claim, that the emotional and aﬀective dimensions of truth
are only accessible by art, seems dubious. The role of intuition in science has been well documented,
and it is well known that the emotions, passions, and motivations play an important role in science.
Scientiﬁcs are human beings as much as artists, and in their work they touch a unique beauty
that is often hard to transmit outside their circles, whether it is in the astuteness of mathematical
proofs, the complexity of chemical reactions, or the elegance of biological interactions.
This is why I ﬁnd that Xenakis’ approach is not only inaccurate (because I think there is a lot of
subjectivity in science, perhaps as much as in art), but it is also barren, as it precludes alternative
forms of relationships to take place beyond the idealization of an artist-engineer who puts science
to the service of art. If we adopt, instead, a perfomative vision of both art and science practices,
where practitioners and researchers engage in a “dance of agencies” with matter, then it becomes
possible to imagine diﬀerent kinds of relationships. For example, it allows for artistic strategies
where an artist discovers a scientiﬁc technique that holds an aesthetic potential and brings it out of
science — such as many of Marcel Duchamp’s readymade works like Fountain (1917) and Bicycle
Wheel (1951). This is similar to what I am doing in this dissertation, and in much of my work: I am
often inspired by a technique that holds a potential to reveal some subjective truth and generate
novel experiences, and I extirpate it from its scientiﬁc context, deconstructing it to bring it in the
ﬁeld of arts.
As an alternative to Xenakis’ artist-engineer ﬁgure that is more compatible with Pickering’s
view, consider Simon Penny’s historical analysis of “artist-inventors” in his 2008 text “Bridging
Two Cultures – towards a history of the Artist-Inventor”. There, Penny tries to position interrela-
tions between scientists and artists in technological practice, focusing on technological practitioners
engaged in the design of “machine-artworks” capable of generating embodied interactive experi-
ences with the audience. On the opposite side of media users who often see technology as an end
itself, these artist-inventors rather develop the technologies they need to achieve their objectives.
In contrast with Xenakis’ ﬁgure of the artist-engineer (who is an artist trained in engineering),
Penny’s artist-inventors category comprise people who are traditionally considered more like sci-
entists than artists, such as Cyberneticians Ross Ashby and Grey Walter, and engineers Nikola
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Tesla and Alexander Graham Bell. As thus, it is a much more inclusive concept which provides an
alternative view against the modernist separation of art and science. (Penny 2008)13
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I used the large-scale performance/installation work N-Polytope as a testbed for the
aesthetics of adaptive behaviors I have articulated through this dissertation. Of keen interest is the
comparative usage of both adaptive and nonadaptive systems in N-Polytope. The morphological
framework was useful in describing behavioral evolution in the diﬀerent kinds of processes. The
various algorithms appearing in the work exploited the tension between morphogenesis, metamor-
phosis, and morphostasis.
The experience of the work as described by members of the audience echoes in many ways how
people experienced Vessels (c.f., section 4.5), seeing patterns that evoke alien agencies, pursuing
behaviors that are hard to pin and can hardly be described. This, in a way, is not surprising, when
one considers how observers are, themselves, adaptive systems, who are trying to make sense of
often complex behaviors that might or might not be stabilized yet. These self-organized systems
need a particular context to be correctly apprehended: they cannot be consumed like your usual
reactive, interactive art piece. One needs to spend time with these agents to get to know them —
in other words, to adapt to them.
Hence, adaptive systems and their use in agent-based artistic installation point to a view about
art and science that questions the notion of indeterminacy. In this context, I see the artist less as
one who attempts to give an idealized shape to matter by controlling randomness through science,
13This is certainly not to say that science and art are equals. As Penny claims, whereas “many of the innovations
in science and technology, arose from a passionate commitment to speciﬁc causes or ideas” and while the “drive to
invent and the drive to create are, at root, almost indistinguishable”, it remains that scientists are “taught to discount
motivations which exceed the positivist quest for knowledge, while artists have no such constraint” (Penny 2008,
143) In an earlier text, Penny compared how artists and scientists approach computer-based artworks. For example,
he contrasted the very scientiﬁc approach in the Oz Project — a research program led by computer scientist Joseph
Bates in the mid–1990s, that aimed to develop technologies that would allow artist to design complex dramatic
interactive ﬁctions — which is very generic and complex, but engendered, in his opinion, rather limited results, to
the much more low tech approach of artist Luc Courchesne which yields a more evocative and achieved artwork in
his piece Family Portraits (1993). Penny pretends that scientists, due to their training, tend in general to focus on
problem solving and to produce “universal” solutions which favor didactic and literal works, whereas artists focus on
the experiental aspect of the work in its relationship with the audience and the environment, thus focusing on the
poetic and metaphorical aspects of the work (Penny 2000).
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but rather as one who tries to negotiate her way through trial and error, and exploration and
exploitation, in an interconnected network of both human and nonhuman agencies. In this regard,
I feel that the artist is ideally participating in the morphological evolution of her agents, yet is
keenly aware of her imperfect control over them, and in fact uses that awareness as a powerful
transformative instrument.
Adaptive Computation and Machine Learning provide ways for artists to design new behavioral
patterns, not by controlling each and every aspect of the outcomes, but rather by eﬀecting the
intentionality of agents who are then left out of any direct human control from either the authors
or the audience. Authorship thus becomes much more diﬀuse, and experiences are brought into a
domain of uncertainty that evokes the meeting of an alien form of life. Understanding these new
experiences and the practices they are associated with demands a change of perspective from both
the artists, the audience and the art institutions. Human-centered principles of control needs to
be replaced by a posthumanist view that takes better account of how both human and nonhuman





My intention is to let things be themselves.
– John Cage
Through this study, I set out to explore the concepts of adaptive systems and Machine Learning
in agent-based new media installations. The relevance of this pursuit is demonstrated by the
uniqueness of its subject of inquiry, the originality of its methods, and the signiﬁcance of the
questions it seeks to address in the ﬁeld of contemporary media art, as summarized by the following
premises:
1. Adaptation plays a central role in contemporary conceptions of life, bridging the gap between
self-organizing phenomena and living systems. Rooted in adaptive principles, the ﬁeld of
Machine Learning has been steadily growing in presence in the contemporary landscape of
computer science since the early 2000. After half a century of research, Machine Learning
ﬁnally seems to have succeeded in surpassing the popularity of rule-based approaches to AI.
2. Adaptation is a core principle that is necessary for understanding scientiﬁc and artistic prac-
tice. For example, Pickering’s concept of a “dance of agencies” and Xenakis’ notion of art-
science “alloys” both articulate adaptive as well as learning mechanisms that resonate with
work in Cybernetics, Artiﬁcial Life, and Machine Learning.
210
3. Because of its capacity to engage critically and creatively with matter and experience, art can
uniquely contribute to the understanding of these concepts, generating alternative narratives
and imaginary grounds for future learning agents.
4. There seems to be a discrepancy between, on the one hand, the growing importance of the
ﬁeld of Machine Learning in AI since the mid–1980s and, on the other hand, the relative
scarcity of artworks that make use of adaptive systems, not to mention the lack of both
practical and theoretical frameworks for understanding such works. The research described
in this dissertation provides historical context as well as practical information for addressing
this gap, for example by developing an aesthetics of adaptive behaviors as they appear in
embodied agent-based art installations.
Following the principles of art-as-research, the study also highlights my experiences employing
an iterative research-creation methodology inspired from Agile software design. Seeking the devel-
opment of new knowledge through the aggregation of material practice and theoretical analysis, I
opened up this research by examining the Absences series of experimental intervention in natural
settings from 2008 to 2011. I described how installing agents in hostile and changing environments
further highlights questions about adaptation, revealing the necessity of doing this research. As
a way of better framing these questions, I followed the entangled historical paths surrounding the
emergence and progress of Machine Learning and Adaptive Computation from the 1950s onward,
examining in particular their inﬂuence on the development of media art. In parallel, I examined
important concepts tied to these research strands, such as embodiment, enaction, coupling, au-
tonomy, emergence, self-organization, authorship, and performativity. Through this theoretical
research, augmented by reﬂexive accounts of practice derived from my experiences creating the art-
works Absences (2008—2011), Vessels (2010—2015), and N-Polytope (2012), I address the research
questions core to this research project:
1. What new forms of aesthetic experience do Machine Learning methods enable or make possible
when utilized outside of their intended context and are instead carried over into artistic works?
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2. What characterizes the practice of using adaptive computational methods in agent-based
artworks?
3. What kind of worldview are these works fostering?
7.1 Experience
One of the biggest challenges of this dissertation has been to extract speciﬁc, focused observations for
comprehending how human audiences experience the type of agent-based, adaptive computational
artistic installations which are the focus of this study. This pursuit is complicated by the fact that
art, and New Media art in particular, is extremely dense and diversiﬁed, and more often than not
involves a multiplicity of technological and artistic strategies. This situation makes it diﬃcult to
isolate the speciﬁc eﬀects associated to the use of Machine Learning techniques in their construction.
As a way to address the aesthetics of such systems, I considered their autonomous coupling with
the real world through the notion of enaction, which provides a model for understanding novelty and
meaning generation through an embodied agent’s interactions with its environment. I examined
how adaptation acts as the way by which self-organizing systems are able to generate novelty in the
work of Peter Cariani, and is therefore an important mechanism in the emergence of creativity and
life. Based on these ideas, I extend Simon Penny’s concept of “behavior aesthetics” by providing a
framework for understanding behaviors in terms of how their shapes evolve through time.
In this taxonomy, three kinds of behaviors were distinguished, namely: (1) mappings; (2) ﬁrst-
order behaviors; and (3) second-order behaviors, or metabehaviors. I claimed that adaptive and
evolutionary systems are the only ones capable of producing this third category, because their
behaviors themselves change over time according to an underlying metamorphic behavioral pattern.
While this does not make these systems aesthetically “better” than others, it reveals how adaptation
can generate diﬀerent kinds of experiences deeply tied to their temporal unfolding.
To describe the ways by which these behaviors transform through time, I reference the notions of
morphostasis, morphogenesis and metamorphosis. Behaviors of the ﬁrst order are purely morpho-
static: their shape does not change through time. Given enough time for their dynamic patterns to
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appear and repeat themselves, an external observer can recognize and familiarize themselves with
them. Contrary to these behaviors of the ﬁrst order, adaptive behaviors usually oscillate between
periods of morphogenesis/metamorphosis and morphostasis as they adjust to their environment. If
the environment and the goals they are trying to meet remain stable, they will eventually stabilize
in a morphostatic behavior of the ﬁrst order, until the conditions change again.
As such, the complexity of the self-organizing circuits that are trained in Machine Learning
algorithms lay beyond human comprehension. This is especially true in neural networks such as
MLPs, whose trained weights are diﬃcult, if not impossible, to interpret by human beings (d’Avila
Garcez, Broda, and Gabbay 2001). Adrian Thompson’s mid–1990s experiment with a genetically
trained programmable circuit described in section 6.4, is an excellent example of that problem.
Once the FGPA was trained to distinguish between two audio frequencies, the scientist removed
the parts of the circuits that were completely disconnected from the inputs and outputs, thinking
that there was no possibility they could logically be involved in the computation. However, he
realized that by doing so he destroyed the functionality of the system, which had learned to make
use of the analogic variations induced on the signal through the disconnected yet physically present
parts of the circuit.
The second-order behaviors induced by adaptive systems, combined with the inability of humans
to understand their structural organization, are two important features of such systems. This may
explain why audiences subjected to such works are often mesmerized by their uncanniness, as they
are never able to settle on a familiar, recognizable morphology in the behaviors that unfold before
their eyes. This is why these works require a period of adjustment from the audience, as only by
spending time with the piece can they really begin “knowing” its behavior. This knowledge of the
work is not one that of speciﬁc logical processes, but rather a knowledge of generalized behavior
that one might become acclimated and perhaps become close to.
This process usually takes time and cannot be described using technical or precise languages, not
even by the artist who designed it. Adaptive systems are thus evocative of alien agencies, of lifelike
processes from another world: observing these behaviors is an underdetermined, subconscious,
concretely unexplainable experience. What it implies aesthetically for both artist and audience is a
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certain loss of control in regards to plastic or logical footholds for aesthetic experience, and instead
that the aesthetics might be found in behavioral patterns that evolve following rules that cannot
be pointed to directly, but felt through one’s own adaptive body.
7.2 Practice
As a ﬁrst step in understanding the artistic implications of working with Machine Learning, I
examined scientiﬁc deﬁnitions of Machine Learning. I looked at how the diﬀerent components of
a learning algorithms can be exploited by artists, namely: (1) models; (2) optimization procedure;
(3) evaluation function; and (4) training data. I used this format to demonstrate how artists could
work with ML methods to build self-organizing behaviors by focusing on each of these constituents
as aspects of creation.
An important aspect of artmaking with ML that constantly resurfaces is the relationship between
the complexity of the problem to solve, the capacity of the model (i.e., the number of free parameters
that can be adjusted, such as weights in a neural network or DNA bits in genetic algorithms), the
number of input and output dimensions and the quantity of data points available to the system.
To make a long story short, complex problems usually require bigger and more powerful models,
which in turn require more data. A direct consequence for artmaking is that, if one wants to
generate an adaptive behavior happening in real-time through an embodied agent, she must either
make the problem simple, or allow the agent to learn over a longer period of time. Even relatively
simple problems can extend beyond the timeframe characteristic of New Media art presentation
opportunities : problems can take days, weeks, or even years to solve.
These time constraints therefore complicate the trial-and-error process usually involved in the
creation of such behaviors in New Media artwork,1 which necessitates a certain loss of control. It
is often impossible to have the system behave exactly the way it was imagined, and therefore the
artist is often at the mercy of the very same system that she is designing.
Machine Learning oﬀers a framework for working more eﬃciently with self-organizing systems, a
1Imagine having to wait for a year before verifying that an agent has learned something aesthetically satisfying,
only to realize there was a bug in the system or that some other adjustment is required.
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set of tools for “shaping” agents by assigning them goals and desires. Machine Learning thus holds
the potential to facilitate the development of emergent systems when compared with “bottom-up”
approaches such as those of ALife. Yet, in no way does it preclude the process of trial-and-error
that one goes through when making art. In a way, the process is even more antagonistic than in
more traditional artforms, because on the one hand, the artist often wants these systems to surprise
even herself, to become alive, so to speak, independent of one’s control; yet at the same time, as an
artist, one wants to create certain eﬀects, and the more the systems become alive and autonomous,
the more they might drift away from one’s will and generate patterns that might be diﬃcult to
understand.
Perhaps a solution to this conundrum is to accept that one cannot have both autonomy over
these processes and command them at the same time. So in the end the creative process demands
that one let down their guard and accommodate themselves to these processes, let the Machine
Learning agents “be themselves”, and then get to know them, and be changed by them. This is, of
course, easier said than done, but my hope is that the accounts of practice and the various tools
presented in this research help facilitate this process for artists wishing to work with adaptive and
evolutive agents.
7.3 Worldview
This loss of control is key to the development of a posthumanist perspective over art and science
in the 21st century. Adaptive behaviors suggest an alternative path between the mythical ﬁgure of
the artistic genius who selects the “right” processes, and the capitalist utopia of artiﬁcial creativity.
They ask for a new way to look at our relationship with other forms of agency.
Furthermore, the use of Machine Learning agents in artistic practice demands of artists and
audiences alike to examine and perhaps revise their expectations about information, control, and
time in regards to technologies themselves. The kind of artworks described in this thesis do not
provide any information, they drift in and out of everybody’s control, and they deploy over very
diverse time spans. This suggests that the media demands new ways for relating to art, science,
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and life, beyond the consumerist, tractable, and eﬃcient forms the Western world has become
so accustomed to in technological interactions, towards undetermined, incontrollable, mutating,
non-optimizable processes which have a true potential for change.
Peter Cariani’s theory of biological semiotics, described above, highlights the profound adaptive
nature of emergent behaviors in both living and computational systems. His characterization of
the relationship between emergence, adaptation, and the production of novelty in such systems
resonates directly with Andrew Pickering’s perspective. Pickering describes how systems faced with
a changing environment that becomes incompatible with their model of the world (resistance) have
to adapt by redeﬁning themselves (accommodation), thus suddenly diverging from their expected
behavior.
Pickering turns to early British Cybernetics to ﬁnd an alternative way to do science, in a way
that both engages directly with matter and might fully embrace the indeterminate and muddy
characters of research. From this, he developed the idea that scientiﬁc practice should be seen as
an ongoing interaction between human and nonhuman agents, a “dance of agencies”, considering
scientiﬁc practice in a way which is decentered from the human subject. Pickering’s view of scientiﬁc
research might also suggest a means of addressing the demands placed on audiences and institutions
by emergent technologies in 21st century New Media art. The complexities of adaptive systems can
shed new insights on the relationalities between the artist, the audience, and the artworks. They
demand from art theories that are able to account for the various human-machine interplays that
happen in making and presenting art. In the context of agent-based systems, this suggests the artist
should be considered not so much as the commander of her work, but rather as a collaborator with
human and nonhuman agencies that literally develop the artistic object into its own intersubjective
becoming.2
2In particular, this further undermines the romantic ﬁgure of the solo artist, which has been put into question by
modern art but is still pervasive in the popular imagination.
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7.4 Implications
The theoretical and practical implication of this resonate across multiple ﬁelds of research in the
humanities. First and foremost, this research engages with contemporary discourses of computa-
tional and robotic systems in media art and STS by clearly articulating the power of adaptive and
learning systems and behaviors within larger historical and conceptual frameworks. My research
uniquely traces the impact of these concepts of adaptation through the history of both science
and art alike since the post-war era. It shows the active part played by Machine Learning and
Adaptive Computation in the history of Artiﬁcial Intelligence — a role that seems to be growing
exponentially in the past decade — while simultaneously demonstrating its impacts in media art.
This historical study of adaptive agents has led me to develop a framework to help art theorists
and practitioners come to a more cohesive understanding of behavioral aesthetics in agent-based
artworks. The proposed taxonomy diﬀerentiates “mappings” from behaviors, and suggests a special
category for the kind of “metabehaviors” produced by self-organizing systems in general (and adap-
tive systems in particular). I believe that this system might help one to better deﬁne behaviors of
Machine Learning agents, taking into account the imagined perspective of an external observer that
perceives recognizable patterns performed in the agent. I suggested the concepts of morphogenesis,
metamorphosis and morphostasis, borrowed from biology, to describe the way such second-order
behaviors change shape through time.
By bringing these conceptual tools into the contemporary discourse of media art, my goal is to
provide artists and theorists with ways to imagine, express, discuss, and criticize works of art that
makes use of computational (or computationally-inspired) processes. In particular, my research on
adaptive and self-organizing systems suggests that emerging, more revolutionary forms of art are
made possible through the use of agent-based systems that perform behaviors of higher order. It
supports and extends the idea that artiﬁcial agencies described by STS scholars such as Pickering
(early Cybernetics systems such as Ashby’s homeostat and Walter’s tortoises) oﬀer the possibility
of a new range of experiential eﬀects through the deployment of behavioral patterns that evoke our
own complexity, imperfections, and indeterminacy as embodied, living beings performing in the
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world.
Yet, it also suggests that the new media art scene might not be currently accustomed to works
with highly adaptive systems, as new media art has developed as a ﬁeld largely through exhibition
contexts and festivals that acclimatize its audiences with mapping and clearly deﬁned procedural
operations. As such, artists working with adaptive systems might perhaps ﬁnd more ready contexts
for their practice by working within more traditional art networks that have long accepted subtle,
long performance of embodied practice as deﬁning aspects of their history: performance art, envi-
ronmental art, and perhaps relational aesthetics. The other option is that institutions presenting
digital artworks could adapt in order to allow for these works to be presented under the right con-
ditions, to educate and develop the public into getting in the good state of mind to appreciate these
works.
As adaptive systems have increasingly become instruments of total control in contemporary
capitalism under the regime of “big data”, artists could perhaps subvert this idea of control and
authorial command into creating technologies of unseated becoming and subjecthood. In particular,
there is a way by which the lifelike behaviors of Machine Learning can become a space of emancipa-
tion from the art-as-object commodity drive of capitalism: if audiences are ready to accept artworks
“as themselves”, the objects as a relational locus can provide a means of artistic interaction that
resist logics of ownership and authorial control.
Further to the consideration of digital art, this study points to the need for a reconsideration
of how artists are conceived of. If we admit that art has “never been modern”, that it is a blurry,
muddy, performative dance that engages many agents, then the ﬁgure of the solo artist should hold
less sway. If practitioners want to truly understand how art and science can work together in the
creation of new aesthetic experiences, one has to also recognize how she is embedded in a network
of agencies that include signiﬁcant economic and political asymetries in a 21st century neoliberal
context.
This in turn suggests a call for the deconstruction of the traditional notions of the solo authorial
artist in favor of models that actively embrace collaboration and multiple authoring as aspects of
contemporary creation, perhaps even assuming the model of the sciences in favor of formalized
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systems for co-authorship.
The relationship between arts and sciences cannot be conceived of any long as “pure” in a
modernist sense — because they never were, as anthropologist of science would claim (Latour
1991) — but should rather be seen as human activities embedded in speciﬁc networks and ways of
doing — engaged in material practice, negotiating with agents in an adaptive fashion, transforming
themselves as much as they transform the agents they are working with. Media art in particular is
hybridized, and for some artists, the practices of science and art are increasingly intertwined.
7.5 Limitations
This study of course is conducted in recognition of many limitations: I will hereby only discuss at
length the limitations that have the strongest impact on the quality of current ﬁndings.
First, this research is based on the important premise that the choice of a particular algorithm
to control the behavior of an agent has a direct impact on how it is experienced by the viewer.
While the aesthetic framework that I introduced in this dissertation has the advantage of clarifying
some of the conceptual and formal aspects of behavior as a medium for artmaking, the research
did not go as in-depth as it could have in understanding the role of the observers in the process.
Whether one uses mappings, ﬁrst-order and/or second-order behaviors as part of an agent-based
installation, the experience of the work can never be separated from the intricate relationships that
are established between the viewers, the work, and the environment.
While much attention has been placed on understanding the intrinsic characteristics of learning
algorithms and the evolution of their morphologies, the role of the observer in this process has been
comparably asymmetric. It is still not clear how the usage of Machine Learning, as opposed to
more simple techniques from Cybernetics or GOFAI for example, really make a diﬀerence when it
comes to audiences—the development of large scale qualitative and quantitative research in this
regard is outside the scope of this thesis.
The second major limitation of this research is the weakness of its methodology when it comes
to evaluating the public response to adaptive works. Indeed, the ﬁrst limitation is in large parts a
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consequence of this methodological ﬂaw. My examination of these reactions could have been more
objective and better documented, for example through a more thorough qualitative study.
More generally, the focus on algorithms over human interactions characterizes an important
shortcoming, a lack of languages on behalf of researcher and audiences alike for how these computationally-
generated behaviors are received beyond a vague sense of “lifelikeness” and “uncanniness”. These
relationships between artwork and observer are subjectively encountered, as it is only the observers
themselves that have the power to assign agency to things around them. Social robotics expert
Cynthia Breazeal considers that making artiﬁcial agents autonomous does not make them “suﬃ-
ciently life-like”, and argues that believability is an important aspect in the design of social robotic
agents because it projects the “illusion of life” and gives the agent a personality (Breazeal 2002, 8).
In this light, the revolutionary nature of this work only holds if it is capable of inspiring a consistent
social impact. While this is true of most forms of experimental art, it is still premature to make
statements of the eﬀects of these works on audiences who are still developing.
Moving on, the artistic projects that I analyzed were complex assemblages of diﬀerent tech-
nologies and physical objects, making it diﬃcult to precisely analyze the impact of the algorithms
used because they were intertwined with the aesthetics of their physical form as well as with other
sensory media. A more systematic set of experiments, where one could isolate the algorithms and
compare their eﬀect in front of an audience, could have been beneﬁcial in trying to tackle the
aesthetic question.
The third main weakness of this study lies in the fact that I feel like I have only scratched the
surface in regards to the establishment of a wider aesthetic worldview. It is still not clear how one
can imagine a new relationship between art and science through a nonmodern ontology. Does the
performative nature of practice adequate insist on a deconstruction of the frontier separating art and
science? How do adaptive systems, and in particular connectionist and deep learning architectures,
challenge both computationalism and enactivism in their conception of cognition, and how does
this aﬀect our view about representation and embodiment in art and science practices? How is
indeterminacy connected to such a performative worldview? There are only a few of the many
questions that still remain to be explored.
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7.6 Future Work
The results of the study as well as its limitations suggest a number of future projects that could
address the study’s shortcomings, as well as extend its ﬁndings. Improved research approaches need
to be enacted for addressing questions of experience and practice in audience members. Can we
assess of human experience, and how? How to evaluate artiﬁcial agency and behavior morphologies
from the audience’s perspective?
The evaluation of experience presents important challenges. First, the concept of human experi-
ence itself is equivocal. When we use the term “human experience”, I consider, along with thinkers
like David Chalmers and Stevan Harnad, that we often conﬂate two distinct notions (Chalmers
1997; Harnad 2000). One meaning of “experience” refers to the set of functional, causal, and possi-
bly observable events happening in the physical world during consciousness. For example, when we
describe an experience using human language, or when we measure it using data such as biosignals,
interviews, or questionnaires, or otherwise employ measures that seem to presuppose rules or gen-
eral principles of human perception, we are referring to this tangible aspect of experience, which I
will refer to as “experience-as-function”.
The other meaning of experience concerns the phenomenal feelings associated with such events,
only accessible by the conscious subject living through them (“experience-as-feeling”). One of the
most fascinating characteristics of the world we live in is that, even though felt experience does
not seem to be playing any causal role in it, the only thing we can truly know for certain is, as
Descartes rightfully claims, that we are feeling. Yet, another fundamental principle of our universe
known as the “other minds problem” is that we can only feel our own experience of the world: we
do not have access to the felt experience of other bodies (Harnad 1991).
It is hence impossible to evaluate someone’s felt experience, because measurement can only be
done using a third person’s perspective, which is forbidden by laws of our universe. Yet, unless
one delves into solipsism, it is rational to assume that similar bodies, because they have close
physical properties, when placed in the same context, subjected to the same conditions, and aﬀected
physically in similar ways, will likely feel something analogous.
221
This correlation existing between function and feeling is what allows us to use diﬀerent method-
ological approaches to measure experience-as-function. A number of strategies have been deployed
in the ﬁelds of user experience (UX) and human-computer interaction (HCI) that might be of in-
terest. Each evaluation method, however, has its drawbacks: for example, if we ask the subject to
describe her experience while she is living them, this will aﬀect her experience, while if we ask her
after, she might not be able to recollect fully how she felt.3
Thus, it is possible to evaluate human experience in works of art, assuming we understand
that (1) what we measure belongs to experience-as-function, that (2) any measurement will be
imperfect and incomplete, and (3) that any instrument we use for observing the subject will impact
her experience and how she reports it. Experience is highly context-dependent, subjective, and
dynamic (Law et al. 2009). The best approaches need to take into account the context of the work,
in order to both limit the impact of the measurement method on the lived experience while getting
the best results, and also to facilitate the establishment of correlations by subjecting audience
members to a similar range of media events. This is very hard to do because works of art often
have open-ended contexts, and the human subjects that see the work of art are subjected to many
incontrollable aﬀects that might be completely independent of the work itself.
Consider, for example, how evaluation of audience’s experience could be implemented in the
cases of Vessels and N-Polytope. These two works have two completely diﬀerent contexts. Vessels
is designed as a public artwork where a mixed audience of passers-by as well as a targeted audience
can observe the ongoing spectacle of a community of artiﬁcial beings in public space. N-Polytope, in
comparison, is designed for indoor presentation as an immersive experience that engulfs the whole
experience of the audience members present. The piece also oscillates between an ambient mode
and a performative mode (which contains a narrative progression).
UX metrics are traditionally categorized as either external (i.e., based on observations from an
external examiner) or internal (i.e., generated by the user’s own observations over her experience).4
3Francisco J. Varela has proposed a set of neurophenomenological methodologies that try to bridge the gap
between ﬁrst-person and third-person accounts of experience, but I do not ﬁnd his argumentation satisfying (Varela
and Shear 1999).
4Importantly, even “internal” methodologies cannot access felt experience directly: they only provide descriptions
of these experiences, through the vantage point of the subject living them.
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External evaluation methods would be unlikely to provide useful data in N-Polytope because very
few observable events usually happen that could give hints about the user’s experience. In the case
of Vessels, it might be useful to use video and audio recordings to observe spectator placements
and movements around the robots as well as conversations between them.
One category of internal methods that could work well for both N-Polytope as well as Vessels is
the thinking aloud method, (Lewis 1982) where users are provided with a microphone and asked to
describe their experience in real-time, in their own words. Since in both cases we not only want to
collect information about the audience’s global experience, but rather how the diﬀerent behavioral
patterns generated by the works comes to aﬀect this experience in real-time, it would be useful
to use some form of recording as a reference frame for both internal and external data gathering
methods.
For example, in the case of N-Polytope, we could align the think-aloud session with the message
cues sent by the software running the show. This way, we could know, for example, how the
spectator reacts when the “ﬁreﬂies” or the “chasers” patterns begin and end. In the case of Vessels,
since there is no centralized system that sends the triggers, a video recording, as suggested earlier,
would suﬃce to align the robotic behavioral happenings with the spectator’s reaction.
Semi-structured interviews (Edwards and Holland 2013, 2—3) would also be an interesting
method of measurement applicable to both cases, allowing the interviewer to investigate speciﬁc
questions while leaving space to allow for unforeseen ideas to ﬂow during the conversation. In
particular, such techniques would be useful for Vessels because they could be applied more easily
to the input of passersby — for whom it might be impractical to ask to be hooked up with a
microphone for a think-aloud session. These interviews could be run on the spot with voluntary
visitors, interrogating them on their experience while promoting dialogue with groups (e.g., families,
couples, friends). For N-Polytope, it would be better that these interviews be made retrospectively,
to allow visitors the opportunity to experience the sensory experience without interruption.
An interesting, complementary approach called experience workshops is described in Edmonds,
Bilda, and Muller (2009). It involves bringing together a small group of experts from various ﬁelds
of study in arts, social sciences, HCI, etc. After experiencing the work on their own, the group
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meets and each participant describes her experience, while the others take notes. They then work
together on a set of questions about the work and generate a report.
New experiences need to be designed in order to better understand how people experience diﬀer-
ent orders and types of behaviors. Vessels and N-Polytope are aesthetically complex works, making
it diﬃcult to separate the inﬂuence of the behavioral patterns from the other media components
such as sound and light. It would be useful to design speciﬁc experiences where (1) users would be
confronted more speciﬁcally with the diﬀerent types of behaviors, while keeping the media elements
stable; and (2) another set experiences where the behaviors are kept stable but are realized through
diﬀerent kinds of media.
The appropriateness of diﬀerent contexts for presenting agent-based works needs to be more
thoroughly studied, perhaps by comparing the experience of a work when it is presented inside a
traditional art venue, a new media festival, in public space, or in a semi-private space (such as a
workplace that would share its audience’s everyday life). More research also needs to be conducted
adressing issues of duration, such as examining the audience’s experience of adaptiebehaviors over
diﬀerent time spans. In relation to these questions, I would like to continue to explore the work
that has been done in the ﬁeld of social robotics.
An area I am interested in exploring further is the tension between a computationalist/representativist
and performative/enactivist worldview. While I agree in most part with critiques of computation-
alism, I ﬁnd the enactivist model to be limited. Like Harnad, I think that representations exist
in the brain and play an important part in cognition, however, these representations are not, like
the computationalists claim, pure symbols independent from a physical substrate, but are rather
grounded in the body (through connectionist networks). I am interested in what the latest devel-
opments in representational learning and deep learning can contribute to this inquiry, and would
like to explore these systems as part of agent-based installations to understand better how these
notions interplay.
Finally, in terms of practice, there are a number of diﬀerent artistic strategies that need to be
further explored. Firstly, the idea of agent “shaping”, where an agent is trained by the artist to
give its behavior the shape he wants through direct feedback, is particularly worthy of attention.
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One can imagine, for example, a robot that interacts in its environment; the artist observes it and
can, through a remote control, give it positive or negative rewards depending on its actions, until
the robot reaches a certain kind of behavior.
Secondly, as a strategy for reducing the time span taken by an agent to stabilize into a learned
behavior, I would like to experiment with pre-training systems over a problem, saving the model’s
state regularly. This would generate a sequence of states representing the diﬀerent stages of learning
the agent has been through. For example, if the learning process takes a month, we could save one
version of the weights every day, yielding thirty (30) sequential sets of parameters, going from the
initial state to the fully adapted state. Once in the gallery space, this process could be accelerated
by sequentially switching from one set of weights to the next, but clearly at a more rapid timescale.
For instance, one could run through a sequence by loading a set of weights every 20 seconds, allowing
the audience to see the adaptive procedure over a span of about 10 minutes.
Thirdly, I am interested in further exploring the idea of bidirectional coupling, the idea that
an adaptive agent is diﬀerent from an inanimate tool (such as a cane) because not only can it
be “ready-to-hand” for a human user, it can also make the human user ready to its hand, so to
speak. In that respect, I am interested in developing artistic agents that could live with a human
for a while so that a symbiotic, bidirectional coupling could start to emerge between them. (I
have already started working on this with a lamp project). In particular, I am interested in the
relationships a human could develop with such a system, which could become an imprint of the
human user’s own behavior. The agent’s adaptive features, when placed in an environment over a
long time, could have some kind of historical capacity, not so much in terms of being a placeholder
for content, such as pictures or words, but rather in its retention of a certain behavior and its
aptitude to recognize. When interacting, both human and non-human agents would adapt to each
other and, in the process, become attuned to one another. Thus, after a period of separation, when
the two met again (provided that they did not change too much in the mean time) there could be
a possibility that they might recognize one another. What becomes even more powerful is that the
kind of interaction the prototype suggests oﬀers a ground for an historical-based social orientation,
where an object attuned to someone can interact with another person. The object is rather ﬂexible
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in regards to to the kind of environment it falls into: it can as well be used solely by a single person,
by two persons or by a group (eg. a family).
7.7 Final Thoughts
The advent of Machine Learning and its growing importance in the 21st century resonates with the
performative turn in humanities, as it suggests that machinic intelligence has less to do with logic
and rationality, and more with lifelike processes of self-organization that run beyond traditional
frameworks of representation. While the general public still perceives computers as things that
accumulate and manipulate data by applying logical rules, the artiﬁcial agents that will populate
our future seem more likely to be akin to biological forms than to advanced calculators. However,
the price to pay is that the behavior and data processing of these artiﬁcial “hybrids” might lay
beyond their users’ comprehension — even more opaque than the computers of today — as these
hypothetically adaptive devices would continuously come up with their own rules.
Artists have an important role to play in addressing these technologies beyond the applications
that science and industry suggest. The autonomy and indeterminacy of adaptive systems suggest
new ways to think about how to make art, how to experience art, and how the artistic world works.
One strategy might be to go back to the experiments of early British cyberneticians, enacting
a newly retro genre of performative science. In some ways, art might be more protected from
neoliberal funding models that currently dominate scientiﬁc research, allowing artists to address
blind spots left in the wake of an increasingly homogenic socio-economic scientiﬁc research culture.
My ambition is that my own research presented in this thesis will allow artists and theorists to
understand better the tensions between art and science in the ﬁeld of AI, the role adaptation plays
as a concept in these relationships, and show how artists can reemploy, exploit, and reappropriate
techniques developed by science to create new aeshethic morphologies, just as Xenakis did decades
ago when he used stochastics to generate new forms of music. I hope that this study, as well as my
artistic practice, can actively participate to the development of this endeavor.
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Online Documentation of Works
This appendix presents web-accessible documentation of a sample of my work involving adaptive




Description of work: Absences is an intervention project that involves electronic devices installed
in outdoor environments. Taking shape at the frontier of new media and environmental art, it pro-
poses a meditation on solitude and association, interaction and adaptation, natural and artiﬁcial,
biological and inanimate. Each intervention consists in the creation and installation of autonomous
electronic devices in various ecosystems. These artiﬁcial agents act within their speciﬁc environ-
ment. The project is created as an ongoing, residency-based process which was largely site-speciﬁc,
each context contributing to the conceptual and technical development of the work.
Link to work description: http://sofianaudry.com/en/works/absences1
Link to project’s blog: http://absences.sofianaudry.com
Duration of video: 3:25
Link to video: https://vimeo.com/41576835
1Links to video documentation of individual projects are available at the bottom of this page.
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A.2 Vessels (2010–2015)
Creators: Soﬁan Audry, Stephen Kelly, and Samuel St-Aubin2
Description of work: Vessels is a robotic installation consisting of large groups of autonomous
water vehicles. The robotic agents interact with each other and their environment to form a simple
ecosystem. Their collective, emergent behavior resembles the social interactions in a community
of living creatures. Observers may empathize with the robots’ behaviors, ascribe intentions and
motivations to their actions, and/or draw correlations between the group dynamic and unseen
characteristics of their milieu.
Link to project’s website: http://vessels.perte-de-signal.org
Duration of video: 2:34
Link to video: https://vimeo.com/137104837
2Special collaboration: Adam Kelly.
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A.3 N-Polytope (2012)
Creators: Chris Salter, Soﬁan Audry, Marije Baaldman, Adam Basanta, Elio Bidinost, and
Thomas Spier
Description of work: N-Polytope: Behaviors in Light and Sound After Iannis Xenakis** is a
spectacular light and sound performance-installation combining cutting edge lighting, lasers, sound,
sensing and Machine Learning software inspired by composer Iannis Xenakis’s radical 1960s- 1970s
works named Polytopes (from the Greek ‘poly’, many and ‘topos’, space). As large scale, immersive
architectural environments that made the indeterminate and chaotic patterns and behaviour of
natural phenomena experiential through the temporal dynamics of light and the spatial dynamics
of sound, the Polytopes still to this day are relatively unknown but were far ahead of their time.
N-Polytope is based on the attempt to both re-imagine Xenakis’ work with probabilistic/stochastic
systems with new techniques as well as to explore how these techniques can exemplify our own
historical moment of extreme instability.
Link to work description: http://chrissalter.com/projects/n-polytope-behaviors-in-light-and-sound-after-
Duration of video: 1:56
Link to video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hxYJxwfnACU
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A.4 Archipelago (2014)
Creators: Soﬁan Audry and Samuel St-Aubin
Description of work: Archipelago is an interactive audio work involving a group of small electronic
modules. The modules emit sounds reminiscent of ﬁctitious birds singing. The songs emitted by
the devices evolve during the course of the exhibition using genetic algorithms. Furthermore, they
respond to infrared signals, allowing visitors to interact with them using remote controls brought
from home or borrowed at the center. The coded messages sent by the remote interrupt and change
the songs through crossovers and mutations.
Link to work description: http://sofianaudry.com/en/works/archipelago
Duration of video: 1:08




Description of work: Plasmosis is a site-speciﬁc, underwater, artiﬁcial life installation. It was
installed at the marina of Carleton-sur-Mer (Quebec, Canada) during the Summer 2013. An arti-
ﬁcial entity, it interacts in the aquatic environment through multiple sensors, adapting over time
to the diﬀerent natural movements that surround it. The work is thus as a passageway between
two worlds: that of air, and that of water. Situated at the point of phase change between liquid
and gas, it allows the visitor to exist for a time between these two worlds, to assess their shape,
density, temporality and limits. It raises questions about our relationship to the maritime area and
its ecosystems.
Link to work description: http://sofianaudry.com/en/works/plasmosis
Duration of video: 3:46
Link to video: https://vimeo.com/86963195
3Electronic and material design: Samuel St-Aubin.
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A.6 Accrochages (2008)
Creators: Soﬁan Audry and Samuel St-Aubin
Description of work: Accrochages is a urban electronic intervention project by Montreal-based
artists Soﬁan Audry and Samuel St-Aubin. It stems from their will to bring their art practice out
of the walls of a gallery space, on the walls of the city itself. The intent is to build small active and
autonomous objects that can, through simple means, give new qualities to the city environment by
creating diﬀerent interactive situations.
Link to work description: http://sofianaudry.com/en/works/accrochages
Link to project’s blog: http://accrochages.drone.ws
Duration of video: 3:39




Description of work: Vévé proposes an environment in which the visitor interacts with textual
entities through written speech. By taking part in a conversation based on exchange of atomic
words, the visitor contributes to the construction of these artiﬁcial beings: she teaches them new
words, but also new semantic links. Through these poetic dialogues, the entities evolve as their
behavior is shaped by interaction with their human counterparts. But there is still place for trials,
errors and novelties: in this allegorical space, the artiﬁcial creatures often seem to act with their
own free will.
Link to work description: http://sofianaudry.com/en/works/veve
Link to work: http://veve.sofianaudry.com




Description of work: Flag is an interactive dictionary of given names and identities. It allows
the visitor to participate by adding his own name and identity to the database. He can also create
new names/identities through an evolutionary algorithm. When a visitor wants to add his name
to the dictionary, the system asks him to ﬁll out a form about his identity. The form compels the
visitor to choose among a limited set of categories and traits, shaping his identity into a socially
acceptable, standardized format. Getting back to the evolutionary analogy, if the name acts as the
genetic code of the visitor, the traits that form his social deﬁnition would be his phenotype. By
using artiﬁcial recombinations, mutations and crossovers through an evolutionary algorithm, the
visitor can then create oﬀspring of his own name or others’. These oﬀsprings’ identity traits are
recombined and mutated versions of their parents.
Link to work description: http://sofianaudry.com/en/works/flag
Duration of video: 3:30




Description of work: CHARACTERS is an interactive dictionary of given names and identities.
It allows the visitor to participate by adding his own name and identity to the database. He can also
create new names/identities through an evolutionary algorithm. When a visitor wants to add his
name to the dictionary, the system asks him to ﬁll out a form about his identity. The form compels
the visitor to choose among a limited set of categories and traits, shaping his identity into a socially
acceptable, standardized format. Getting back to the evolutionary analogy, if the name acts as the
genetic code of the visitor, the traits that form his social deﬁnition would be his phenotype. By
using artiﬁcial recombinations, mutations and crossovers through an evolutionary algorithm, the
visitor can then create oﬀspring of his own name or others’. These oﬀsprings’ identity traits are
recombined and mutated versions of their parents.
Link to work description: http://sofianaudry.com/en/works/characters




This appendix contains full-page reproductions of works discussed in this research.
259
Trace L (2007). With Jonathan Villeneuve, in collaboration with Myriam Bessette. Photo by Alexis Bellavance.
Trace V (2007). With Jonathan Villeneuve. Photo by Alexis Bellavance.
Trace S (2008). With Jonathan Villeneuve. Photo by Alexis Bellavance.
Drift (2007), V2 Institute for the Unstable Media (Rotterdam, Netherlands). Photo by Soﬁan Audry.






Vessels, LABoral (Gijón, Spain) (2013). Photo by Beatriz Orviz.
Vessels, L’Ososphère (Strasbourg, France) (2015). Photo by Philippe Groslier.
Vessels, Nuit Blanche (Montréal, Canada) (2016) Photo by Catherine Aboumrad.
N-Polytope, LABoral (Gijón, Spain) (2012). Photo by Thomas Spier.
N-Polytope, LABoral (Gijón, Spain) (2012). Photo by Thomas Spier.
N-Polytope, Darling Foundry (Montréal, Canada) (2014). Photo by Thomas Spier.
N-Polytope, Darling Foundry (Montréal, Canada) (2014). Photo by Thomas Spier.
N-Polytope, Vitra Design Museum (Weil am Rhein, Germany) (2014). Photo by Thomas Spier.
N-Polytope, Nuit Blanche (Paris, France) (2015). Photo by Thomas Spier.
Archipelago, L’Imagier (Gatineau, Canada) (2014).
Plasmosis (2013) (Carleton-sur-Mer, Canada).
Plasmosis (2013) (Carleton-sur-Mer, Canada).
Plasmosis (2013) (Carleton-sur-Mer, Canada).
Plasmosis (2013) (Carleton-sur-Mer, Canada).
